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Chapter 1
Introduction
In this thesis, several markets are analyzed in which firms are not able to
produce to order; instead, they can only sell what they already have in stock.
The reasons for a firm not to be able to produce to order can be numerous.
The most common one is that a firm does not produce the good itself, but
buys it from a third-party, and the delivery of a new order takes time. Or the
firm does produce its own goods, but it takes time to start up the machines
and produce a new batch. Producing/purchasing products in advance limits
the quantity output choices of a firm (and its possible competitors), which
has an effect on the revenue, prices and competition-level - if multiple firms
supply the market.
That the extent to which firms are flexible in their price and output de-
cisions has a big effect on the market outcome, has been a topic of interest
of economists for many years. Already in 1838, Auguste Cournot described
two firms competing in the sales of a homogeneous good. In the model, tak-
ing its competitor’s output as given, a firm chooses its quantity output to
maximize profits. The price for which the good is eventually sold is the mar-
ket clearing price. It turns out that in Cournot’s model, both firms make a
strictly positive profit. Joseph Bertrand, in 1883, criticized this model. He
claimed that, since the firms sell exactly the same product, the only thing
that is important for consumers is the price of this product. The firm that
sells it for the lowest price shall accordingly get all of the market demand.
Therefore, in his model, the firms compete in price, not in quantity. Given
that its competitor prices above its marginal costs, a firm will slightly un-
dercut this price and thereby serve the whole market. Since this holds for
both the firms, it turns out that in the end, both firms will set a price that
Chapter 1. Introduction
is exactly equal to marginal costs and make zero profit (given that marginal
costs are constant and equal for both firms). Both the models and their re-
sults, Cournot’s as well as Bertrand’s, can easily be extended from duopoly
to oligopoly.
The difference in firm profits between the models has stirred up the dis-
cussion about which of the two is the more accurate one - do firms compete in
quantity or in price? This question is not easily answered and depends very
much on the market where the competition takes place. If quantity output
decisions cannot be changed in the short-run, the extra demand that a firm
gains from undercutting its competitors in price, will go to waste. On the
other hand, if a firm can easily serve the extra demand gained from cutting
in price, it will be appealing to do so. In sum, how easily a firm can adjust
or renew the quantity of the product it is selling, will have a big influence on
its profits.
In some markets, firms may only to some extent be flexible in their quan-
tity decisions in the short-run. Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) described
a duopoly in which firms first have to invest in capacity, after which they
compete in price. Under certain assumptions, they find that in their model
price competition actually leads to Cournot outcomes, thereby bridging the
gap between Bertrand and Cournot’s models. In other settings, flexibility
in quantity setting is restricted by assuming that firms have to deal with a
given capacity constraint. Up to the constraint, they can easily adjust their
output, but supplying more than their capacity limit is infinitely costly. In
most models analyzed in the literature, the firms all face the same capacity
constraint. The analysis increases quickly in complexity if firms face indi-
vidual capacity constraints. Therefore, individual capacity constraints are
usually used only in models with at most two firms. If there is no firm for
whom it holds that its competitor(s) together can supply the whole market
demand when price is equal to marginal costs, all firms expect a strictly
positive profit when competing in price. This is shown in a simple model
by Levitan and Shubik (1972), and has been extended by Allen and Hellwig
(1993) and Osborne and Pitchik (1986).
Another method that has been used to overcome the differences in out-
comes between the two models, is to find an intermediate model. In the
last two decades, a strand of literature has appeared in which some of the
firms compete in price and others in quantity.1 The common factor in all
1Examples of articles in which a simultaneous price and quantity competition is analyzed
in a homogeneous framework are Allen (1992) and Qin and Stuart (1997).
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the models described in the last three paragraphs is that less flexibility in
output decisions leads to less severe competition and therefore an increase
in profits.
Flexibility in quantity decisions does not only effect market outcomes in
competition, but also has an effect on the opportunities to collude between
firms. Collusion is not possible if the firms only meet for one single period.
The reason for that is that a firm that defects in that period, cannot be pun-
ished for it by its competitors afterwards. Ergo, every firm has an incentive
to defect. However, this changes when market contact takes place an infi-
nite amount of times - or, as it can be interpreted in practice, the firms have
no idea when market contact will come to an end. If future profits are valu-
able enough and firms are not limited in their choice of capacity, it is a well
known result that any price between the competitive price and the monopoly
price can be colluded on. This is because the gain in profit from defecting one
period cannot make up for the future losses caused by the breakdown of col-
lusion. However, if a firm faces a restrictive capacity constraint, defecting
from the collusive price is less profitable, since it cannot supply the whole
market demand for the lower price it defects with. On the other hand, if
its competitors together do not have enough capacity to serve the market at
the competitive price, the future losses caused by the breakdown of collusion
are also less severe. Both these effects influence the likeliness that collusion
will actually take place. If competitors collude explicitly on one or several of
their strategic variables, this agreement is also called a cartel.
When analyzing the effect of quantity limitations, the market structure
cannot be neglected. Amonopolist needs only to consider how its own output
choices today will influence its set of possibilities tomorrow, the day after to-
morrow, etcetera. It does not gain any extra profit from a less severe compe-
tition, since there is none. Firms that operate on a duopolistic or oligopolistic
market need to consider that as well, but take into account at the same time
how their current output choices will influence the future output choices of
their competitors.
A fixed per-period capacity constraint is not the only way in which firms
can be limited in their quantity flexibility. In some models, like in Benoit
and Krishna (1987), firms can invest in capacity accumulation. Or there
is one pool from which all firms extract their resource, as is sometimes the
case with exhaustible resources. In the following, it is described how the
firms in this thesis are restricted in their quantity flexibility and what the
consequences of these limitations are.
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Chapter 2 deals with a duopoly, in which the firms have a time-span of
two periods in which they compete in the sales of their exogenously given
individual inventory. After those two periods, their product is worthless.
In making their quantity output decisions, the firms have to take into ac-
count not only how this will affect their own inventory level and current
profit, but also future competition. In the next chapter, no longer a fixed
end-period is given and ordering new inventory is now also part of the pos-
sibilities. The analysis is restricted to a monopolistic market structure. The
goal of the monopolist is to determine the best moment to order a new batch
and to maximize its profit on sales. In the last chapter of this thesis, in an
oligopolistic setting, firms make an individual price and quantity decision in
every period. Two types of production are considered: production in advance
and production to order. For both types of production, it is analyzed under
which conditions collusion between firms is sustainable and which form of
collusion is preferred: collusion in price only, or collusion in price ánd quan-
tity.
Dynamic Duopoly with Intertemporal Capacity Con-
straints
In this chapter, a duopoly is studied in which both firms start with an exoge-
nously given capacity, which they cannot renew. They both know that the
demand for the product they are selling will only last for two periods, after
that, their stock is worthless. Examples for these type of markets are, for
instance, fashion items. The price that they will receive for their products
each period is the market clearing price. We distinguish two cases. In the
first, both firms already decide on their sales quantity for each period before
competition actually takes place. We will call this commitment. It is shown
that in this case, there exists a unique pure equilibrium in which, among
others, price goes up over time. And if the difference in capacity between the
two firms increases, consumer surplus and total surplus decrease. In the
other case that is described, firms decide on their second period sales after
the first period of competition already has taken place. We will call this non-
commitment. It is found that here a pure equilibrium does not always exist.
And if an equilibrium does exist, it depends on the starting capacities of the
firms whether price will actually go up or down over time.
12
The Impact of Bulk-Supply on a Dealer’s Sales Strat-
egy
A firm/dealer with monopolistic power is described in this chapter. The
dealer in question can only renew its supply by large batches. Reasons for
this are either because it can only buy the finished product from a whole-
saler or an important part of production is only delivered in large bulks. We
analyze the best moment to reorder and the optimal sales strategy between
those reordering moments. It is found that the dealer always reorders af-
ter the same amount of time. Right after receiving the new batch, its sales
quantity is the highest and this quantity continuously decreases until its
new batch arrives. Its sales pattern is always the same in between any two
consecutive, ordering moments. If future profits become less valuable, con-
trary to what one might think beforehand, there are settings in which the
dealer will increase the time before it reorders.
Collusion in a Price-Quantity Oligopoly
This chapter studies an oligopoly in which the firms have both price and
quantity as strategic variables. The game has an infinite time horizon, and
the strategic variables can be adjusted every period. Two types of industry
are analyzed, production in advance and production to order. In competi-
tion, for both modes of production, the expected profit of all firms is zero. To
increase their profits, the firms can collude in price only, or in both strategic
variables. It is found that, when production is in advance of sales and mar-
ket demand is relatively inelastic, collusion in price only may not be sustain-
able and an additional agreement on outputs may be required to overcome
coordination and incentive problems. On top of this, a price-quota cartel is
more profitable than a price cartel. With production to order, collusion may
not be sustainable without an agreement on production levels.
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Chapter 2
Dynamic Duopoly with
Intertemporal Capacity
Constraints
2.1 Introduction
In most models of dynamic duopoly, it is assumed that production is in-
stantly adjusted to per-period demand. However, in many real-world ap-
plications, this is not the case. Take for instance a market vendor. He buys
his inventory at a wholesaler in batches. Until the next batch arrives, he has
to decide every day how much of his inventory he is willing to sell at that
day’s market. To maximize profits, the vendor has to take into account how
selling part of his inventory today influences the profits he can make on the
remainder of its stock. Moreover, he will have to take into account how its
actions today will affect the behavior of its competitors the following days.
This chapter analyzes quantity competition in situations where produc-
tion precedes sales and sales take place during a number of periods.1 As
a result, the firm operates under a multi-period capacity constraint. Any
production process that involves batch production would fit this description.
Other examples concern settings with costly transportation, causing stores
to be supplied only every few periods. Another relevant case can be found
in the field of exhaustible resources. Firms at the source cannot renew their
supply, but have many periods to sell the resource.
1This chapter is based on the paper van den Berg et al. (2011a).
Chapter 2. Dynamic Duopoly with Intertemporal Capacity Constraints
We address a number of questions related to the dynamics of the market
structure, the development of prices and sales over time, and the implica-
tions for profits and consumer surplus. We examine the simplest situation
possible: production or resource extraction has already taken place, the com-
modity is sold during two periods and demand is linear. Firms thereby ef-
fectively face a two-period capacity constraint.
In such a multi-period setting, it becomes relevant whether or not firms
use current period outcomes before deciding upon their next period actions.
We refer to these two possibilities as non-commitment versus commitment.
In this chapter, both the non-commitment and the commitment case are an-
alyzed and related to one another. In the commitment setting, the strategy
of a firm specifies the amount it is going to supply at each period. This
amount does not depend on the observed sales of the competing firm in
the previous periods. This type of commitment is encountered, for instance,
in situations where information about previous period(s) profits/sales is not
processed before current period strategy decisions have to be made. In the
non-commitment setting, the strategy of a firm describes how much stock
to sell in each period, conditional on observed sales in previous periods by
the competing firm. In the literature the commitment setting is often an-
alyzed due to its better tractability. Nevertheless, in many settings, the
non-commitment case is more realistic. We will show that the level of com-
mitment can have a serious influence on the results.
In the commitment case, firms base their plan of action only on the level
of initial stock of both the firms. In the exhaustible resource literature, this
case has been analyzed for numerous settings similar to ours. This litera-
ture starts with Hotelling (1931). More recently, Loury (1986), Gaudet and
Long (1994) and Lewis and Schmalensee (1980), all find results that are
compatible with the results we find for the commitment setting. Wirl (2010)
analyses a model with dynamics on the demand and supply side in which
firms use a noncompetitive quantity strategy. We establish the existence of
a unique Nash equilibrium. It is shown that, in this equilibrium, price in-
creases over time and as a consequence, aggregate sales decrease over time.
Aggregate sales per period depend on the distribution of initial production
over the firms. Also, the firm with more stock will never leave the market
before the smaller one does.
In the setting without commitment, a firm’s supply is conditional on the
amounts sold in the previous period. This makes it possible to adjust the
sales path over time in response to observed sales by the competitor. In the
16
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non-commitment setting, there are some combinations of stock for which a
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium does not exist. However, for most combi-
nations, an equilibrium exists and is unique. In equilibrium, the firm with
the larger initial production amount will never leave the market before the
smaller firm. Equilibria in the non-commitment setting may exhibit counter-
intuitive features. For instance, price may decrease over time and therefore
aggregate sales may increase over time. In the exhaustible resource liter-
ature, Salo and Tahvonen (2001) also analyze a non-commitment setting.
Reinganum and Stokey (1985) analyze a setting in which firms extract their
resource from a common property source and in which they can commit to
certain extraction levels only for a limited number of periods.
We find that the equilibrium outcomes in the commitment-setting are
equivalent to the equilibrium outcomes of the non-commitment setting for
most combinations of initial stock. The outcomes differ when one of the firms
is large and the other one is intermediate in stock size. In that situation,
the large firm prefers not being able to commit, whereas the smaller firms
prefers both firms committing. Consumer surplus is almost always higher
in the commitment setting, except for some specific situations in which firms
are very patient. Total surplus is at least as high in the commitment setting
as it is in the non-commitment setting.
Apart from the literature on exhaustible resources, this chapter is re-
lated to those papers that analyze models with capacity constraints. Most of
these papers, for instance Levitan and Shubik (1972), Osborne and Pitchik
(1986) and Bikhchandani and Mamer (1993), use a setting in which firms
compete in price. Bikhchandani and Mamer show that in their case of unit
demand, there is a unique equilibrium, which is robust to extension over
multiple periods and extension over additional sellers. Kreps and Scheinkman
(1983) show in a dynamic game how an individually chosen capacity con-
straint in the first period can influence second-period price competition. More
recently, several papers were written in which firms compete in quantity and
are constrained in capacity. In Gabszewicz and Poddar (1997), firms choose
their level of capacity before demand is known. After true consumers’ de-
mand is known, they compete in quantity for one period. It is shown that a
symmetric subgame perfect Nash equilibrium exists. Laye and Laye (2008)
analyze multi-market Cournot competition with capacity constraints. All
firms can produce a limited amount of a homogeneous product. For this
product they have to choose which part they will sell at every market. In
this situation, a unique Cournot-Nash equilibrium exists. Besanko and Do-
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raszelski (2004) analyze a dynamic repeated setting in which firms in every
period can invest in capacity and either compete in price or quantity. When
firms compete in quantity, this leads to equal sized firms. However, when
firms compete in price, over time the industry evolves towards asymmetric
firm sizes.
To the best of our knowledge, the only other paper in the literature that
uses an intertemporal capacity constraint, is Biglaiser and Vettas (2004). In
their model, the two competing firms have an equal finite amount of product
that they can sell in two periods. Demand is in units and growing, and
firms compete in prices. The total demand over the two periods is more
than one firm can produce, but less than both firms can produce together.
An important feature of their model is that not only the sellers, but also
the buyers act strategically. One of the results is that, when there is only
one consumer, linear pricing implies there is no pure strategy equilibrium.
Another paper that shows some resemblance with ours is the two-period
model of Saloner (1987). In that paper, there are two periods of production,
after which the goods are sold for the market clearing price. Saloner finds
a unique subgame perfect equilibrium. The results of this paper have been
extended by Pal (1991, 1996), in which the first of the papers allows for
different costs in the two periods of production and the second one extends
this model even further to allow for mixed strategies. Kovenock and Roy
(1998) show that the work of Saloner is not robust against replacing the
third stage by one of price competition, instead of assuming market clearing.
The chapter is organized as follows. The next section introduces the
model. Section 2.3 analyzes the equilibria that result in the commitment
case. The non-commitment situation is addressed in Section 2.4. In Section
2.5, we analyze how the equilibrium outcomes in the commitment setting
relate to the equilibrium outcomes in the non-commitment setting. Section
2.6 concludes. Lengthy and technical proofs are relegated to the appendix.
2.2 Model
We consider two profit maximizing firms that have produced (or bought) a
homogeneous good. Firm i = 1,2 therefore owns a finite amount Si ≥ 0 of
the good. Since the goods are produced beforehand, the production costs are
sunk and they do not play a role in the model. With their fixed amount of
stock as an upperbound, the firms compete in quantity for two periods. A
firm may choose to have residual supply at the end of the second period. The
18
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quantities sold by firm i in period 1 and period 2 are denoted by qi and r i,
respectively, so qi+ r i ≤ Si. The inverse demand each period is
P(Q)= 1−Q,
where Q = q1+ q2 in the first period and Q = r1+ r2 in the second.
2,3 Profits
earned in period 2 are discounted with a factor δ ∈ (0,1].
Two cases are analyzed. In the first, firms can commit to a sales strategy
that is independent of sales by their competitor. That is, after production has
taken place, both firms unconditionally decide how much they are going to
sell in each period. This implies that firm i’s strategy space is of the form
Γi = {(qi, r i) ∈R
2
+ | qi+ r i ≤ Si}.
The second case is the one of non-commitment. In this case, the amount
a firm is going to offer for sale in a period depends on the realized sales of
its competitor in the previous period. As a result, the second-period strat-
egy of a firm is now the specification of a sales quantity conditional on the
observation of first-period sales. We define Fi = { f i : [0,S1]× [0,S2]→ [0,Si] |
qi+ f i(q1,q2)≤ Si} as the set of functions that assign a feasible second-period
sales quantity to every possible combination of first-period sales. Firm i’s
strategy space is Σi = [0,Si]×Fi.
2.3 Commitment
In the commitment case firms choose a sales path that does not depend on
their competitor’s realized sales. Given strategies (q1, r1) ∈ Γ1 and (q2, r2) ∈
Γ2, the profit Πi(q1, r1,q2, r2) of firm i is given by
Πi(q1, r1,q2, r2)= qiP(qi+ q j)+δr iP(r i+ r j)
When choosing its sales path (qi, r i), firm i takes the sales path (q j, r j) of
firm j as given, where we use the notation i and j for the two competing
firms. Firm i therefore solves the problem
max
qi ,r i
Πi(q1, r1,q2, r2)
2The results in this chapter can be extended to the more general inverse demand functions
of the form P(Q)= a−bQ, where a,b> 0 and with firms facing unit costs of c, to be interpreted
for instance as handling costs.
3We choose to analyze linear demand only to keep the analysis tractable.
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subject to
qi, r i ≥ 0 and qi+ r i ≤ Si.
The result is a best response γi(q j, r j) ∈Γi given by
γi(q j, r j)=


(Si,0)


if [q j−δr j < 1−δ−2Si,
q j+ r j ≤ 2−2Si and q j, r j ≤ 1]
or [q j ≤ 1−2Si and r j > 1]
(0,Si)


if [q j−δr j > 1−δ+2δSi,
q j+ r j ≤ 2−2Si and q j, r j ≤ 1]
or [q j > 1 and r j ≤ 1−2Si]
(
1−δ+2δSi−q j+δr j
2+2δ
,
2Si−1+δ+q j−δr j
2+2δ
) 

if 1−δ−2Si ≤ q j−δr j ≤
1−δ+2δSi,
q j+ r j ≤ 2−2Si and q j, r j ≤ 1
(1
2
− 1
2
q j,
1
2
− 1
2
r j)
{
if q j+ r j > 2−2Si
and q j, r j ≤ 1
(1
2
− 1
2
q j,0)
{
if 1−2Si < q j ≤ 1
and r j > 1
(0, 1
2
− 1
2
r j)
{
if 1−2Si < r j ≤ 1
and q j > 1
(0,0) if q j, r j > 1.
The seven cases for Si are mutually exclusive and the best responses against
(q j, r j) are unique. The function γi is continuous.
A pair of strategies (q∗1 , r
∗
1,q
∗
2 , r
∗
2) is a Nash equilibrium iff
Π1(q
∗
1 , r
∗
1,q
∗
2 , r
∗
2) ≥ Π1(q1, r1,q
∗
2 , r
∗
2) for all (q1, r1) ∈Γ1,
Π2(q
∗
1 , r
∗
1,q
∗
2 , r
∗
2) ≥ Π2(q
∗
1 , r
∗
1,q2, r2) for all (q2, r2) ∈Γ2,
or, equivalently, γ1(q
∗
2 , r
∗
2)= (q
∗
1 , r
∗
1) and γ2(q
∗
1 , r
∗
1)= (q
∗
2 , r
∗
2).
Given any initial combination (S1,S2,δ), there is a unique equilibrium,
as specified in Table 2.1 and depicted in Figure 2.1. In the figure, δ is fixed
and S1,S2 are variable. A change of δ will not change the shape of the
equilibrium areas, only the ratio between them. We use the superscript ‘c’
to refer to equilibria in the commitment case. The two letters in the sub-
script represent the relative level of stock of respectively firm i and j, where
l stands for low, m for medium and h for high. In Figure 2.1, also the num-
ber of active firms in each period is indicated, where N1/N2/Nr represents
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respectively the number of firms that have strictly positive sales in the first
period, the number of firms that have strictly positive sales in the second
period, and the number of firms that have residual supply at the end of the
second period. The figure shows that the number of active firms increases
when production increases.
Parameter conditions Period 1 Period 2
(Xc
ll
) 0≤ S1 <
1
2
− 1
2
S2−
1
2
δ qc
1
= S1 r
c
1
= 0
0≤ S2 <
1
2
− 1
2
S1−
1
2
δ qc
2
= S2 r
c
2
= 0
(Xc
lm
) 0≤ S1 <
1
3
− 1
3
δ qc
1
= S1 r
c
1
= 0
1
2
− 1
2
δ− 1
2
S1 ≤ S2 ≤ 1−
1
2
S1 q
c
2
=
1−S1−δ+2δS2
2+2δ
rc
2
=
2S2+S1−1+δ
2+2δ
(Xc
ml
) 1
2
− 1
2
δ− 1
2
S2 ≤ S1 ≤ 1−
1
2
S2 q
c
1
=
1−δ+2δS1−S2
2+2δ
rc
1
=
2S1+S2−1+δ
2+2δ
0≤ S2 <
1
3
− 1
3
δ qc
2
= S2 r
c
2
= 0
(Xc
lh
) 0≤ S1 <
1
3
− 1
3
δ qc
1
= S1 r
c
1
= 0
1− 1
2
S1 < S2 q
c
2
= 1
2
− 1
2
S1 r
c
2
= 1
2
(Xc
hl
) 1− 1
2
S2 < S1 q
c
1
= 1
2
− 1
2
S2 r
c
1
= 1
2
0≤ S2 <
1
3
− 1
3
δ qc
2
= S2 r
c
2
= 0
(Xcmm)
1
3
− 1
3
δ≤ S1 ≤ 1−
1
2
S2 q
c
1
=
1−δ+3δS1
3+3δ
rc
1
=
3S1−1+δ
3+3δ
1
3
− 1
3
δ≤ S2 ≤ 1−
1
2
S1 q
c
2
=
1−δ+3δS2
3+3δ
rc
2
=
3S2−1+δ
3+3δ
(Xc
mh
) 1
3
− 1
3
δ≤ S1 ≤
2
3
qc
1
=
1−δ+3δS1
3+3δ
rc
1
=
3S1−1+δ
3+3δ
1− 1
2
S1 < S2 q
c
2
=
2+4δ−3δS1
6+6δ
rc
2
=
4+2δ−3S1
6+6δ
(Xc
hm
) 1− 1
2
S2 < S1 q
c
1
=
2+4δ−3δS2
6+6δ
rc
1
=
4+2δ−3S2
6+6δ
1
3
− 1
3
δ< S2 ≤
2
3
qc
2
=
1−δ+3δS2
3+3δ
rc
2
=
3S2−1+δ
3+3δ
(Xc
hh
) 2
3
< S1 q
c
1
= 1
3
rc
1
= 1
3
2
3
< S2 q
c
2
= 1
3
rc
2
= 1
3
Table 2.1: Equilibria in the commitment case.
When the stock of firm 1 is low, as it is in Regions Xc
ll
, Xc
lm
, and Xc
lh
, it will
sell all of its stock in the first period. These regions are non-empty only if the
discount rate is strictly below one. The discounting of second-period profits
gives firms an incentive to sell in period 1 rather than in period 2. When
firm 1 has a low stock S1, then selling this entirely in the first period will
hardly decrease the marginal revenue in the first period. Consequently, as
long as δ is not too high, marginal revenue in the second period will be less
than the marginal revenue in the first period and firm 1 will sell its entire
production in the first period.
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Figure 2.1: The commitment case: Equilibrium outcome regions and the number
of firms that have stock in respectively period 1, period 2 and after period 2, for
δ= 0.5.
In Regions Xc
ml
, Xcmm, and X
c
mh
, firm 1 has an intermediate amount of the
commodity in stock. It then maximizes profit by dividing its sales over the
two periods in such a way that marginal revenue in both periods is equal.
In the remaining Regions, Xc
hl
, Xc
hm
and Xc
hh
, firm 1 has a high stock and
acts as if it has no capacity constraints. Firm 1 maximizes its profit in each
period separately as to maximize total profit. It will have residual stock at
the end of period 2.
A similar line of argumentation applies to the equilibrium strategy of
firm 2. Note that in both periods in situation Xc
hh
firms maximize their profit
as if there is no capacity limit. This results in both firms choosing their
Cournot equilibrium quantities of 1
3
in both periods.
The next five propositions describe some comparative statics results for
the case with commitment.
Proposition 2.3.1. In equilibrium, price weakly increases over time.
Proof For any given combination of S1,S2, and δ, one can verify directly
that qc
1
+ qc
2
≥ rc
1
+ rc
2
. Thus, the aggregate sales in the first period weakly
exceed the aggregate sales in the second period and therefore price in the
first period is less than or equal to the price in the second period. 
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Notice, in particular, that as long as its capacity doesn’t prevent it from
doing so, a firm will adjust its sales to achieve equal marginal revenues in
both periods. This together with a discount rate which is less than or equal
to one implies that price cannot decrease over time.
Also the following proposition describes an intuitive result.
Proposition 2.3.2. An increase in Si leads to a weak increase in firm i’s
equilibrium profit.
Proof The derivative of the equilibrium profit function of firm i with respect
to Si is non-negative in every equilibrium outcome region and the profit
function is continuous for all δ,Si,S j ≥ 0. 
Notice, of course, that the profits in Proposition 2.3.2 correspond to sales
revenues and do not take into account the costs of production.
The next proposition studies how the relative stock sizes of the two firms
affect the commodity price. For fixed aggregate stock size S1+S2, we analyze
how an increase in asymmetry |S1−S2| influences equilibrium outcomes.
Proposition 2.3.3. Given fixed aggregate production S1+S2, an increase in
|S1−S2| leads to a weak decrease of first-period aggregate equilibrium sales
and therefore a weak increase of first-period equilibrium price. It leads (i)
to a decrease of second-period aggregate equilibrium sales and an increase
of second-period equilibrium price in Regions Xc
mh
and Xc
hm
and (ii) to an in-
crease of second-period aggregate equilibrium sales and a decrease of second-
period equilibrium price in Regions Xc
lm
and Xc
ml
. It has no effect on second-
period aggregate equilibrium sales and equilibrium price in the other regions.
Proof Let S = S1+S2 be fixed and assume without loss of generality that
S2 ≥ S1. Then |S1−S2| increases if S1 decreases. Since S2 ≥ S1, it holds that
(S1,S2,δ) ∈X
c
ll
∪Xc
lm
∪Xc
lh
∪Xcmm∪X
c
mh
∪Xc
hh
. Let Qab be the aggregate sales
in equilibrium region Xab.
For first-period aggregate sales, we find that
Qc
ll
= S,
∂Qc
ll
∂S1
= 0,
Qc
lm
=
1−δ+S1+2δS
2+2δ
,
∂Qc
lm
∂S1
= 1
2+2δ
> 0,
Qc
lh
= 1
2
+ 1
2
S1,
∂Qc
lh
∂S1
= 1
2
> 0,
Qcmm =
2−2δ+3δS
3+3δ
,
∂Qcmm
∂S1
= 0,
Qc
mh
=
4+2δ+3δS1
6+6δ
,
∂Qc
mh
∂S1
= 3δ
6+6δ
> 0,
Qc
hh
= 2
3
,
∂Qc
hh
∂S1
= 0.
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For second-period aggregate sales we have that
Qc
ll
= 0,
∂Qc
ll
∂S1
= 0,
Qc
lm
=
2S−S1−1+δ
2+2δ
,
∂Qc
lm
∂S1
=− 1
2+2δ
< 0,
Qc
lh
= 1
2
,
∂Qc
lh
∂S1
= 0,
Qcmm =
3S−2+2δ
3+3δ
,
∂Qcmm
∂S1
= 0,
Qc
mh
=
3S1+2+4δ
6+6δ
,
∂Qc
mh
∂S1
= 3
6+6δ
> 0,
Qc
hh
= 2
3
,
∂Qc
hh
∂S1
= 0.

A larger difference in stocks results in a higher first-period price. This is
intuitive: consider the extreme case where one of the firms is a monopolist,
resulting in the highest possible first-period price. Surprisingly, the effect
of increasing difference between the firms’ stocks on second-period prices is
ambiguous. In particular, it leads to a weak decrease in second-period price
in Regions Xc
lm
and Xc
ml
. In these regions, the smaller firm has no stock left
at the beginning of period 2. An increase in the size of the bigger firm then
simply leads to more sales by this firm in period 2.
The following proposition studies the consequences of increased stocks
for consumer surplus. Consumer surplus in the first period and in the sec-
ond period is respectively 1
2
(q1+ q2)
2 and 1
2
(r1+ r2)
2. To compute the total
consumer surplus we have to discount the second-period consumer surplus
by δ. Consumer surplus is therefore given by 1
2
(q1+ q2)
2+ 1
2
δ(r1+ r2)
2.
Proposition 2.3.4. Equilibrium consumer surplus weakly increases if the
stock of at least one of the firms increases.
Proof It follows directly from the equilibrium outcomes that per-period
sales weakly increase in S1 and S2. 
Since the effect of an increase in |S1−S2| on second-period sales is am-
biguous by Proposition 2.3.3, it is not a priori clear how such an increase
affects consumer surplus. The next proposition states, nevertheless, that
this effect is unambiguously negative.
Proposition 2.3.5. Given fixed aggregate stock S1+S2, an increase in |S1−
S2| leads to a weak decrease in equilibrium consumer surplus.
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Proof Proposition 2.3.3 implies a weak decrease in sales in both periods
when |S1−S2| increases, and therefore a weak decrease in consumer surplus,
except possibly in Regions Xc
lm
and Xc
ml
.
Consider some (S1,S2,δ) in Region X
c
lm
or Xc
ml
. Assume without loss of
generality that S2 ≥ S1, so |S1−S2| increases if S1 decreases. Then (S1,S2,δ)
belongs to Region Xc
lm
. Consumer surplus is given by
1
2
(
1−δ+S1+2δS
2+2δ
)2
−
1
2
δ
(
2S−S1−1+δ
2+2δ
)2
,
where, as before, S = S1+S2. The derivative of the expression above with
respect to S1 is given by
1−δ+S1+2δS
(2+2δ)2
+δ
2S−S1−1+δ
(2+2δ)2
,
which is easily shown to be non-negative. 
An increase in inequality in firm sizes makes the bigger firm relatively
more powerful compared to the smaller firm. This gives the bigger firm
the opportunity to portray more “monopolist-like” behavior, which influences
consumer surplus negatively.
By the same type of analysis, it can be shown that the results we have
found for equilibrium consumer surplus coincide with the results that can
be found for equilibrium total surplus. Total surplus is defined as the sum of
consumer surplus and both the firms’ surplus. In this case, total surplus is
(q1+ q2)(1−
1
2
(q1+ q2))+δ(r1+ r2)(1−
1
2
(r1+ r2)).
Equilibrium total surplus weakly increases if production by at least one of
the firms increases and, given fixed aggregate production S1 +S2, an in-
crease in |S1−S2| leads to a weak decrease in equilibrium total surplus.
Summary of comparative statics results for the commitment case
We find that, when firms have the power to commit to an unconditional sales
strategy, price never decreases over time. A firm’s profit increases when its
stock increases and so does consumer surplus and total surplus. Finally,
an increase in the difference between the stocks of the firms leads to lower
sales in period 1 and lower consumer surplus and total surplus. The effect
on period 2 sales is ambiguous.
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2.4 Non-commitment
We now study the case where the sales strategy of a firm in period 2 depends
on the observed first-period sales. Once firms arrive in the second period
of the game, they play a one-period game with capacity constraints. We
analyze the subgame perfect Nash equilibria of the game. We do this by first
analyzing the Nash equilibria of all possible period 2 subgames.
Consider the subgame q = (q1,q2) in period 2 that results from first-
period sales (q1,q2) by the firms. Denote firm i’s second-period stock by
Ti = Si−qi. Now we can define σiq : [0,T j]→ [0,Ti] as firm i’s best response
function in subgame q. Given sales r j by firm j, firm i solves the problem
max
r i
r iP(r i+ r j)
subject to
0≤ r i ≤Ti.
The best response for firm i in period 2 is then given by
σiq(r j)=
{
Ti, if 0≤Ti ≤
1
2
− 1
2
r j,
max{0, 1
2
− 1
2
r j}, otherwise.
Quantities (r∗1, r
∗
2) are a Nash equilibrium of the second-period subgame
q if and only if σ1q(r
∗
2)= r
∗
1 and σ2q(r
∗
1)= r
∗
2. Each subgame q has a unique
Nash equilibrium as specified in Table 2.2 and depicted in Figure 2.2.4
In Region Yhh, both firms have sufficient residual stock in the second
period to choose their unconstrained profit maximizing sales quantity. In
Regions Yhl and Ylh, only one firm is restricted by its residual stock, respec-
tively firm 1 and firm 2. In Region Yll both firms are restricted by their
residual stock and sell in the second period all they have left.
The equilibrium action chosen by firm i in period 2 is given by the func-
tion f ∗
i
defined by
f ∗i (qi,q j)=


1
3
, if Ti,T j >
1
3
,
1
2
− 1
2
T j, if Ti >
1
2
− 1
2
T j and T j ≤
1
3
,
Ti, if Ti ≤
1
3
or T j ≤ 1−2Ti.
(2.1)
4This figure was earlier portrayed in Krishnan and Röller (1993), Figure 1. Their Stage 5
problem coincides with our second-period subgame.
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Ti T j r i r j profits i profits j
(Yhh) >
1
3
> 1
3
1
3
1
3
1
9
1
9
(Ylh) ≤
1
3
>
1−Ti
2
Ti
1−Ti
2
Ti(
1−Ti
2
) (
1−Ti
2
)2
(Yhl) >
1−T j
2
≤ 1
3
1−T j
2
T j
(1−T j)
2
4
T j(
1−T j
2
)
(Yll) ≤
1−T j
2
≤
1−Ti
2
Ti T j Ti(1−Ti−T j) T j(1−Ti−T j)
Table 2.2: Second-period equilibrium outcomes.
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Figure 2.2: Second-period equilibrium regions for δ= 0.5.
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We now replace the second-period subgames by the second-period out-
comes as induced by f ∗. The result is a one-period reduced game with pay-
offs given by
Π
R
i (qi,q j)=Πi(qi,q j, f
∗
i (qi,q j), f
∗
j (qi,q j)), 0≤ qi ≤ Si, 0≤ q j ≤ S j.
It follows that the reduced profit function of firm i is given by
Π
R
i (qi,q j) = qi(1− qi− q j)+ (2.2)

1
9
δ, if Ti >
1
3
and T j >
1
3
, (Yhh)
1
2
δTi(1−Ti), if 1−2T j <Ti ≤
1
3
, (Ylh)
1
4
δ(1−T j)
2, if Ti >
1
2
− 1
2
T j and T j ≤
1
3
, (Yhl)
δTi(1−Ti−T j), if Ti ≤min{
1
2
− 1
2
T j,1−2T j}. (Yll)
A pair of strategies (q∗1 ,q
∗
2) is a Nash equilibrium of the reduced game iff it
holds that
Π
R
1 (q
∗
1 ,q
∗
2) ≥ Π
R
1 (q1,q
∗
2), for all q1 ∈ [0,S1],
Π
R
2 (q
∗
1 ,q
∗
2) ≥ Π
R
2 (q
∗
1 ,q2), for all q2 ∈ [0,S2].
A Nash equilibrium (q∗1 ,q
∗
2) of the reduced game corresponds to a subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium (q∗1 , f
∗
1 ,q
∗
2 , f
∗
2 ) of the complete game and vice versa.
Lemma 2.4.1. q∗
i
,q∗
j
≤ 1
2
for any Nash equilibrium (q∗1 ,q
∗
2) of the reduced
game.
Proof The first-period profit is qi(1−qi−q j), which is strictly decreasing in
qi if qi >
1
2
− 1
2
q j, so in particular if qi >
1
2
. If firm i decreases its first-period
sales, it increases its second-period stock. As can be seen in Table 2.2, firm i’s
second-period profit never decreases when its second-period stock increases.
Consequently, firm i strictly increases its profits if it sets qi =
1
2
instead of
qi >
1
2
. 
Using the reduced profit function (2.2), we determine the reduced best
responses, denoting by σR
i
(q j) the reduced best response of firm i against
q j. Appendix A provides the computational details. Given q j, the reduced
profit function is not always concave, though it is continuous. As a conse-
quence, the reduced best response against q j does always exist, but may
not be unique. We therefore have a reduced best response correspondence
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rather than a reduced best response function. This correspondence may fail
to be convex-valued though it is upper hemi-continuous. The reduced best
response correspondence of firm i is presented in Appendix A.
Quantities (q∗1 ,q
∗
2) are a Nash equilibrium of the reduced game if and
only if q∗
i
∈σR
i
(q∗
j
) and q∗
j
∈σR
j
(q∗
i
). The Nash equilibria of the reduced game,
and thereby the subgame perfect Nash equilibria of the game of interest, are
calculated in Appendix B. Since the reduced best response correspondences
are not convex-valued, it is not guaranteed that a subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium exists. Indeed, it turns out that for some combinations of Si,S j
and δ a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium fails to exist.
The set of exogenous variables (S1,S2,δ) can be partitioned in 12 regions.
In each region in which there exists an equilibrium, the equilibria share
the same qualitative features and are differentiable functions of S1,S2, and
δ. The equilibrium regions are given in Table 2.3 and depicted in Figure
2.3 for δ = 0.5. Table 2.3 also shows the equilibrium outcomes. We use the
superscript ‘nc’ to refer to equilibria in the non-commitment case. The two
letters in the subscript represent the relative level of stock of respectively
firm i and j , where l stands for low, m for medium, m’ for medium-high and
h for high.
As is illustrated by Figure 2.3 for δ = 1/2, the 12 regions are mutually
exclusive. This property is generally true, leading to the following theorem.
Theorem 2.4.2. There is at most one subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for
every combination of S1,S2, and δ.
Proof It follows from comparing the constraints in Table 2.3, that all re-
gions are disjoint. Therefore, every combination of Si,S j and δ belongs to at
most one equilibrium region. The Nash equilibrium of the reduced game is
therefore unique for (Si,S j,δ) in Regions X
nc
ll
up to and including Xnc
hh
. The
reduced game has no Nash equilibrium for (Si,S j,δ) belonging to Region
Xnc
Ø
. Nash equilibria for the reduced game are in a one to one relationship
with subgame perfect Nash equilibria of the complete game. 
In some cases an equilibrium does not exist.5
Theorem 2.4.3. For every δ, there is a set of stock levels (S1,S2) with non-
empty interior for which an equilibrium does not exist.
5More specifically, no pure equilibrium exists. Since the reduced strategy spaces are
nonempty compact subsets of R and the payoff functions ΠR
i
(qi ,q j) are continuous (Glicks-
berg, 1952), there will be a mixed equilibrium.
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Parameter conditions Period 1 Period 2
(Xnc
ll
) 0≤ S1 <
1
2
− 1
2
δ− 1
2
S2 q
nc
1
= S1 r
nc
1
= 0
0≤ S2 <
1
2
− 1
2
δ− 1
2
S1 q
nc
2
= S2 r
nc
2
= 0
(Xnc
lm
) 0≤ S1 <
1
3
(1−δ) qnc
1
= S1 r
nc
1
= 0
1
2
− 1
2
δ− 1
2
S1 ≤ S2 ≤ 1−
1
2
S1 q
nc
2
=
1−S1+2δS2−δ
2+2δ
rnc
2
=
2S2−1+S1+δ
2+2δ
(Xnc
ml
) 1
2
− 1
2
δ− 1
2
S2 ≤ S1 ≤ 1−
1
2
S2 q
nc
1
=
1−S2+2δS1−δ
2+2δ
rnc
2
=
2S1−1+S2+δ
2+2δ
0≤ S2 <
1
3
(1−δ) qnc
2
= S2 r
nc
2
= 0
(Xnc
lh
) 0≤ S1 <
1
3
(1−δ) qnc
1
= S1 r
nc
1
= 0
S2 > 1−
1
2
S1 q
nc
2
= 1
2
− 1
2
S1 r
nc
2
= 1
2
(Xnc
hl
) S1 > 1−
1
2
S2 q
nc
1
= 1
2
− 1
2
S2 r
nc
1
= 1
2
0≤ S2 <
1
3
(1−δ) qnc
2
= S2 r
nc
2
= 0
(Xncmma)
1
3
(1−δ)≤ S1 ≤β1
1
3
(1−δ)≤ S2 ≤β2 q
nc
1
=
1−δ+3δS1
3+3δ
rnc
1
=
3S1−1+δ
3+3δ
(Xncmmb) β3 < S1 ≤ 1−
1
2
S2 q
nc
2
=
1−δ+3δS2
3+3δ
rnc
2
=
3S2−1+δ
3+3δ
β4 < S2 ≤ 1−
1
2
S1
(Xnc
mh
) 1
3
(1−δ)≤ S1 ≤
2
3
− 1
9
δ qnc
1
=
1−δ+2δS1
3+2δ
rnc
1
=
3S1−1+δ
3+2δ
S2 >β5 q
nc
2
=
2+3δ−2δS1
6+4δ
rnc
2
=
4+δ−3S1
6+4δ
(Xnc
hm
) S1 >β6 q
nc
1
=
2+3δ−2δS2
6+4δ
rnc
1
=
4+δ−3S2
6+4δ
1
3
(1−δ)≤ S2 ≤
2
3
− 1
9
δ qnc
2
=
1−δ+2δS2
3+2δ
rnc
2
=
3S2−1+δ
3+2δ
(Xnc
m’h
) 2
3
− 1
9
δ< S1 ≤
2
3
qnc
1
= S1−
1
3
rnc
1
= 1
3
S2 >β7 q
nc
2
= 2
3
− 1
2
S1 r
nc
2
= 1
3
(Xnc
hm’
) S1 >β8 q
nc
1
= 2
3
− 1
2
S2 r
nc
1
= 1
3
2
3
− 1
9
δ< S2 ≤
2
3
qnc
2
= S2−
1
3
rnc
2
= 1
3
(Xnc
hh
) S1 >
2
3
qnc
1
= 1
3
rnc
1
= 1
3
S2 >
2
3
qnc
2
= 1
3
rnc
2
= 1
3
(Xnc
Ø
) All other values of (S1,S2,δ) No equilibrium
Explanation of the symbols
β1
7
6
−S2−
1
6
δ+
√
(1+δ)(1+ 1
2
δ)
1+δ
(5
6
+ 1
6
δ−S2)
β2
7
6
−S1−
1
6
δ+
√
(1+δ)(1+ 1
2
δ)
1+δ
(5
6
+ 1
6
δ−S1)
β3
4+5 1
2
δ− 1
2
δ2−3δS2
6+6δ
β4
4+5 1
2
δ− 1
2
δ2−3δS1
6+6δ
β5
7+6 1
2
δ+ 3
2
δ2−6S1−5δS1−δ
2S1+(5+5δ−2δS1)
√
(1+δ)(1+ 1
2
δ)
6+7δ+2δ2+(6+4δ)
√
(1+δ)(1+ 1
2
δ)
β6
7+6 1
2
δ+ 3
2
δ2−6S2−5δS2−δ
2S2+(5+5δ−2δS2)
√
(1+δ)(1+ 1
2
δ)
6+7δ+2δ2+(6+4δ)
√
(1+δ)(1+ 1
2
δ)
β7
10+6δ−7S1−3δS1
8+6δ
β8
10+6δ−7S2−3δS2
8+6δ
Table 2.3: Equilibria in the non-commitment case.
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Figure 2.3: The non-commitment case: Equilibrium outcome regions and the num-
ber of firms that have stock in respectively period 1, period 2 and after period 2, for
δ= 0.5.
Proof It can be verified that for each δ, the set of stock profiles (S1,S2) such
that (S1,S2,δ) belongs to Region X
nc
Ø
has a non-empty interior. 
Figure 2.3 gives an overview of the dynamic development of the market
structure, where again N1/N2/Nr represents the number of firms that sell
the commodity in the first period, the number of firms that sell the commod-
ity in the second period, and the number of firms that have residual stock
by the end of the second period. Just as in the non-commitment case, the
number of active firms increases when initial production levels increase.
Some of the regions in the non-commitment case coincide with those in
the case with commitment. This holds specifically for the Regions Xnc
ll
, Xnc
lm
,
Xnc
ml
, Xnc
lh
, Xnc
hl
, Xncmm, and X
nc
hh
.6 For these regions, the equilibrium outcomes
in the commitment and in the non-commitment case are equivalent.
In the commitment case, the price never decreases from period 1 to pe-
riod 2. The reason is that a decreasing price would make it profitable for
a firm to transfer some of its sales from period 2 to period 1. This line of
6We have named the regions in the non-commitment case in such a way that the names
in the commitment and non-commitment case coincide as much as possible.
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reasoning does not hold when there is no commitment. Indeed, in the non-
commitment case a transfer of sales from period 2 to period 1 may trigger a
reaction by the competing firm, which renders such a transfer unprofitable,
even when the price in period 1 is higher than in period 2.
Proposition 2.4.4. In Regions Xnc
ll
,Xnc
lm
,Xnc
ml
,Xnc
lh
,Xnc
hl
,Xncmm and X
nc
hh
, the equi-
librium price weakly increases over time. For any δ, there is a set of stock lev-
els (S1,S2) ∈ X
nc
mh
∪Xnc
m’h
∪Xnc
hm
∪Xnc
hm’
with non-empty interior such that the
equilibrium price strictly decreases over time. In particular, the equilibrium
price strictly decreases over time if and only if Si < S j and
2−2δ
3−2δ
≤ Si <
2
3
−
1
9
δ,
S j >
7+61
2
δ+ 3
2
δ2−6Si−5δSi−δ
2Si+ (5+5δ−2δSi)
√
(1+δ)(1+ 1
2
δ)
6+7δ+2δ2+ (6+4δ)
√
(1+δ)(1+ 1
2
δ)
or
2
3
−
1
9
δ< Si <
2
3
,
S j >
10+6δ−7Si−3δSi
8+6δ
.
Proof By Proposition 2.3.1, price never decreases over time in the commit-
ment situation. Price decreases in the non-commitment case are therefore
only possible in regions where the non-commitment case is different from
the case with commitment, i.e. Regions Xnc
mh
, Xnc
hm
, Xnc
m’h
, and Xnc
hm’
. In these
regions, one firm has an intermediate and one firm has a high stock level.
Let i be the intermediate firm and let j be the large firm. In Regions Xnc
mh
and Xnc
hm
it holds that
1
3
(1−δ) < Si ≤
2
3
−
1
9
δ,
S j >
7+61
2
δ+ 3
2
δ2−6Si−5δSi−δ
2Si+ (5+5δ−2δSi)
√
(1+δ)(1+ 1
2
δ)
6+7δ+2δ2+ (6+4δ)
√
(1+δ)(1+ 1
2
δ)
.
The total quantity sold in the first period is
qnci + q
nc
j =
1−δ+2δSi
3+2δ
+
2+3δ−2δSi
6+4δ
=
4+δ+2δSi
6+4δ
.
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The total quantity sold in the second period is
rnci + r
nc
j =
3Si−1+δ
3+2δ
+
4+δ−3Si
6+4δ
=
3Si+2+3δ
6+4δ
.
The price strictly decreases from period 1 to period 2 when 4+δ+2δSi <
3Si+2+3δ, so when Si >
2−2δ
3−2δ
.
In Regions Xnc
m’h
and Xnc
hm’
we have
2
3
−
1
9
δ < Si ≤
2
3
S j >
10+6δ−7Si−3δSi
8+6δ
.
The total quantity sold in the first period is
qnci + q
nc
j = Si−
1
3
+
2
3
−
1
2
Si =
1
2
Si+
1
3
.
The total quantity sold in the second period is
rnci + r
nc
j =
1
3
+
1
3
=
2
3
.
Since 1
2
Si +
1
3
< 2
3
as long as Si <
2
3
, in this region, price strictly decreases
from period one to period two whenever Si 6=
2
3
. 
Proposition 2.4.4 makes clear that price may decrease over time in the
non-commit-ment case. This can happen for the following reason. In the set-
tings where price decreases over time, the larger firm reacts in both periods
– unrestricted by its stock – per-period optimal to the sales of the smaller
firm. Since the smaller firm has a stock less than 1/3 in the second period,
the larger firm cannot deviate in the first period in such a way that the
smaller firm will lower its second-period sales. This implies that the larger
firm cannot increase profits by deviating. The smaller firm, just as in the
commitment case, might want to transfer some of its sales from the second
to the first period. However, in the non-commitment situation, if the smaller
firm transfers sales from period 2 to period 1, there will be a response by
the larger firm. The larger firm reacts to this transfer by increasing its
second-period sales, causing the second-period price to fall. Therefore, the
second-period profits of the smaller firm drop. The decrease in profits in the
second period outweigh the increase in profits in the first period. This makes
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transferring sales from the second-period to the first not worth the while for
the smaller firm.
In the commitment case, an increase in a firm’s stock leads to an increase
in profits. Is this property still true in the non-commitment case? It is eas-
ily shown, with the help of the derivatives of the equilibrium profits, that
within each region profit rises when a firm’s stock level increases. More-
over, the profit function is continuous on the domain of (Si,S j,δ) for which
an equilibrium exists. However, it is still possible for the profit to decrease
when a firm’s stock level increases, namely when a small increase in stock
level leads to non-existence of equilibrium. The next proposition confirms
that such decreases in profit may occur for specific parameter values. That
is, equilibria may not be “destroy-proof”.
Proposition 2.4.5. An increase in Si, ceteris paribus, leads to a weak in-
crease of the equilibrium profit of firm i, as long as the increase doesn’t
change the equilibrium outcome region. If an increase in Si does change
the equilibrium outcome region, there are combinations of Si,S j and δ such
that an increase in Si leads to a strict decrease in equilibrium profit of firm
i.
Proof The derivative of the equilibrium profit function with respect to Si
is non-negative in every equilibrium region. The non-existence of an equi-
librium for some combinations of (Si,S j,δ) makes it possible that a strict
increase in Si leads to a strict decrease in the equilibrium profit of firm i.
Take δ= 0.2, S j = 0.69824, and
Si =
7
6
−S j−
1
6
δ+
√
(1+δ)(1+ 1
2
δ)
1+δ
(
5
6
+
1
6
δ−S j)≈ 0.59634.
These parameters correspond to a point on the upper boundary of Region Xncmm.
The equilibrium profit for firm i equals 0.12937. We now let Si increase to
S′i =
7+61
2
δ+ 3
2
δ2−6S j−78δS j−2δ
2S j+ (5+5δ−6S j−4δS j)
√
(1+δ)(1+ 1
2
δ)
6+5δ+δ2+2δ
√
(1+δ)(1+ 1
2
δ)
≈ 0.61011.
Our parameters now belong to Region Xnc
mh
. The equilibrium profit for firm i
equals 0.12751. 
We now study the consequences of increasing difference in stock size on
sales.
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Proposition 2.4.6. Given fixed aggregate stock S1+S2, an increase in |S1−
S2| leads to a weak decrease in first-period aggregate equilibrium sales and
a weak increase of first-period equilibrium price. It leads to a decrease in
second-period aggregate equilibrium sales and an increase in second-period
equilibrium price in Regions Xc
mh
and Xc
hm
and to an increase in second-
period aggregate equilibrium sales and a decrease in second-period equilib-
rium price in Regions Xc
lm
and Xc
ml
. It has no effect on second-period aggre-
gate equilibrium sales and equilibrium price in the other regions.
Proof Let S = S1+S2 be fixed and assume without loss of generality that
S2 ≥ S1. Then |S1−S2| increases if S1 decreases. Since S2 ≥ S1, it holds that
(S1,S2,δ) ∈X
nc
ll
∪Xnc
lm
∪Xnc
lh
∪Xncmm∪X
nc
mh
∪Xnc
m’h
∪Xnc
hh
. It holds that
Qnc
ll
= S,
∂Qnc
ll
∂S1
= 0,
Qnc
lm
=
1−δ+S1+2δS
2+2δ
,
∂Qnc
lm
∂S1
= 1
2+2δ
> 0,
Qnc
lh
= 1
2
+ 1
2
S1,
∂Qnc
lh
∂S1
= 1
2
> 0,
Qncmm =
2−2δ+3δS
3+3δ
,
∂Qncmm
∂S1
= 0,
Qnc
mh
=
4+δ+2δS1
6+4δ
,
∂Qnc
mh
∂S1
= 2δ
6+4δ
> 0,
Qnc
m’h
= 1
2
S1+
1
3
,
∂Qnc
m’h
∂S1
= 1
2
> 0.
Qnc
hh
= 2
3
,
∂Qnc
hh
∂S1
= 0,
Between Regions Xncmm and X
nc
mh
there is no equilibrium. Consider an in-
crease in S1 together with a decrease of the same magnitude in S2 that leads
to a move from Region Xnc
mh
to Region Xncmm. It holds that Q
nc
mm coincides with
Qcmm and
Qncmh =
4+δ+2δS1
6+4δ
<
4+2δ+3δS1
6+6δ
=Qcmh.
The desired result for this case now follows from Proposition 2.3.3.
Between Regions Xnc
m’h
and Xncmm there is no equilibrium. Consider an
increase in S1 together with a decrease of the same magnitude in S2 that
leads to a move from Region Xnc
m’h
to Region Xncmm. Again, it holds that Q
nc
mm
coincides with Qcmm, Region X
nc
m’h
is a subset of Region Xc
mh
, and
Qnc
m’h
=
1
2
S1+
1
3
≤
4+2δ+3δS1
6+6δ
=Qcmh,
where S1 ≤ 2/3 is used to derive the inequality sign. The desired result for
this case now follows from Proposition 2.3.3.
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For second-period aggregate sales we have that
Qnc
ll
= 0,
∂Qnc
ll
∂S1
= 0,
Qnc
lm
=
2S−S1−1+δ
2+2δ
,
∂Qnc
lm
∂S1
=− 1
2+2δ
< 0,
Qnc
lh
= 1
2
,
∂Qnc
lh
∂S1
= 0,
Qncmm =
3S−2+2δ
3+3δ
,
∂Qncmm
∂S1
= 0,
Qnc
mh
=
3S1+2+3δ
6+4δ
,
∂Qnc
mh
∂S1
= 3
6+4δ
> 0,
Qnc
m’h
= 2
3
,
∂Qnc
m’h
∂S1
= 0,
Qnc
hh
= 2
3
,
∂Qnc
hh
∂S1
= 0.

Between Regions Xncmm and X
nc
mh
there is no equilibrium. For this region,
the consequences of increasing disparity of initial stock on second-period
aggregate sales haven’t been discussed yet.
Proposition 2.4.7. Consider an increase in S1 together with a decrease of
the same magnitude in S2 that leads to a move from Region X
nc
mh
to Re-
gion Xncmm. The second-period equilibrium sales may both decrease and in-
crease, depending on the values of S1,S2, and δ.
Proof For instance, when S1 = 5/9, S2 = 3/4, and δ= 1,we are in Region X
nc
mh
and the aggregate second-period sales are equal to 2/3. After an increase
in S1 accompanied by a decrease in S2 of the same magnitude resulting in
S1 = S2 = 47/72,we are in Region X
nc
mm and the aggregate second-period sales
are equal to 47/72< 2/3. We now make the same calculations for a discount
rate equal to 1/2. When (S1,S2,δ) = (5/9,3/4,1/2) we are in Region X
nc
mh
and
the aggregate second-period sales are equal to 13/24, whereas at (S1,S2,δ)=
(47/72,47/72,1/2) we are in Region Xncmm and the aggregate second-period
sales are equal to 35/54> 13/24. 
So, in these settings, increasing disparity of initial stock can increase as
well as decrease second-period aggregate sales. There is also no equilibrium
between Regions Xncmm and X
nc
m’h
. Here, it can be shown that an increase in
disparity of initial stock will always decrease second period sales.
Proposition 2.4.8. An increase in S1 together with a decrease of the same
size in S2 that leads from Region X
nc
m’h
to Region Xncmm will univocally lead to
a decrease in second-period sales.
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Proof In Region Xncmm it holds that S1+S2 ≤ 4/3, we have that
Qncmm =
3S−2+2δ
3+3δ
≤
2
3
=Qnc
m’h
.

Analogous results hold for comparative statics involving Regions Xncmm
and Xnc
hm
, and Regions Xncmm and X
nc
hm’
.
We next evaluate the effect of an increase in stock on consumer surplus.
We use the same measure for consumer surplus as before.
Proposition 2.4.9. An increase in Si, ceteris paribus, leads to a weak in-
crease in equilibrium consumer surplus, as long as the increase doesn’t change
the equilibrium outcome region. For some combinations of Si,S j and δ, a
strict increase in Si does change the equilibrium outcome region. This can
lead to a strict decrease in equilibrium consumer surplus.
Proof It follows directly from the equilibrium outcomes that per-period
sales in every equilibrium outcome region weakly increase in S1 and S2.
However, take δ,Si,S
′
i
and S j as defined in the proof of Proposition 2.4.5.
Equilibrium consumer surplus for δ,Si,S j is
CSncmm ≈ 0.25818.
An increase from Si to S
′
i
results in equilibrium consumer surplus of
CSncmh ≈ 0.25600.

That is, just like the firms, consumers usually gain from an increase in
stock. There are settings in which consumers are better off if a firm does
not increase its stock. However, this can only happen if, for some stock lev-
els in between the old and new stock level of the firm, ceteris paribus, an
equilibrium doesn’t exist.
The influence of increasing difference in stock level on consumer surplus
is given in the following proposition.
Proposition 2.4.10. Given fixed aggregate stock S1+S2, an increase in |S1−
S2| leads to a weak decrease in equilibrium consumer surplus.
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Proof By Proposition 2.3.5, this proposition holds for |S1−S2|, as long as
(S1,S2,δ) ∉X
nc
mh
∪Xnc
hm
∪Xnc
m’h
∪Xnc
hm’
. Assume, without loss of generality, that
S2 ≥ S1, so |S1−S2| increases if S1 decreases. Proposition 2.4.6 implies a
weak decrease in sales in both periods when |S1−S2| increases, and there-
fore a weak decrease in consumer surplus, for Region Xnc
m’h
and Xnc
mh
. The
remaining cases to check are those where a decrease in S1 changes the equi-
librium outcome from a point in Xncmm to a point in X
nc
mh
or from Xncmm to X
nc
m’h
.
Let c = S1+S2, where c is a constant. Consumer surplus in Region X
nc
mh
and Region Xnc
m’h
is
CSncmh =
1
2
(
4+δ+2δS1
6+4δ
)2+
1
2
δ(
3S1+2+3δ
6+4δ
)2,
CSnc
m’h
=
1
2
(
1
2
S1+
1
3
)2+
2
9
δ,
and in Region Xncmm
CSncmm =
1
2
(
2−2δ+3δc
3+3δ
)2+
1
2
δ(
3c−2+2δ
3+3δ
)2.
As mentioned, consumer surplus in Regions Xnc
mh
and Xnc
m’h
increases
with S1, for fixed c. In Region X
nc
mm, consumer surplus doesn’t change if S1
changes, for fixed c. This implies that, if CSnc
mh
≤ CSncmm for any (S1,S2,δ) ∈
{(S1,S2,δ) | S2 =β5,
1
3
(1−δ)≤ S1 ≤
2
3
− 1
9
δ}, consumer surplus decreases when
an increase in S1 changes the equilibrium outcome from period X
nc
mh
to Xncmm.
Calculations indeed show that CSnc
mh
≤ CSncmm for these values of (S1,S2,δ).
It also implies that, if CSnc
m’h
≤ CSncmm for any (S1,S2,δ) ∈ {(S1,S2,δ) | S2 =
β7,
2
3
− 1
9
δ < S1 ≤
2
3
}, consumer surplus decreases when an increase in S1
changes the equilibrium outcome from period Xnc
m’h
to Xncmm. 
The last part of this section is, again, devoted to total surplus. We have
already seen that an increase in a firm’s stock can lead to a decrease in its
equilibrium profit and in consumer surplus. It will not come as a surprise
that, with some extra calculations, the same type of results can be found for
total surplus. If an increase in stock of one of the firms doesn’t change the
equilibrium outcome region, equilibrium total surplus increases with this
increase in stock. If an increase in stock of one of the firms does change the
equilibrium outcome region, for some combinations of variables, this leads
to a decrease in total surplus. And, given fixed aggregate stock S1+S2, an
increase in |S1−S2| leads to a weak decrease in equilibrium total surplus.
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Summary of comparative statics results for the non-commitment case
In this section we have found that there is at most one subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium for each combination of Si,S j and δ. In contrast to the commit-
ment situation, in the case without commitment it is possible that the equi-
librium price decreases over time and that a firm’s profit increases when it
produces less. Increasing disparity in firm size leads to higher first-period
equilibrium prices and lower sales, but has ambiguous effects on second-
period equilibrium prices. Within every equilibrium outcome region, an in-
crease in some firm’s production level leads to an increase in it’s profit, an
increase in consumer surplus and an increase in total surplus. However,
there are situations in which an increase in some firm’s production level can
lead to a decrease in its profits, a decrease in consumer surplus and/or a
decrease in total surplus.
2.5 Commitment versus Non-commitment
In this section, we analyze how the equilibrium outcomes of the commitment
setting are related to the equilibrium outcomes of the non-commitment case.
For certain regions, as was mentioned before, the equilibrium outcomes
coincide. Notice that the equilibrium outcome corresponds to equilibrium
sales by the two firms in both periods.
Proposition 2.5.1. For every (S1,S2,δ) ∈X
nc
ll
∪Xnc
lm
∪Xnc
ml
∪Xnc
lh
∪Xnc
hl
∪Xncmm∪
Xnc
hh
, the equilibrium sales in the non-commitment case coincide with those of
the commitment setting.
Proof From the constraints defining the various regions it follows that
Xnc
ll
⊆ Xc
ll
, Xnc
lm
⊆ Xc
lm
, Xnc
ml
⊆ Xc
ml
, Xnc
lh
⊆ Xc
lh
, Xnc
hl
⊆ Xc
hl
,Xncmm ⊆ X
c
mm, and X
nc
hh
⊆
Xc
hh
. The equilibrium sales in Regions Xnc
ll
, Xnc
lm
, Xnc
ml
, Xnc
lh
, Xnc
hl
, Xncmm, and X
nc
hh
coincide with the equilibrium sales in Region Xc
ll
, Xc
lm
, Xc
ml
, Xc
lh
, Xc
hl
, Xcmm,
and Xc
hh
, respectively. 
An equilibrium always exists when S1 = S2. Since, for these produc-
tion levels, (S1,S1,δ) ∈ X
nc
ll
∪Xncmm∪X
nc
hh
when there is no commitment and
(S1,S1,δ) ∈ X
c
ll
∪Xcmm∪X
c
hh
when there is commitment, the following corol-
lary follows.
Corollary 2.5.2. When firms 1 and 2 are symmetric, the equilibrium sales
in the commitment case coincide with those of the non-commitment setting.
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The equivalence in equilibrium outcomes no longer holds when (Si,S j,δ) ∈
Xnc
mh
∪Xnc
hm
∪Xnc
m’h
∪Xnc
hm’
∪Xnc
Ø
. In these cases, there is one firm of intermediate
size, and one firm that can react almost unrestrictedly to the quantities of its
competitor. In the following we refer to these firms as the intermediate firm
and the large firm, respectively. We show that the large firm gains and the
intermediate firm loses from being in the non-commitment case, whenever
we are not in Region Xnc
Ø
, i.e. whenever a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
exists in the non-commitment case.
Proposition 2.5.3. For every (S1,S2,δ) outside Region X
nc
Ø
, the change in
equilibrium outcome from the commitment case to the non-commitment case
is to the advantage of the larger firm and to the disadvantage of the smaller
firm.
Proof Assume without loss of generality that S2 ≥ S1. Whenever there is a
change in the equilibrium outcome, it holds that (S1,S2,δ) belongs to Region
Xc
mh
. Firm 2 has profits equal to
Π
c
2 = (
2+4δ−3δS1
6+6δ
)2+δ(
4+2δ−3S1
6+6δ
)2.
It also holds that (S1,S2,δ) belongs to Region X
nc
mh
or Region Xnc
m’h
. In Region
Xnc
mh
, firm 2 has profits equal to
Π
nc
2 = (
2+3δ−2δS1
6+4δ
)2+δ(
4+δ−3S1
6+4δ
)2.
In Region Xnc
m’h
the profits of firm 2 are equal to
Π
nc
2 =
4
9
+
1
9
δ−
2
3
S1+
1
4
(S1)
2.
We have that S1 ≤
2
3
in all these regions, from which it follows that Πnc
2
≥Πc
2
.
Analogous calculations show the opposite relation for the profits of firm 1.

The intuition for this proposition follows from the same line of reasoning
as that of Proposition 2.4.4. The total quantity sold is, in both the settings,
the same for each firm. The small firm sells all of its stock in two periods,
whereas the large firm reacts per-period optimal. The small firm sells more
of its stock in the first period commitment setting than in the first period
non-commitment setting and for the large firm it is the other way around.
40
2.5. Commitment versus Non-commitment
Price is higher in the first period non-commitment setting than in the first
period commitment setting (see Proposition 2.5.4). For the second period,
it is the other way around again. Therefore, the large firm makes more
profit and the small firm makes less profit in the non-commitment setting,
compared to the commitment setting. The small firm cannot change this
by selling more of its stock in the first period, since this will induce the
large firm to sell extra in the second period, thereby making this deviation
unprofitable.
The following proposition describes the consequences of commitment for
equilibrium prices and sales.
Proposition 2.5.4. For every (S1,S2,δ) outside Region X
nc
Ø
, the first-period
equilibrium price in the non-commitment case is greater than or equal to
the first-period equilibrium price in the commitment case and the second-
period equilibrium price in the non-commitment case is less than or equal to
the second-period equilibrium price in the commitment setting. The opposite
relationships hold for aggregate sales in the two periods.
Proof We assume without loss of generality that S2 ≥ S1. Whenever there
is a change in the equilibrium price, (S1,S2,δ) belongs to Region X
c
mh
. In
Region Xc
mh
, prices in the first and second period are respectively
pc1 =
2+4δ−3δS1
6+6δ
and pc2 =
4+2δ−3S1
6+6δ
.
It also holds that (S1,S2,δ) belongs to Region X
nc
mh
or Xnc
m’h
. In Region Xnc
mh
,
prices are
pnc1 =
2+3δ−2δS1
6+4δ
and pnc2 =
4+δ−3S1
6+4δ
and in Region Xnc
m’h
, prices are
pnc1 =
2
3
−
1
2
S1 and p
nc
2 =
1
3
.
In Region Xc
mh
it holds that (1− δ)/3 < S1 ≤
2
3
, from which it follows that
pc
1
≤ pnc
1
and pc
2
≥ pnc
2
. 
The equilibrium outcome in the commitment case does not always coin-
cide with the equilibrium outcome in the non-commitment setting, in par-
ticular when there is one intermediate and one large firm. In these cases,
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it is the intermediate firm that would deviate if the commitment equilib-
rium quantities were chosen in the non-commitment setting. By transfer-
ring some of its quantity from the first to the second period, the intermedi-
ate firm could improve its profit, knowing that it forces the bigger firm to
adjust its second-period quantity downwards. This opportunity to deviate
profitably leads to the non-existence of an equilibrium in Region Xnc
Ø
.
In Regions Xnc
mh
, Xnc
hm
, Xnc
m’h
, and Xnc
hm’
, the profitable deviation of the in-
termediate firm results in a change in the equilibrium outcome. Perhaps
surprisingly, the equilibrium outcomes change to the disadvantage of the in-
termediate firm. To avoid a deviation by the intermediate firm, in the non-
commitment case the large firm sets a higher first-period quantity than in
the commitment case. This increase in sales by the large firm is more than
offset by lower first-period sales by the intermediate firm. The first-period
equilibrium price is higher in the non-commitment case than in the commit-
ment setting. The intermediate firm still sells all its production, leading to
a strong increase in its second-period sales. The second-period equilibrium
price is lower in the non-commitment case than in the commitment setting.
The large firm reacts per-period optimal to the intermediate firms and has
the same total sales as before. It follows that the profit for the intermedi-
ate firm is lower in the non-commitment setting than in the commitment
setting, whilst it is the other way around for the large firm.
Regarding consumer surplus, we mention the following. One may expect
the ability to commit to lead to less competition in the commitment setting
than in the case without commitment. However, this only holds for some
settings in which future profits are hardly discounted. The non-commitment
setting gives the large firm more opportunity to use its power, which, as a
result, increases the first period price and decreases the second period price.
Due to discounting, in most cases this results in consumer surplus being
lower in the non-commitment setting than in the case with commitment.
Proposition 2.5.5. For every (S1,S2,δ), such that (S1,S2,δ) ∉ X
nc
Ø
and δ ≤
24
25
, consumers prefer the commitment setting over the non-commitment set-
ting. If δ> 24
25
, there are combinations of (S1,S2,δ) for which consumers prefer
the non-commitment setting.
Proof We assume, without loss of generality, that S2 ≥ S1. Whenever there
is a change in consumer surplus between the settings, (S1,S2,δ) belongs to
Region Xc
mh
, and to Region Xnc
mh
or Xnc
m’h
. Consumer surplus in Regions Xc
mh
,
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Xnc
mh
and Xnc
m’h
is respectively
CScmh = (
4+2δ+3δS1
6+6δ
)2+δ(
3S1+2+4δ
6+6δ
)2,
CSncmh = (
4+δ+2δS1
6+4δ
)2+δ(
3S1+2+3δ
6+4δ
)2,
CSnc
m’h
= (
1
2
S1+
1
3
)2+
4
9
δ.
For Region Xnc
mh
and Xnc
m’h
, it holds respectively that 1
3
(1−δ)≤ Si ≤
2
3
− 1
9
δ and
2
3
− 1
9
δ< Si ≤
2
3
. Now,
CScmh ≥CS
nc
mh for Si ∈ [
1
3
(1−δ),
24−7δ−17δ2
3δ
]
and
CScmh ≥CS
nc
m’h
for Si ∈ [−2+
8
3
δ,
2
3
].
It holds that
24−7δ−17δ2
3δ
≥
2
3
−
1
9
δ
iff δ≤ 24
25
and
−2+
8
3
δ≤
2
3
−
1
9
δ
iff δ ≤ 24
25
. So for δ ≤ 24
25
, consumers prefer the commitment setting over the
non-commitment setting. 
The smaller firm prefers the commitment setting, the larger firm prefers
the non-commitment setting and consumers prefer in most situations the
commitment setting. Which setting then maximizes total surplus is the
question yet to answer.
Proposition 2.5.6. Total surplus is higher in the commitment setting than
in the non-commitment setting.
Proof We again assume w.l.o.g. that S2 ≥ S1. Whenever there is a change
in total surplus between the commitment and the non-commitment setting,
(S1,S2,δ) belongs to Region X
c
mh
, and to Region Xnc
mh
or Xnc
m’h
. Total surplus
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in Regions Xc
mh
, Xnc
mh
and Xnc
m’h
is respectively
TScmh = (
4+2δ+3δS1
6+6δ
)(1-
1
2
(
4+2δ+3δS1
6+6δ
))+δ(
3S1+2+4δ
6+6δ
)(1-
1
2
(
3S1+2+4δ
6+6δ
)),
TSncmh = (
4+δ+2δS1
6+4δ
)(1-
1
2
(
4+δ+2δS1
6+4δ
))+δ(
3S1+2+3δ
6+4δ
)(1-
1
2
(
3S1+2+3δ
6+4δ
)),
TSnc
m’h
= (
1
2
S1+
1
3
)(1−
1
2
(
1
2
S1+
1
3
))+δ(
2
3
)(1−
1
3
).
For Region Xnc
hm
and Region Xnc
hm’
, it holds respectively that 1
3
(1−δ) ≤ Si ≤
2
3
− 1
9
δ and 2
3
− 1
9
δ< Si ≤
2
3
. Now,
TSncmh ≥TS
c
mh iff S1 ∈ [
−12+5δ+7δ2
3δ
,
1
3
(1−δ)]
and
TSnc
m’h
≥TScmh iff S1 ∈ [
2
3
,2−
4
3
δ].
So, for S1 ∈ [
1
3
(1−δ), 2
3
], total surplus is the highest in the commitment set-
ting. 
Summary of comparative statics results for the commitment versus the
non-commitment case
The following can be said about the equilibrium outcome regions. There
is no difference between the equilibrium outcomes in the commitment and
the non-commitment case if the firms are of equal size. Non-commitment
is preferred over commitment only by the larger of the two firms. When
there is no commitment, the first-period equilibrium price is higher and the
second-period equilibrium price is lower than in the case with commitment.
Consumer surplus is in most cases highest in the commitment setting and
total surplus is in all cases highest in the commitment setting.
2.6 Concluding Remarks
We have shown that whether firms can or cannot commit to their sales strat-
egy influences prices, sales quantities, profits and surplus. Comparative
statics in the case with commitment conform to standard intuition. In the
non-commitment situation, however, a number of counterintuitive results
were found. First, equilibria may fail to exist. Moreover, in equilibrium
prices may decrease over time and higher stocks can lead to lower revenues
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from sales. Large firms benefit from the absence of commitment, contrary to
small firms and, in most cases, consumers.
We have limited the analysis to the case where competition takes place
during two periods. We expect our main results to be true in the multi-
period setting as well, but we fail to have an analytically tractable model
specification for that situation.
We have only analyzed the case where production has already taken
place, and firms compete in sales strategies. An extension of the model could
be to make the production capacity choice of the firms endogenous, if, again,
the tractability issues can be overcome.
Another issue that should be addressed in future research is to what ex-
tent the choice for quantity competition affects our outcomes. It is natural
to address the questions of this chapter for models of price competition. Also
here, however, it is challenging to find a model specification that is suffi-
ciently general but still analytically tractable.
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2.A The Reduced Best Response Correspondence
We derive the reduced best response correspondence of firm i for the non-
commitment case. To keep the appendix within reasonable length, we have
omitted the derivation of second-order conditions. In accordance with Propo-
sition 2.4.1, we can restrict our analysis to best responses against q j ≤
1
2
. We
distinguish three cases:
(A) q j < S j−
1
2
,
(B) S j−
1
2
≤ q j < S j−
1
3
,
(C) S j−
1
3
≤ q j ≤ S j.
These three cases correspond to the three cases of residual stock T j =
S j − q j of firm j with qualitatively different second-period behavior of firm
j.
(A) q j < S j−
1
2
Using the reduced profit function (2.2), for 0≤ qi < Si −
1
3
, profit is given by
(Yhh), and for Si−
1
3
≤ qi ≤ Si, profit is given by (Ylh). Taking the unrestricted
first-order condition of the profit function in (Yhh) and (Ylh) and solving for
qi results in q
hh
i
and qlh
i
given by
qhhi =
1
2
−
1
2
q j,
qlhi =
1− q j−
1
2
δ+δSi
2+δ
.
It holds that qhh
i
∈ [0,Si−
1
3
) if and only if 5
6
− 1
2
q j < Si. Similarly, it holds that
qlh
i
∈ [Si−
1
3
,Si] if and only if
1
2
− 1
2
q j−
1
4
δ≤ Si ≤
5
6
− 1
12
δ− 1
2
q j. We therefore
find that the reduced best response q∗
i
of player 1 to q j is given by
q∗i =


Si, if 0≤ Si <
1
2
− 1
2
q j−
1
4
δ,
1−q j−
1
2
δ+δSi
2+δ
, if 1
2
− 1
2
q j−
1
4
δ≤ Si ≤
5
6
− 1
12
δ− 1
2
q j,
Si−
1
3
, if 5
6
− 1
12
δ− 1
2
q j < Si ≤
5
6
− 1
2
q j,
1
2
− 1
2
q j, if
5
6
− 1
2
q j < Si.
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(B) S j−
1
2
≤ q j < S j−
1
3
It follows from the reduced profit function (2.2) that, for 0≤ qi < Si−
1
3
, profit
is given by (Yhh), for Si −
1
3
≤ qi < 2T j −1+Si, profit is given by (Ylh), and
for 2T j − 1+Si ≤ qi ≤ Si, profit is given by (Yll). Taking the unrestricted
first-order condition of the reduced profit function in (Yhh), (Ylh) and (Yll)
and solving for qi results in q
hh
i
,qlh
i
, and qll
i
given by
qhhi =
1
2
−
1
2
q j,
qlhi =
1− q j−
1
2
δ+δSi
2+δ
,
qlli =
1− q j+2δSi−δ+δT j
2+2δ
.
It holds that qhh
i
∈ [0,Si −
1
3
) if and only if 5
6
− 1
2
q j < Si. Similarly, it holds
that qlh
i
∈ [max{0,Si−
1
3
},2T j−1+Si) if and only if S
lh
i < Si ≤ S¯
lh
i
, where
Slhi =
3
2
+
1
4
δ−
1
2
q j− (2+δ)T j,
S¯lhi =
5
6
−
1
12
δ−
1
2
q j.
The requirement qlh
i
≥ 0 is not binding, since q j ≤
1
2
implies qlh
i
is positive. It
holds that qll
i
∈ [max{0,2T j−1+Si},Si] if and only if max{S
lla
i
,Sllb
i
}≤ Si ≤ S¯
ll
i
,
where
Sllai =
1
2δ
(q j−1+δ−δT j),
Sllbi =
1
2
(1−δ− q j+δT j),
S¯lli =
3
2
+
1
2
δ−
1
2
q j− (2+
3
2
δ)T j.
Since S j − q j ≥ 1/3, it holds that max{S¯
lh
i
, S¯ll
i
} ≤ 5/6− q j/2. The intervals
[Slhi , S¯
lh
i
] and [max{Slla
i
,Sllb
i
}, S¯ll
i
] are overlapping. In particular, since q j ≤
1/2, T j = S j− q j ≤ 1/2, and δ≤ 1, it holds that max{S
lla
i
,Sllb
i
}≤ Slhi ≤ S¯
ll
i
.
The reduced profit function of firm i has two local maxima if Slhi ≤ Si ≤
min{S¯ll
i
, S¯lh
i
}. Since S¯lh
i
≤ S¯ll
i
if and only if q j ≥ S j−
8+7δ
24+18δ
, the profit function
has two local maxima if
S j−
1
2
≤ q j ≤ S j−
8+7δ
24+18δ
and Slhi ≤ Si ≤ S¯
ll
i
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or
S j−
8+7δ
24+18δ
≤ q j ≤ S j−
1
3
and Slhi ≤ Si ≤ S¯
lh
i .
To find the global maximum, we compare the profits in both local maxima.
The profits corresponding to qlh
i
and qll
i
are respectively
Π
lh
i =
4+4q2
j
−4δ+16δSi +8δS
2
i
+δ2+−8q j +4δq j −8Siδq j
16+8δ
,
Π
ll
i =
1-2δ+δ2-2q j+2δ
2q j+q
2
j
+2δq2
j
+δ2q2
j
+8δSi-4δS
2
i
+2δS j-2δ
2S j-2δq jS j-2δ
2q jS j-4δSiS j+δ
2S2
j
4+4δ
.
It holds that Πlh
i
≥Πll
i
if and only if Si ≥ S˜i, where
S˜i = 1−
1
2
q j− (1+
1
2
δ)T j+ (
1
2
−T j)
√
(1+δ)(1+
1
2
δ).
Since S˜i > S
lh
i whenever q j ≥ S j−
1
2
, qlh
i
maximizes profits for S˜i ≤ Si ≤ S¯
lh
i
.
Since max{Slla
i
,Sllb
i
}≤ S˜i ≤ S¯
ll
i
, qll
i
maximizes profits for max{Slla
i
,Sllb
i
}≤
Si ≤ S˜i.
When max{S¯ll
i
(q j), S¯
lh
i
(q j)} < Si ≤
5
6
− 1
2
q j we have a boundary solution,
and profit maximizing sales are given by q∗
i
= Si−
1
3
.
One possibility remains: max{S¯lh
i
, S˜i} < Si ≤ S¯
ll
i
. In this case, the profit
maximizing choice is either qll
i
or q∗
i
.We argue that qll
i
maximizes profits, so
for S¯lh
i
≤ Si ≤ S¯
ll
i
, the best response of firm i is qll
i
.
It holds that
Π
ll
i ≥Π
∗
i = (Si−
1
3
)(
4
3
−Si− q j)+
1
9
δ
if and only if
Si ∈ [
5
6
−
1
6
δ−
1
2
q j+
1
2
δT j±
1
3
√
δ(1+δ)(3T j−1)].
Since
[S¯lhi , S¯
ll
i ]⊂ [
5
6
−
1
6
δ−
1
2
q j+
1
2
δT j±
1
3
√
δ(1+δ)(3T j−1)]
for
q j < S j−
4+5δ−4
√
(1+δ)(1+ 1
2
δ)
6δ
,
we have our desired conclusion.
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Summarizing, the reduced best response q∗
i
of player i against q j for
S j−
1
2
≤ q j < S j−
1
3
is given by
q∗i =


0, if 0≤ Si < S
lla
i
,
Si, if 0≤ Si < S
llb
i
,
(1−q j+2δSi−δ+δT j)
2+2δ
, if max{Slla
i
,Sllb
i
}≤ Si ≤ S˜i,
1−q j−
1
2
δ+δSi
2+δ
, if S˜i ≤ Si ≤ S
lh
i ,
(1−q j+2δSi−δ+δT j)
2+2δ
, if max{S˜i,S
lh
i }< Si ≤ S
ll
i ,
Si−
1
3
if max{S
lh
i ,S
ll
i }< Si ≤
5
6
− 1
2
q j,
1
2
− 1
2
q j, if
5
6
− 1
2
q j < Si,
where
S˜i = 1−
1
2
q j− (1+
1
2
δ)T j+ (
1
2
−T j)
√
(1+δ)(1+
1
2
δ),
Slhi =
3
2
+
1
4
δ−
1
2
q j− (2+δ)T j,
S¯lhi =
5
6
−
1
12
δ−
1
2
q j,
Sllai =
1
2δ
(q j−1+δ−δT j),
Sllbi =
1
2
(1−δ− q j+δT j),
S¯lli =
3
2
+
1
2
δ−
1
2
q j− (2+
3
2
δ)T j.
(C) S j−
1
3
≤ q j ≤ S j
It follows from the reduced profit function (2.2) that, for 0≤ qi < Si−
1
2
+ 1
2
T j,
profit is given by (Yhl), and for Si−
1
2
+ 1
2
T j ≤ qi ≤ Si, profit is given by (Yll).
Taking the unrestricted first-order condition of the profit function in (Yhl)
and (Yll) and solving for qi results in q
hl
i
and qll
i
given by
qhli =
1
2
−
1
2
q j,
qlli =
1− q j+2δSi−δ+δT j
2+2δ
.
It holds that qhl
i
∈ [0,Si −
1
2
+ 1
2
T j) if and only if 1−
1
2
S j < Si. Similarly, it
holds that qll
i
∈ [Si−
1
2
+ 1
2
T j,Si] if and only if max{
1
2
(1−δ−q j+δT j),
1
2δ
(−1+
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δ+q j−δT j)}≤ Si ≤ 1−
1
2
S j. We therefore find that the reduced best response
q∗
i
of player 1 to q j is given by
q∗
i
=


Si, if 0≤ Si <
1
2
(1−δ− q j+δT j),
0, if 0≤ Si <
1
2δ
(−1+δ+ q j−δT j),
1−q j+2δSi−δ+δT j
2+2δ
, if max{1
2
(1−δ− q j+δT j),
1
2δ
(−1+δ+ q j−δT j)}
≤ Si ≤ 1−
1
2
S j,
1
2
− 1
2
q j, if 1−
1
2
S j < Si.
Overview of the Reduced Best Response Correspondence
Table 2.4 now follows immediately.
2.B Subgame Perfect Equilibria
We define the sets A j(1), . . . ,A j(4), B j(1), . . . ,B j(7), C j(1), . . . ,C j(4) as the sets
of quantities q j satisfying the constraints as presented in Table 2.4. Notice
that each of these sets is a subset of [0,1/2].Moreover, we define A j(k1, . . . ,kℓ)=
A j(k1)∪·· ·∪A j(kℓ), and similarly for sets B j(k1, . . . ,kℓ) and C j(k1, . . . ,kℓ). In
the proofs we will make use of Table 2.4. That table presents the reduced
best response of firm i to a first-period sales quantity of firm j with the use of
coefficients α1, . . . ,α8. In the sequel we will need the reduced best response of
firm j to a first-period sales quantity of firm i, which follows from Table 2.4
by reversing the roles of firm i and j. The corresponding coefficients are de-
noted by β1, . . . ,β8.
Proposition B.1 If (q∗
i
,q∗
j
) is a Nash equilibrium of the reduced game and
q∗
j
∈ A j(1,2,3)∪B j(1,2,3,4,5,6)∪C j(1), then Si−q
∗
i
≤ 1
3
, so q∗
i
∈Ci(1,2,3,4).
Proof For q∗
j
∈ A j(1,3)∪B j(1,6)∪C j(1) it follows immediately from Table 2.4
that Si− q
∗
i
≤ 1
3
. For q∗
j
∈ A j(2)∪B j(4),
Si− q
∗
i =
2Si−1+ q
∗
j
+ 1
2
δ
2+δ
≤
2
3
+ 1
3
δ
2+δ
=
1
3
,
where the inequality follows from q∗
j
≤α2. For q
∗
j
∈B j(2),
Si− q
∗
i <
3
4
−
1
4δ
−
1
2
S j <
1
3
,
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A j (q j < S j−
1
2
) q∗
i
r∗
i
1) 0≤ q j <α1 Si 0
2) α1 ≤ q j ≤α2
1−q j−
1
2
δ+δSi
2+δ
2Si−1+q j+
1
2
δ
2+δ
3) α2 < q j ≤α3 Si−
1
3
1
3
4) q j > α3
1
2
− 1
2
q j
1
3
B j (S j−
1
2
≤ q j < S j−
1
3
) q∗
i
r∗
i
1) 0≤ q j <α4 Si 0
2) q j >α5 0 Si
3) max{α4,α6}≤ q j ≤α5
1−q j+2δSi−δ+δT j
2+2δ
2Si−1+q j+δ−δT j
2+2δ
4) q j ≤α6,q j ≤α2
1−q j−
1
2
δ+δSi
2+δ
2Si−1+q j+
1
2
δ
2+δ
5) α2 < q j <α6,q j ≥α7
1−q j+2δSi−δ+δT j
2+2δ
2Si−1+q j+δ−δT j
2+2δ
6) α2 < q j ≤α3,q j <α7 Si−
1
3
1
3
7) q j > α3
1
2
− 1
2
q j
1
3
C j ( q j ≥ S j−
1
3
) q∗
i
r∗
i
1) 0≤ q j <α4 Si 0
2) q j >α5 0 Si
3) α4 ≤ q j ≤α5,Si ≤α8
1−q j+2δSi−δ+δT j
2+2δ
2Si−1+q j+δ−δT j
2+2δ
4) Si >α8
1
2
− 1
2
q j
1
2
− 1
2
S j+
1
2
q j
Explanation of the symbols
α1 1−
1
2
δ−2Si
α2
5
3
− 1
6
δ−2Si
α3
5
3
−2Si
α4
1−δ+δS j−2Si
1+δ
α5
1−δ+δS j+2δSi
1+δ
α6
2Si−2+2S j+δS j−(1−2S j)
√
(1+δ)(1+ 1
2
δ)
1+δ+2
√
(1+δ)(1+ 1
2
δ)
α7
2Si−3−δ+4S j+3δS j
3+3δ
α8 1−
1
2
S j
Table 2.4: Reduced best response correspondence σR∗
i
(q j) for 0≤ q j ≤
1
2
.
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where the first inequality follows from α5 < q
∗
j
≤ 1
2
and the second one from
δ≤ 1 and S j > q
∗
j
+ 1
3
≥ 1
3
. For q∗
j
∈B j(3),
Si− q
∗
i =
2Si−1+ q
∗
j
+δ−δT j
2(1+δ)
≤
(1+δ+
√
(1+δ)(1+ 1
2
δ))(1−2T j)
2(1+δ)
≤
1+δ+
√
(1+δ)(1+ 1
2
δ)
6(1+δ)
≤
1
3
,
where the first inequality follows from q∗
j
≥α6 (i.e. Si ≤ S
c
i
), the second from
1
3
<T j ≤
1
2
and the third one from δ ∈ (0,1]. For q∗
j
∈B j(5),
Si− q
∗
i =
2Si−1+ q
∗
j
+δ−δT j
2(1+δ)
≤ 1−2T j ≤
1
3
,
where the first inequality follows from q∗
j
≤ α7, i.e. Si ≤ S
ll
i , and the second
one from 1
3
<T j ≤
1
2
. 
Proposition B.2 If (q∗
i
,q∗
j
) is a Nash equilibrium of the reduced game and
q∗
j
∈ A j(4)∪B j(7)∪C j(4), then Si−q
∗
i
> 1
3
, so q∗
i
∈ A i(1,2,3,4)∪Bi(1,2,3,4,5,6,7).
Proof If q∗
j
∈ A j(4)∪B j(7), then since q
∗
j
> α3, we have Si >
5
6
− 1
2
q∗
j
, and
q∗
i
= 1
2
− 1
2
q∗
j
. Therefore, Si − q
∗
i
> 1
3
. If q∗
j
∈ C j(4), then S j − q
∗
j
≤ 1
3
, Si >
1− 1
2
S j, and q
∗
i
= 1
2
− 1
2
q∗
j
. This implies Si− q
∗
i
> 1
3
. 
We continue by solving for all Nash equilibria (q∗
i
,q∗
j
) of the reduced game
where q∗
j
∈ A j(1). Next we consider Nash equilibria (q
∗
i
,q∗
j
) with q∗
j
∈ A j(2).
We restrict attention to the case with q∗
i
∉ A i(1), since using the symmetry
of the firms such equilibria follow already from the first case. We continue
with q∗
j
∈ A j(3), and so on.
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q∗
j
∈Aj(1)
It holds that
q∗j < S j−
1
2
, (2.3)
q∗j < 1−
1
2
δ−2Si, (2.4)
q∗i =σ
R
i (q
∗
j )= Si. (2.5)
By Proposition B.1, q∗
i
∈Ci(1,2,3,4). This gives the following possibilities:
q∗i ∈Ci(1) : q
∗
j = S j,
q∗i ∈Ci(2) : q
∗
j = 0,
q∗i ∈Ci(3) : q
∗
j =
1−Si+2δS j−δ
2+2δ
, (2.6)
q∗i ∈Ci(4) : q
∗
j =
1
2
−
1
2
Si. (2.7)
If q∗
i
∈ Ci(2), then q
∗
i
> β5 implies S j <
1
2
− 1
2δ
+ 1
2δ
Si <
1
2
by (2.5) and
Lemma 2.4.1, so (2.3) leads to a contradiction.
Next, (2.3) and (2.6) imply S j > 1−
1
2
Si, whereas q
∗
i
∈Ci(3) implies q
∗
i
≤
β8, so S j ≤ 1−
1
2
Si, a contradiction.
When q∗
i
∈ Ci(4), then q
∗
i
≥ Si −
1
3
and S j > β8. These inequalities to-
gether with the inequalities (2.3) and (2.4) lead to the conclusion that (q∗
j
,q∗
i
)
is a Nash equilibrium with q∗
j
∈ A j(1) if and only if q
∗
j
= 1
2
− 1
2
Si, q
∗
i
= Si,
S j > 1−
1
2
Si, and Si <
1
3
− 1
3
δ.
q∗
j
∈Aj(2)
It holds that
q∗j < S j−
1
2
, (2.8)
1−
1
2
δ−2Si ≤ q
∗
j ≤
5
3
−
1
6
δ−2Si, (2.9)
q∗i =σ
R
i (q
∗
j )=
1− q∗
j
− 1
2
δ+δSi
2+δ
≤
1
2
.
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By Proposition B.1, q∗
i
∈Ci(2,3,4).
7 This gives the following possibilities:
q∗i ∈Ci(2) : q
∗
i =
1− 1
2
δ+δSi
2+δ
, q∗j = 0, (2.10)
q∗i ∈Ci(3) : q
∗
i =
1+2δ−δ2+δSi+2δ
2Si−2δS j
3+5δ+2δ2
, (2.11)
q∗j =
2−3δ−δ2+8δS j+4δ
2S j+2δSi
6+10δ+4δ2
,
q∗i ∈Ci(4) : q
∗
i =
1−δ+2δSi
3+2δ
, q∗j =
2+3δ−2δSi
6+4δ
. (2.12)
Consider q∗
i
∈ Ci(2). Then q
∗
i
> β5, so S j <
−2+3δ+δ2−2δSi
8δ+4δ2
< 1
2
, and (2.8)
leads to a contradiction.
Consider q∗
i
∈Ci(3). It holds that
5+2δ+δ2+2δSi
6+2δ
< S j ≤ 1−
1
2
Si, (2.13)
where the first inequality follows from (2.8) and (2.11), and the second in-
equality from S j ≤ β8. By rewriting the expression in (2.13), it follows that
Si <
1
3
− 1
3
δ.
However, this is contradicted by
Si ≥
1+2δ−δ2−2δS j
3+4δ
≥
1
3
−
1
3
δ,
where the first inequality follows from (2.9) and (2.11), and the second in-
equality from S j ≤β8.
Consider q∗
i
∈Ci(4). It is implied by (2.9) and (2.12) that
1
3
(1−δ)≤ Si ≤
1
3
(2−
1
3
δ).
From (2.8) and (2.12) it follows that S j >
5+5δ−2δSi
6+4δ
. In conclusion, (q∗
j
,q∗
i
)
is a Nash equilibrium with q∗
j
∈ A j(2) if and only if q
∗
j
=
2+3δ−2δSi
6+4δ
, q∗
i
=
1−δ+2δSi
3+2δ
, 1
3
(1−δ)≤ Si ≤
1
3
(2− 1
3
δ), and S j >
5+5δ−2δSi
6+4δ
.
7Note that, by Proposition B.1, q∗
i
∉ Ci(1). By Proposition B.1, if q
∗
i
∈ Ci(1), then q
∗
j
∈
C j(1,2,3,4).
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q∗
j
∈Aj(3)
It holds that
q∗j < S j−
1
2
, (2.14)
5
3
−
1
6
δ−2Si < q
∗
j ≤
5
3
−2Si, (2.15)
q∗i =σ
R
i (q
∗
j )= Si−
1
3
.
By Proposition B.1, q∗
i
∈Ci(2,3,4). This gives the following possibilities:
q∗i ∈ Ci(2) : q
∗
j = 0,
q∗i ∈ Ci(3) : q
∗
j =
4
3
− 2
3
δ+2δS j−Si
2+2δ
,
q∗i ∈ Ci(4) : q
∗
j =
2
3
−
1
2
Si.
Consider q∗
i
∈Ci(2). Since q
∗
j
= 0, the second inequality in (2.15) implies
Si ≤
5
6
. We have that
1
2
< S j <
Si−
4
3
+ 2
3
δ
2δ
, (2.16)
where the first inequality follows from (2.14) and the second from q∗
i
> β5.
By rewriting the expression (2.16), we find that Si >
4
3
+ 1
3
δ, contradicting
Si ≤ 5/6.
Consider q∗
i
∈Ci(3). By (2.14), it should hold that
S j > 1
1
6
+
1
6
δ−
1
2
Si,
which contradicts with S j ≤β8.
Consider q∗
i
∈Ci(4). It holds that
2
3
−
1
9
δ< Si ≤
2
3
,
where both inequalities follow from (2.15). From (2.14), it follows that
S j >
7
6
−
1
2
Si.
The other constraints are redundant. In conclusion, q∗
j
∈ A j(3) if and
only if q∗
i
∈Ci(4),S j >
7
6
− 1
2
Si and
2
3
− 1
9
δ< Si ≤
2
3
.
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q∗
j
∈Aj(4)
It holds that
q∗j < S j−
1
2
, (2.17)
q∗j >
5
3
−2Si.
We have
q∗i =σ
R
i (q
∗
j )=
1
2
−
1
2
q j ≤
1
2
.
By Proposition B.1 and Proposition B.2, q∗
i
∈ A i(4)∪Bi(7).
8 This gives
the following possibilities:
q∗i ∈ A i(4) : q
∗
i = q
∗
j =
1
3
,
q∗i ∈ Bi(7) : q
∗
i = q
∗
j =
1
3
,
Consider q∗
i
∈ A i(4)∪Bi(7). It follows from (2.17) that
S j >
5
6
.
For q∗
i
∈ A i(4), it follows from q
∗
i
< Si −
1
2
that Si >
5
6
. Next, if q∗
i
∈ Bi(7), it
follows from
Si−
1
2
≤ q∗i < S j−
1
3
that
2
3
< Si ≤
5
6
.
The other constraints are redundant. In conclusion, q∗
j
∈ A j(4) if and
only if q∗
i
∈ A i(4)∪Bi(7) and S j >
5
6
, Si >
2
3
.
q∗
j
∈Bj(1)
It holds that
S j−
1
2
≤ q∗j < S j−
1
3
, (2.18)
q∗j <
1−δ+δS j−2Si
1+δ
. (2.19)
8Note that Proposition B.1 excludes that q∗
i
∈ A i(1,2,3)∪Bi(1,2,3,4,5,6) and q
∗
j
∈ A j(4).
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We have
q∗i =σ
R
i (q
∗
j )= Si ≤
1
2
.
By Proposition B.1, q∗
i
∈Ci(2,3,4). This gives the following possibilities:
q∗i ∈ Ci(2) : q
∗
j = 0,
q∗i ∈ Ci(3) : q
∗
j =
1−Si+2δS j−δ
2+2δ
,
q∗i ∈ Ci(4) : q
∗
j =
1
2
−
1
2
Si.
For q∗
i
∈Ci(2), it can be found that
S j <
1
2δ
(Si−1+δ)<
1
3δ
(−1+δ)≤ 0,
where the first inequality follows from q∗
i
> β5, the second one from (2.19)
and the last one from δ≤ 1.
For q∗
i
∈Ci(3), (2.18) implies
5
6
− 1
6
δ− 1
2
Si < S j ≤ 1−
1
2
Si. By (2.19), Si <
1
3
− 1
3
δ. The other constraints are redundant.
Next, q∗
i
∈Ci(4) implies S j > 1−
1
2
Si, whereas (2.18) implies S j ≤ 1−
1
2
Si,
a contradiction.
In conclusion, q∗
j
∈B j(1) if and only if q
∗
i
∈Ci(3) and
5
6
− 1
6
δ− 1
2
Si < S j ≤
1− 1
2
Si,Si <
1
3
− 1
3
δ.
q∗
j
∈Bj(2)
It holds that
S j−
1
2
≤ q∗j < S j−
1
3
, (2.20)
q∗j >
1−δ+δS j+2δSi
1+δ
. (2.21)
We have
q∗i =σ
R
i (q
∗
j )= 0.
By Proposition B.1, q∗
i
∈Ci(2,3,4). This gives the following possibilities:
q∗i ∈ Ci(2) : q
∗
j = 0,
q∗i ∈ Ci(3) : q
∗
j =
1+2δS j−δ+δSi
2+2δ
,
q∗i ∈ Ci(4) : q
∗
j =
1
2
.
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For q∗
i
∈Ci(2), from q
∗
i
>β5 it follows that S j <
1
2δ
(−1+δ−δSi)≤ 0.
Consider q∗
i
∈Ci(3). Inequality (2.20) implies Si <
1
3δ
(−1+δ)≤ 0.
If q∗
i
∈Ci(4), it holds again that
Si <
1
4δ
(−1+3δ−2δS j)<
1
3δ
(−1+δ)≤ 0,
where the first inequality follows from (2.21) and the second one from S j >
β8.
In conclusion, q∗
j
∉B j(2).
q∗
j
∈Bj(3)
It holds that
S j−
1
2
≤ q∗j < S j−
1
3
, (2.22)
q j ≥ max{
1-δ+δS j-2Si
1+δ
,
2Si-2+2S j+δS j-(1-2S j)
√
(1+δ)(1+1
2
δ)
1+δ+2
√
(1+δ)(1+ 1
2
δ)
},(2.23)
q j ≤
1−δ+δS j+2δSi
1+δ
. (2.24)
We have
q∗i =σ
R
i (q
∗
j )=
1− q j+2δSi−δ+δS j−δq j
2+2δ
.
By Proposition B.1, q∗
i
∈Ci(2,3,4). This gives the following possibilities:
q∗i ∈Ci(2) : q
∗
i =
1+2δSi−δ+δS j
2+2δ
,q∗j = 0,
q∗i ∈Ci(3) : q
∗
i =
1−δ+3δSi
3+3δ
,q∗j =
1−δ+3δS j
3+3δ
,
q∗i ∈Ci(4) : q
∗
i =
1−3δ+4δSi+2δS j
3+3δ
,
q∗j =
1+3δ−2δSi−δS j
3+3δ
.
For q∗
i
∈Ci(2), it follows from q
∗
i
>β5 that S j <
1
3δ
(−1+δ)≤ 0.
If q∗
i
∈ Ci(3), it is implied by (2.23) that
1
3
(1− δ) ≤ Si ≤
7
6
− S j −
1
6
δ+√
(1+δ)(1+ 1
2
δ)
1+δ
(5
6
+ 1
6
δ−S j). It follows from (2.22) that S j >
2
3
. The remaining
constraints are redundant.
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Consider q∗
i
∈ Ci(4). By S j > β8 and (2.23) it follows that 2−2S j < Si ≤
7+10δ+3δ2−6S j−10δS j−4δ
2S j+(5+9δ−6S j−8δS j)
√
(1+δ)(1+ 1
2
δ)
6+8δ+2δ2+4δ
√
(1+δ)(1+ 1
2
δ)
. Such an Si only exists
if S j >
5+δ
6
. From (2.22) it follows that Si ≤
5+9δ−6S j−8δS j
4δ
. Now, there only
exists an Si such that 2−2S j < Si ≤
5+9δ−6S j−8δS j
4δ
, if S j <
5+δ
6
, a contradic-
tion.
In conclusion, q∗
j
∈ B j(3) if and only if q
∗
i
∈ Ci(3) and
1
3
(1− δ) ≤ Si ≤
7
6
−S j−
1
6
δ+
√
(1+δ)(1+ 1
2
δ)
1+δ
(5
6
+ 1
6
δ−S j),S j >
2
3
.
q∗
j
∈Bj(4)
It holds that
S j−
1
2
≤ q∗j < S j−
1
3
, (2.25)
q j <
2Si−2+2S j+δS j− (1−2S j)
√
(1+δ)(1+ 1
2
δ)
1+δ+2
√
(1+δ)(1+ 1
2
δ)
, (2.26)
q j ≤
5
3
−
1
6
δ−2Si. (2.27)
We have
q∗i =σ
R
i (q
∗
j )=
1− q j−
1
2
δ+δSi
2+δ
.
By Proposition B.1, q∗
i
∈Ci(2,3,4). This gives the following possibilities:
q∗i ∈Ci(2) : q
∗
i =
1− 1
2
δ+δSi
2+δ
,q∗j = 0,
q∗i ∈Ci(3) : q
∗
i =
1+2δ−δ2+δSi+2δ
2Si−2δS j
3+5δ+2δ2
,
q∗j =
2−3δ−δ2+8δS j+4δ
2S j+2δSi
6+10δ+4δ2
,
q∗i ∈Ci(4) : q
∗
i =
1−δ+2δSi
3+2δ
,q∗j =
2+3δ−2δSi
6+4δ
.
For q∗
i
∈ Ci(2), qi > β5 and inequality (2.25) imply respectively that
1
3
<
S j <
−1+ 3
2
δ+ 1
2
δ2−δSi
2δ(2+δ)
. However, no such S j exists, since this would imply that
Si <
1
δ
(−1+ 1
6
δ− 1
6
δ2)≤ 0.
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Consider q∗
i
∈Ci(3). It follows from (2.26) and qi <β5 that
7+91
2
δ+2δ2-1
2
δ3-6S j-9δS j-3δ
2S j+(5+2δ+δ
2-6S j-2δS j)
√
(1+δ)(1+1
2
δ)
6+9δ+3δ2−2δ
√
(1+δ)(1+ 1
2
δ)
< Si ≤ 2−2S j (2.28)
and from (2.25) and qi <β5 that
6S j+2δS j−5−2δ−δ
2
2δ
≤ Si ≤ 2−2S j. (2.29)
There exists an Si such that (2.28) if and only if S j >
5+δ
6
and there exists
an Si such that (2.29) holds if and only if S j ≤
5+δ
6
, a contradiction.
If q∗
i
∈Ci(4), inequality (2.27) implies Si ≤
1
3
(2−1
3
δ). It follows from (2.26)
and (2.25) respectively that S j >
7+6 1
2
δ+ 3
2
δ2−6Si−5δSi−δ
2Si+(5+5δ−2δSi)
√
(1+δ)(1+ 1
2
δ)
6+7δ+2δ2+(6+4δ)
√
(1+δ)(1+ 1
2
δ)
and S j ≤
5+5δ−2δSi
6+4δ
. The other constraints are redundant.
In conclusion, q∗
j
∈ B j(4) if and only if q
∗
i
∈ Ci(4) and Si ≤
1
3
(2− 1
3
δ),
7+6 1
2
δ+ 3
2
δ2−6Si−5δSi−δ
2Si+(5+5δ−2δSi)
√
(1+δ)(1+ 1
2
δ)
6+7δ+2δ2+(6+4δ)
√
(1+δ)(1+ 1
2
δ)
< S j ≤
5+5δ−2δSi
6+4δ)
.
q∗
j
∈Bj(5)
It holds that
S j−
1
2
≤ q∗j < S j−
1
3
, (2.30)
5
3
−
1
6
δ−2Si < q j <
2Si−2+2S j+δS j− (1−2S j)
√
(1+δ)(1+ 1
2
δ)
1+δ+2
√
(1+δ)(1+ 1
2
δ)
,(2.31)
q j ≥
2Si−3−δ+4S j+3δS j
3+3δ
. (2.32)
We have
q∗i =σ
R
i (q
∗
j )=
1− q j+2δSi−δ+δS j−δq j
2+2δ
.
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By Proposition B.1, q∗
i
∈Ci(2,3,4). This gives the following possibilities:
q∗i ∈Ci(2) : q
∗
i =
1+2δSi−δ+δS j
2+2δ
,q∗j = 0,
q∗i ∈Ci(3) : q
∗
i =
1−δ+3δSi
3+3δ
,q∗j =
1−δ+3δS j
3+3δ
,
q∗i ∈Ci(4) : q
∗
i =
1−3δ+4δSi+2δS j
3+3δ
,
q∗j =
1+3δ−2δSi−δS j
3+3δ
.
For q∗
i
∈Ci(2), it follows from qi >β6 that S j <
1
3δ
(−1+δ)≤ 0.
For q∗
i
∈ Ci(3), it holds that S j ≤ 1−
1
2
Si. It is implied by (2.31) that
Si >max{
4+5 1
2
δ− 1
2
δ2−3δS j
6+6δ
, 7
6
− 1
6
δ−S j+
√
(1+δ)(1+ 1
2
δ)
1+δ
(5
6
+ 1
6
δ−S j)}. From (2.30)
it follows that S j >
2
3
. The other constraints are redundant.
If q∗
i
∈ Ci(4), it holds that S j > 1−
1
2
Si. From (2.32) it follows that S j ≤
1− 1
2
Si, a contradiction.
In conclusion, q∗
j
∈B j(5) if and only if q
∗
i
∈Ci(3) and Si >max{
4+5 1
2
δ− 1
2
δ2−3δS j
6+6δ
, 7
6
−
1
6
δ−S j+
√
(1+δ)(1+ 1
2
δ)
1+δ
(5
6
+ 1
6
δ−S j)},
2
3
< S j ≤ 1−
1
2
Si.
q∗
j
∈Bj(6)
It holds that
S j−
1
2
≤ q∗j < S j−
1
3
, (2.33)
5
3
−
1
6
δ−2Si < q j ≤
5
3
−2Si, (2.34)
q j <
2Si−3−δ+4S j+3δS j
3+3δ
. (2.35)
We have
q∗i =σ
R
i (q
∗
j )= Si−
1
3
.
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By Proposition B.1, q∗
i
∈Ci(2,3,4). This gives the following possibilities:
q∗i ∈ Ci(2) : q
∗
j = 0, (2.36)
q∗i ∈ Ci(3) : q
∗
j =
4
3
− 2
3
δ+2δS j−Si
2+2δ
,
q∗i ∈ Ci(4) : q
∗
j =
2
3
−
1
2
Si.
For q∗
i
∈Ci(2). It holds that
S j ≤
1
2δ
(Si−
4
3
+
2
3
δ)≤
1
2δ
(−
1
2
+
2
3
δ)≤
1
3
,
where the first inequality follows from (2.36) and the second one from (2.34).
This contradicts with (2.33).
Consider q∗
i
∈Ci(3).It holds that S j ≤ 1−
1
2
Si. From (2.33) it follows that
S j > 1−
1
2
Si, a contradiction.
Next, if q∗
i
∈ Ci(4), it follows from (2.33) that S j ≤
7
6
− 1
2
Si. By (2.34)
and by (2.35) it is implied respectively that 1
3
(2− 1
3
δ) < Si ≤
2
3
and S j >
10+6δ−7Si−3δSi
8+6δ
. The other constraints are redundant.
In conclusion, q∗
j
∈ B j(6) if and only if q
∗
i
∈ Ci(4) and
1
3
(2− 1
3
δ) < Si ≤
2
3
,
10+6δ−7Si−3δSi
8+6δ
< S j ≤
7
6
− 1
2
Si.
q∗
j
∈Bj(7)
It holds that
S j−
1
2
≤ q∗j < S j−
1
3
, (2.37)
q∗j >
5
3
−2Si.
We have
q∗i =σ
R
i (q
∗
j )=
1
2
−
1
2
q j ≤
1
2
.
By Proposition B.1 and Proposition B.2, q∗
i
∈Bi(7). This gives the follow-
ing possibilities:
q∗i ∈Bi(7) : q
∗
i = q
∗
j =
1
3
.
For q∗
i
∈B j(7), it follows from Si−
1
2
≤ q∗
i
< S j −
1
2
that 2
3
< Si ≤
5
6
. From
(2.37) it follows that 2
3
< S j ≤
5
6
. The rest of the constraints is redundant.
Therefore, q∗
j
∈B j(7) if q
∗
i
∈Bi(7) and
2
3
< Si ≤
5
6
, 2
3
< S j ≤
5
6
.
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q∗
j
∈Cj(1)
It holds that
q∗j ≥ S j−
1
3
, (2.38)
q∗j <
1−δ+δS j−2Si
1+δ
. (2.39)
We have
q∗i =σ
R
i (q
∗
j )= Si ≤
1
2
.
By Proposition B.1 and Proposition B.2, q∗
i
∈ Ci(1,2,3). This gives the fol-
lowing possibilities:
q∗i ∈ Ci(1) : q
∗
j = S j,
q∗i ∈ Ci(2) : q
∗
j = 0,
q∗i ∈ Ci(3) : q
∗
j =
1−Si+2δS j−δ
2+2δ
.
If q∗
i
∈Ci(1), then, by qi <β4, it holds that S j <
1
2
− 1
2
δ− 1
2
Si. From (2.39),
it follows that Si <
1
2
− 1
2
δ− 1
2
S j.
Consider q∗
i
∈Ci(2). It holds that
S j <
1
2δ
(Si−1+δ)<
1
3δ
(−1+δ)≤ 0,
where the first inequality follows from qi > β5 and the second one from
(2.39).
For q∗
i
∈ Ci(3), it follows from q
∗
i
≥ β4 that S j ≥
1
2
− 1
2
δ− 1
2
Si. By (2.39),
it is implied that Si <
1
3
− 1
3
δ. From (2.38), it follows that S j ≤
5
6
− 1
6
δ− 1
2
Si.
The rest of the constraints is redundant.
In conclusion, q∗
j
∈ C j(1) if and only if q
∗
i
∈ Ci(1) and Si <
1
2
− 1
2
δ−
1
2
S j,S j <
1
2
− 1
2
δ− 1
2
Si or q
∗
i
∈ Ci(3) and Si <
1
3
− 1
3
δ, 1
2
− 1
2
δ− 1
2
Si ≤ S j ≤
5
6
− 1
6
δ− 1
2
Si.
q∗
j
∈Cj(2)
It holds that
q∗j ≥ S j−
1
3
,
q∗j >
1−δ+δS j+2δSi
1+δ
. (2.40)
63
Chapter 2. Dynamic Duopoly with Intertemporal Capacity Constraints
We have
q∗i =σ
R
i (q
∗
j )= 0.
By Proposition B.2, q∗
i
∈Ci(2,3). This gives the following possibilities:
q∗i ∈ Ci(2) : q
∗
j = 0,
q∗i ∈ Ci(3) : q
∗
j =
1+2δS j−δ+δSi
2+2δ
.
For q∗
i
∈Ci(2), it follows from (2.40) that Si <
1
2δ
(−1+δ−δS j)≤ 0.
For q∗
i
∈Ci(3), it is implied by (2.40) that Si <
1
3δ
(−1+δ)≤ 0.
In conclusion, q∗
j
∉C j(2) if q
∗
i
∈Ci(2,3).
q∗
j
∈Cj(3)
It holds that
q∗j ≥ S j−
1
3
, (2.41)
1−δ+δS j−2Si
1+δ
≤ q∗j ≤
1−δ+δS j+2δSi
1+δ
, (2.42)
Si ≤ 1−
1
2
S j. (2.43)
We have
q∗i =σ
R
i (q
∗
j )=
1− q j+2δSi−δ+δS j−δq j
1+δ
.
By Proposition B.2, q∗
i
∈Ci(3). This gives the following possibility:
q∗i ∈Ci(3) : q
∗
i =
1−δ+3δSi
3+3δ
,q∗j =
1−δ+3δS j
3+3δ
.
For q∗
i
∈ Ci(3), it follows from q
∗
i
≥ Si −
1
3
and (2.41) respectively that
Si ≤
2
3
and S j ≤
2
3
.
Since q∗
i
∈ Ci(3) and by (2.41), Si ≤
2
3
and S j ≤
2
3
. Next, it follows from
q∗
i
≥ β4 that S j ≥
1
3
− 1
3
δ. By (2.42), Si ≥
1
3
− 1
3
δ. The remaining constraints
are redundant.
In conclusion, q∗
j
∈C j(3) if q
∗
i
∈Ci(3) and
1
3
(1−δ)≤ Si ≤
2
3
, 1
3
(1−δ)≤ S j ≤
2
3
.
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2.B. Subgame Perfect Equilibria
q∗
j
∈Cj(4)
This case does not need to be calculated here, since, by proposition B.2, it
can only be combined with the situations A i and Bi, and all these situations
are already calculated.
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Chapter 3
The Impact of Bulk-Supply
on a Dealer’s Sales Strategy
3.1 Introduction
Consider a dealer that buys its product in bulks from a manufacturer or
wholesaler. On the market where it operates, the dealer has some monop-
olistic power. This gives the dealer the opportunity to influence its instan-
taneous revenue by the quantity it offers to the market. In an attempt to
maximize its profit stream, it faces the following questions: Is it best to
always offer the same quantity, or is there another scheme of selling the
product that will increase profits? What is the best moment to order new
stock? Should it try to sell many products right now and reorder quickly, or
could it better postpone its reorder moment and thereby create an “artificial
scarcity” to drive up price? And how does its own level of patience influence
its optimal path? In this chapter, we try to answer these and some other
related questions.1, 2
Examples of situations where these questions may rise are the following.
The webstore that has a fixed consumer base and sells catalog books and/or
cd’s, i.e. products that have been on the market for a while. A dealer or
webstore which offers specialized goods that are only manufactured far away
1Other papers discussing related issued, like the dealer-wholesaler arrangements and
vertical integration are, among others, Bresnahan and Reiss (1985), Waterson (1982) and
Greenhut and Ohta (1979).
2This chapter is based on the paper van den Berg et al. (2011b).
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or sold in large bulks.
In our model, a dealer tries to maximize its profit stream over an infinite
horizon, in which future profits are discounted. It sells a product that it
can only buy in bulks from the manufacturer. For each bulk, it pays a fixed
price. It then resells the product to the consumers, where its instantaneous
revenue is a concave function of the quantity it puts on the market.
We find that there exists a unique optimal order-sales strategy. When
the dealer sticks to this strategy, it reorders always after the same amount
of time has elapsed. The refill of stock is done exactly the moment it runs out
of its current inventory. The dealer does not supply the same quantity every
instant in time. Instead, it offers the largest quantity to the market right
after it has refilled its stock. Then, it keeps on continuously decreasing its
quantity-output, until it hits its lowest point right before reordering. When
stock is refilled again, it offers the same amount of quantity to the market,
as it did the first time it ordered a bulk. This pattern keeps on repeating
itself. If the level of patience of the dealer decreases, its response is not to
automatically increase its current sales and thereby its current instanta-
neous revenue. Instead, situations exists in which it actually will respond
by lowering its sales-level and postponing its reordering moment.
One could also note some similarities between the topic of this chapter
and the literature on inventory. However, one of the major differences be-
tween this chapter and the inventory literature is that we do not use inven-
tory costs in our model, as we already find these results without having to
implement any costs for inventory. We conjecture that inventory costs will
only magnify our findings. Readers interested in literature on inventory-
models somewhat related to our model are referred to, for instance, El-
maghraby and Kescinocak (2003), Transchel and Minner (2009), Chen and
Simchi-Levi (2006) and Amihud and Mendelson (1983).
This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.2, we build up the
model. Section 3.3 is divided into two main parts. In the first part, we de-
termine the dealer’s optimal quantity-stream if the moment of reordering
is fixed. In the second part, we apply the results found in the first part to
determine the best reorder moment. In Section 3.4, we analyze the compar-
ative statics. A discussion and ideas for possible extensions are given in the
last section.
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3.2 The model
We search for the profit-maximizing strategy of a single dealer that sells a
nonperishable good. The manufacturer delivers the good in batches of size
S for a cost of K > 0 per batch. The size of the batches S is constant and
exogenously determined by the manufacturer. The dealer’s inventory-level
can never become negative. That is, backlogging is not allowed. It can choose
when to order new stock and how much it is willing to sell from its stock
every moment in time. Newly ordered stock is delivered instantly.3 Time is
continuous and infinite and revenue streams and costs are discounted with
a rate of r > 0.
The variable q(t) ≥ 0, i.e. the quantity the dealer sells at moment t,
is the control variable. It is assumed that q(t) is a piecewise continuous
function of t on any finite interval of [0,∞) and does not have any removable
discontinuities. A function q(t) is said to be piecewise continuous on an
interval if the interval can be broken into a finite number of subintervals
on which the function is continuous on each open subinterval and has a
finite limit at the endpoints of each subinterval. A removable discontinuity
is a point x at which limt↑x q(t) = limt↓x q(t) 6= q(x). Define Q as the set of
functions that satisfy these assumptions.
The instantaneous revenue the dealer receives for selling a quantity of
q is given by the general revenue function R. The function R is assumed to
be strictly positive on some interval (0,A), on which it is twice-continuously
differentiable, has a unique maximum at qm, such that 0 < qm < A, and is
strictly concave. For q= 0 and q≥ A, R(q)= 0.
Let X (t) be the inventory-level of the dealer at time t ∈ R+, q(t) is the
amount of stock the dealer sells at t ∈ [0,∞) and T1,T2,T3, ... are the reorder-
moments. We assume that at t= 0, the dealer starts with exactly S in stock.
Without loss of generality, we assume that 0=T0 <Ti <Ti+1 for all i ∈N.
Under the assumptions given above, let w∗ be the maximum discounted
revenue stream that the dealer can receive for selling a single batch of size
S. We assume that K <w∗.
The dealer’s objective is to maximize its discounted profit stream over
an infinite horizon. It does so by choosing q(t) and its reorder moments
optimally, subject to some restrictions. It is not possible to sell a negative
quantity. Its initial stock is equal to S and the decrease in stock at moment
3This model can easily be extended to a model in which it takes x time to deliver the good.
This will have no major effect on the results.
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t is equal to the amount sold q(t). Stock can never become negative and stock
increases with S the moment the dealer reorders. This makes the optimal
control problem of the dealer the following.
max
q∈Q,T1,T2,...∈R+,
T1<T2<...
∞∑
i=0
(
∫Ti+1
Ti
e−rtR(q(t))dt− e−rTiK),
subject to q(t)≥ 0,
X (0)= S,
X˙ (t)=−q(t),
X (t)≥ 0,
X (Ti)= lim
t↑Ti
X (t)+S, for all i ≥ 1.
A feasible strategy is a tuple (q,T1,T2, ...) such that q ∈ Q, 0 < T1 < T2 <
... ∈ R, such that X (t)≥ 0 for all t ≥ 0. By Σ we denote the set of all feasible
strategies.
3.3 The control problem
Before we start analyzing the specifics of this optimal control problem, we
can reduce the set of possible optimal strategies with the help of the follow-
ing lemma. This lemma shows that a dealer will never reorder before it has
sold all of its inventory. And, the moment the dealer runs out of inventory,
it reorders.
The amount of stock the dealer owns at t ∈ [0,∞) when it plays strategy
σ ∈Σ is defined by S(σ, t). The profit a dealer receives when it plays accord-
ing to σ ∈Σ is denoted by π(σ). In an optimal strategy, the dealer will reorder
exactly the moment it runs out of stock, but never before that.
Lemma 3.3.1. In an optimal strategy σ, for every i = 0,1,2, ...,
(a) S(σ, t)> 0 for all t≥ 0,
(b) limt↑Ti+1 S(σ, t)= 0.
Proof First, we will show that the dealer will not reorder before it is out
of stock. Let σ = (q,T1,T2, ...) ∈ Σ be a strategy of the dealer, in which
for some Tk, k ∈ N, limt↑Tk S(σ, t) > 0. This implies that here is an ε ∈ R
such that S(σ,Tk + ε) > S and Tk + ε < Tk+1. Let T˜k = Tk + ε and define
σ˜= (q,T1,T2, ...,Tk−1, T˜k,Tk+1, ...). This new strategy σ˜ is feasible, since the
dealer has positive stock at every t ∈ R. And since the dealer in both σ and
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σ˜ sells its stock according to the same function q, discounted revenue is the
same for both strategies. Cost are also the same for every order, except for
the k’th one. That is,
π(σ˜)=π(σ)+ (e−rTk − e−rT˜k )K .
Since, by definition, T˜k > Tk, it holds that π(σ˜)> π(σ) and the dealer there-
fore strictly prefers σ˜ over σ.
Secondly, the dealer will reorder immediately the moment it runs out of
stock. Let there be a period of length x in which the dealer is out of stock and
does not reorder. After that period, the dealer orders new stock and makes
from that period onwards a discounted profit of R. This means that at the
beginning of period x, the future profit of the dealer is e−rxR. This would
have been R > e−rxR, if the dealer would not have waited for a length of x to
reorder. 
This lemma is a direct result of the effect of the discount factor r. That
the dealer does not reorder when it still has stock, is because it is more ex-
pensive to order now than to order later. If a dealer can postpone ordering
stock without having to change its output, i.e. without decreasing its rev-
enue, this will always increase profits. The dealer has to stop sales when
it runs out of stock, since backlogging is not allowed. By assumption, we
know that the revenue the dealer makes on the new stock exceeds the costs
of buying it. Therefore, the longer it waits with ordering new stock, the
longer it takes before it can make profit on the new batch. And because of
the discounting of future profits, the less profit it will get for the new stock.
Revenue maximization in between ordering moments
Lemma 3.3.1 makes it possible to break the main problem up into parts and
to first analyze the optimal sales strategy in between ordering moments.
W.l.o.g. let T be the moment at which the dealer reorders for the first time.
At this point, we analyze the problem for a given T that is a candidate for
a possible maximizing strategy, but is not necessarily optimally chosen yet.
We can already say the following about this T. Note that in a strategy that
maximizes total profit, q(t)≤ qm for all t ∈ [0,T). The reason for this is that
selling more than qm instead of selling qm during an interval of length x will
decrease revenues for that interval, while at the same time the dealer runs
out of stock more quickly, i.e., discounted costs for buying new stock increase.
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Therefore, it must hold that the minimum time between reordering in the
optimal sales strategy is Tm = S/qm and we can restrict the set of times
between consecutive ordering moments from here onwards to T ≥Tm.
The dealer faces the following problem. Note that it faces a similar opti-
mization problem in between any two, consecutive ordering moments.
max
q∈Q
∫T
0
e−rtR(q(t)) dt (3.1)
subject to
X˙ (t) = −q(t), (3.2)
q(t) ≥ 0, (3.3)
X (0) = S, (3.4)
X (T) = 0. (3.5)
The first restriction, (3.2), expresses the change in inventory at period
t when the dealer sells q(t) of its inventory. Equation (3.3) states that the
dealer can only put a nonnegative quantity on the market every moment in
time. That a dealer only reorders when it is out of stock, is expressed by
(3.4) and (3.5). At the reordering moment, the dealer has S in stock. As time
approaches the next ordering moment, the remaining stock approaches zero.
Condition (3.5) has been stated as X (T)= 0 instead of limt↑T X (t)= 0, since
there is no reordering in the subproblem.
To find the solution to this problem, we take the Hamiltonian. The
Hamiltonian of this problem is:
H = e−rtR(q(t))−π(t)q(t)
and, since the control variable q(t) is restricted by (3.3), the Lagrangian is
L= e−rtR(q(t))−π(t)q(t)+λ(t)q(t). (3.6)
Given that the revenue function is concave in q, solving the following equa-
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tions is necessary and sufficient to find the maximum:
∂L
∂q(t)
= e−rtR′(q(t))−π(t)+λ(t)= 0, (3.7)
∂L
∂π(t)
= X˙ (t)=−q(t), (3.8)
∂L
∂X (t)
= −π˙(t)= 0, (3.9)
λ(t)q(t) = 0, (3.10)
λ(t) ≥ 0, (3.11)
q(t) ≥ 0, (3.12)
X (0) = S, (3.13)
X (T) = 0. (3.14)
From (3.9) we can easily see that there is a constant c such that
π(t)= c for all t ∈ [0,T).
Combining this with (3.7), we find that
e−rtR′(q(t))+λ(t)=π(t)= c. (3.15)
In the following lemma, we will show that (3.15) implies that the dealers
sells its stock continuously, until it is out of it.
Lemma 3.3.2. Let q(t1)> 0 for some t1 ∈ [0,T), then q(t)> 0 for all t ∈ [0, t1].
Proof Let q(t)= 0 for some t ∈ [0, t1). Since q(t1)> 0, (3.10) and (3.15) imply
that
c = e−rt1R′(q(t1))
≤ e−rt1R′(0)
< e−rtR′(0)
< e−rtR′(0)+λ(t)
= c.
This is a contradiction. 
Lemma 3.3.2 implies that there is a unique 0 < tˆ ≤ T such that q(t) > 0
for t< tˆ and q(t)= 0 for t≥ tˆ. Since q(t)= 0 for t≥ tˆ, the dealer does not sell
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any of its stock from tˆ till T and as a result, X (tˆ)= X (T). By (3.5), X (T)= 0
and thus X (tˆ) = 0. That is, the moment the dealer stops selling should be
the moment it runs out of stock.
By (3.10) and q(t) > 0 for all t ∈ [0, tˆ), it must hold that λ(t) = 0 for all
t ∈ [0, tˆ).
Lemma 3.3.3. The control variable q(t) is continuous for t ∈ [0,T].
Proof From Lemma 3.3.2, we know that there is a unique tˆ such that q(t)>
0 for all t< tˆ. For q(t)> 0, by (3.15), c= e−rtR′(q(t)). Since R′(q) and e−rt are
continuous functions, q(t) must be continuous for all t< tˆ. For t> tˆ, q(t)= 0
and automatically continuous. All is left to show that q(t) is continuous at
t= tˆ. For t ↑ tˆ, e−rtR′(q(t))= c and at tˆ, e−rtR′(0)+λ(tˆ)= c. By (3.11), λ(tˆ)≥ 0.
This implies
c = lim
t↑tˆ
e−rtR′(q(t))
≤ lim
t↑tˆ
e−rtR′(0)
= e−rtˆR′(0)
≤ e−rtˆR′(0)+λ(tˆ)
= c.
For this to hold true, no inequality can be strict and λ(tˆ) = 0. This implies
that limt↑tˆ e
−rtR′(q(t))= e−rtˆR′(0) and therefore, q(t) must be continuous at
t= tˆ. 
With the help of Lemmas 3.3.2 and 3.3.3, the function q that maximizes
(3.1), subject to (3.2)-(3.5), satisfies the following conditions.
Proposition 3.3.4. a) Let q be a solution of (3.1)-(3.5). Then there are c ∈ R
and tˆ ∈ [Tm,T] such that
R′(q(t))= cert, for t≤ tˆ, (3.16)
∫tˆ
0
q(t)dt= S, (3.17)
and
q(t)= 0 for t≥ tˆ. (3.18)
b) The solution to the system in a) is unique.
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Proof a) Follows directly from (3.7)-(3.14) and Lemmas 3.3.2 and 3.3.3.
b) Let c, tˆ and q∗ be a solution to the system in a). While keeping the tˆ
fixed, a strict increase (decrease) in c will strictly decrease (increase) q∗(t)
for all t ∈ [0, tˆ] and this violates (3.17). Vice versa, while keeping this tˆ fixed,
a strict increase (decrease) in q∗(t) for some t ∈ [0, tˆ] violates (3.16), unless
c is strictly decreased (increased). However, then q∗(t) must be increased
(decreased) for all t ∈ [0, tˆ] to not violate (3.16), thereby automatically vio-
lating (3.17). That is, every tˆ that is a solution to the system in Proposition
3.3.4, is accompanied by a uniquely determined c and q∗. Left to show is
that tˆ itself is uniquely determined. If tˆ< T, then by the continuity of q∗(t),
q(tˆ)= 0. A strict increase (decrease) in tˆ results in a strict decrease (increase
) of q(tˆ) and q is no longer continuous at tˆ. If tˆ = T, q(t)> 0 for all t ∈ [0,T].
A strict decrease4 of tˆ results in a strict increase of q∗(tˆ) and q∗ is no longer
continuous at tˆ. Ergo, for every combination of r,S and T ≥ Tm, the system
gives a unique solution for c, tˆ and q∗. 
From now on, given T, the unique q and c in Proposition 3.3.4 are de-
noted by qT and cT .
Note that, if tˆ < T, a further increase in T will not change qT , cT and
tˆ anymore. And the dealer is out of stock before it reorders. From Lemma
3.3.1 we know this will not happen if the dealer can choose its own reorder
moment. This makes it possible to not only have a lower bound for T, but
also set an upper bound on it. We already know that the moment the dealer
is out of stock, tˆ, is uniquely defined by T. We define Tˆ to be the maximal
T ∈ R+ for which the associated tˆ is equal to T. So, if the dealer were to
choose the time between ordering moments, Tˆ is its upper bound. From
here onwards, we assume that T ∈ [Tm, Tˆ]. This makes it possible to restate
Proposition 3.3.4 as:
Proposition 3.3.5. If T ∈ [Tm, Tˆ], there are unique cT and qT such that
R′(qT (t))= cT ert, for t≤T, (3.19)∫T
0
qT (t)dt= S (3.20)
Given what is now known about qT and cT , we argue next that cT ≥ 0.
We will also show how a change in t or T affects qT and cT . Note that, since
cT ert is differentiable to t, by equation (3.19) so is qT (t) for t≤T.
4Note that increasing t˜ is not possible here.
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Proposition 3.3.6. a) cT ≥ 0.
b)
∂qT (t)
∂t
≤ 0,
∂qT (t)
∂T
≤ 0
and
∂cT
∂T
≥ 0.
Proof a) As mentioned in the beginning of this section, qT (t) ≤ qm for all
t ∈ [0,T]. For qT (t) ≤ qm it holds that R′(qT (t)) ≥ 0. Since ert > 0 for all
t ∈ [0,Tm], from (3.19) it follows directly that cT ≥ 0.
b) See appendix. 
That is, the derivatives learn us the following. In between two arbitrary
consecutive ordering moments, the dealer sells relatively the largest part
of its stock in the beginning and continuously sells less and less, until it
reorders. If the dealer increases the time it will take before it has sold all
of its stock, the amount it sells at every instant in time decreases and cT
goes up. Note that, even though the dealer’s quantity output continuously
decreases until it reorders, this does not imply that its sales right before
reordering are equal to zero in the limit.
Example 3.3.7. Let R(q)= q(1− q). Then, from (3.19) it follows that qT (t)=
1
2
(1− cT ert). Substituting qT (t) in (3.20), we get
S =
∫T
0
1
2
(1− cT ert)dt (3.21)
=
1
2
[t−
1
r
cT ert]T0
=
1
2
(T−
1
r
cT erT +
1
r
cT ).
This gives
cT =
r(2S−T)
1− erT
(3.22)
and
qT (t)=
1
2
(1−
ertr(2S−T)
1− erT
). (3.23)
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Figure 3.1: Output at any moment t for a linear demand function with S = 10, r =
0.05 and K = 2.
Figure 3.1 shows how output depends on time for a linear demand function.
The lower and upper bound for T are calculated as follows. The monopoly
output is qm = 1
2
, which gives Tm = 2S. The upper bound for T should equate
qT (Tˆ) =
1
2
(1−
erTˆ r(2S− Tˆ)
1− erTˆ
) (3.24)
= 0.
This implies that Tˆ can be found by solving for
e−rTˆ −1= r(2S− Tˆ). (3.25)
In the model, we have assumed that K < w∗, where w∗ is the maximal
discounted revenue the dealer can make on a single batch. With the help of
what we have analyzed so far, we can now calculate w∗.
Lemma 3.3.8. The maximum discounted revenue a dealer can earn on a
batch of size S is w∗ =
∫Tˆ
0 e
−rtR(qTˆ (t))dt.
Proof The maximum revenue a dealer can make is given by
max
t¯
V (t¯)= max
t¯∈[Tm,Tˆ]
∫t¯
0
e−rtR(q t¯(t))dt
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Differentiating this, we get
dV (t¯)
dt¯
= e−rt¯R(q t¯(t¯))+
∫t¯
0
e−rtR′(q t¯(t))
dq t¯(t)
dt¯
dt
= e−rt¯R(q t¯(t¯))+
∫t¯
0
c t¯
dq t¯(t)
dt¯
dt
= e−rt¯R(q t¯(t¯))− c t¯q t¯(t¯). (3.26)
These equalities follow from (3.19) and (2.22). Again using (3.19) to substi-
tute, this gives
dV (t¯)
dt¯
= e−rt¯(R(q t¯(t¯))−R′(q t¯(t¯))q t¯(t¯)). (3.27)
Note that ∂
∂t¯
(R(q t¯(t¯))−R′(q t¯(t¯))q t¯(t¯))=−
∂q
∂t¯
R′′(q t¯(t¯))q t¯(t¯)< 0. So, the right-
hand-side (3.27) strictly decreases as t¯ increases. Note that, by definition,
(3.27) is 0 when q t¯(t¯) = 0. This must be the t¯ that maximizes (3.27), since
(3.27) strictly decreases in t¯. Therefore, the t¯ that maximizes the revenue on
a specific batch S is found by solving q t¯(t¯) = 0. This implies that t¯ = Tˆ and
the dealer will only reorder if
K ≤
∫Tˆ
0
e−rtR(qTˆ (t))dt.

This lemma implies that the assumption K < w∗ is equivalent to K <∫Tˆ
0 e
−rtR(qTˆ (t))dt.
The best moment to order
So far, we have analyzed the best sales strategy of the dealer when its order-
ing moments are fixed. In this section we will analyze how it can best choose
those ordering moments. Let T∗ be the optimal time after which the dealer
wants to reorder. We already know that T∗ ∈ [Tm, Tˆ]. We will now demon-
strate in a few steps that, if there exists an optimal strategy, there exists an
optimal strategy that is stationary.5 Let Σ∗ ⊂Σ be the set of strategies that
maximize profits and let π∗ be the maximal discounted sum of profits the
dealer can make over all its future sales. First, we will show that there is an
5See definition below.
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optimal strategy in which the dealer always reorders after the same amount
of time has elapsed.
Lemma 3.3.9. Let σ= (q,T1,T2,...) ∈Σ
∗. Then there exists an optimal strat-
egy σ′ = (q′1,T
′
1,T
′
2, ...) ∈Σ
∗ such that T ′n = nT1 for all n ∈N.
Proof Let σ1 =σ(q
∗,T∗1 ,T
∗
2 , ...) ∈Σ
∗ and let σ2 =σ(q
∗(t+T∗1 ),T
∗
2 −T
∗
1 ,T
∗
3 −
T∗1 , ...). Since σ1 is an optimal strategy and σ2 is exactly σ1, but then begin-
ning at moment T∗1 , it should hold as well that σ2 ∈ Σ
∗. If not, playing σ1
implies the dealer can strictly improve its profits from T∗1 onwards by devi-
ating from σ1 and σ1 would not be an optimum strategy. Let v1(σ) be the
profit the dealer makes up to the first ordering moment, if it plays according
to strategy σ. Since σ2 ∈Σ
∗, we know the following:
π∗ = π(σ1)
= v1(σ1)+ e
−rT∗1π(σ2)
= v1(σ1)+ e
−rT∗1π∗.
Rewriting this last expression, we get the following.
π∗ = v1(σ1)∗
1
1− e−rT
∗
1
= (
∞∑
i=0
e−irT
∗
1 )∗v1(σ1)
= π(σ(q˜(t),T∗1 ,2T
∗
1 ,3T
∗
1 , ...)),
where
q˜(t)=
{
q∗(t) for t<T∗1
q∗(t− iT∗1 ) for iT
∗
1 ≤ t< (i+1)T
∗
1
.
This implies that repeatedly playing q∗(t) as it is defined between 0 and T1,
results into the dealer receiving the maximum discounted sum of profits. 
We have shown so far that, if there exists an optimal strategy, there
exists an optimal strategy in which the dealer always orders after the same
amount of time. We can now show that there exists an optimal strategy
that is stationary. A stationary strategy is a strategy in which the dealer
bases its choice of action only on the state variable X (t), such that, when
X (t1) = X (t2), then q(t1) = q(t2) and O(X (t1)) = O(X (t2)) for all t1, t2 ∈ R
+.
The variable O(x) is binary and takes on the values 1 or 0, respectively,
when the dealer reorders or does not reorder, given that the remaining stock
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is equal to x. It is already known from Lemma 3.3.1 that the dealer reorders
exactly at the moment it runs out of stock. That means that in any optimal
strategy, O(0) = 1 and O(x) = 0 for all x 6= 0. Therefore, to prove that there
exists an optimal strategy that is stationary, it is sufficient to show that,
when X (t1)= X (t2), then q(t1)= q(t2) for all t1, t2 ∈R
+.
Theorem 3.3.10. There exists an optimal strategy that is stationary.
Proof If the dealer never reorders, this is true by definition. If the dealer
reorders, it is an optimal strategy to keep the time in between ordering mo-
ments fixed for some optimally chosen T∗, as is shown in Lemma 3.3.9. Take
two optimal, arbitrary chosen, reordering moments Ti = iT
∗ and T j = jT
∗,
where i 6= j and i, j ∈ N, from an optimally chosen strategy in which the
time between ordering moments is fixed. Note that X (Ti)= X (T j). For this
strategy it should hold that
∫Ti+T∗
Ti
e−r(t−Ti)R(q(t))dt=
∫T j+T∗
T j
e−r(t−T j)R(q(t))dt. (3.28)
Let q˜(t) maximize the revenues in between Ti and Ti+T
∗. Then q˜(Ti−T j+t)
should also maximize revenues for t ∈ [T j,T j +T
∗) and (3.28) holds. Define
q(t)= q˜(Ti−T j+ t) for all j ∈N. This strategy maximizes revenue in between
any two ordering moments, and since the ordering moments are chosen op-
timally, this must be a profit maximizing strategy. For this strategy it holds
that whenever X (t1)= X (t2) it must be that q(t1)= q(t2) and therefore, this
strategy is stationary. 
We have shown that, if there exist an optimal strategy, there exist an
optimal strategy that is stationary. The following theorem shows that there
exists an optimal strategy. Furthermore, there is an explicit equation to find
the best moment to order and thereby an explicit way of how to determine
the optimal strategy.
Theorem 3.3.11. There exists a unique stationary strategy that maximizes
total profits. In this strategy, new inventory is ordered after T∗ periods, where
T∗ can be found by solving
(1−e−rT
∗
)(e−rT
∗
R(qT
∗
(T∗))−cT
∗
qT
∗
(T∗))+re−rT
∗
(K−
∫T∗
0
e−rtR(qT
∗
(t))dt)= 0.
(3.29)
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Proof See appendix. 
Since T∗ is unique, we know that there is only one stationary strategy
that maximizes total profit. This is also the only optimal strategy. If there is
a strategy σ˜ that is not stationary, but optimal, then there must be periods
where the time between ordering is not equal to T∗, but to some T˜ 6=T∗. This
implies that there must exist a non-stationary optimal strategy in which the
first reordering moment comes after T˜ time. By Lemma 3.3.2, this means
there must be an optimal strategy that is stationary and in which reordering
is done every time after T˜ time. This is a contradiction. Given that T∗ is
the unique optimal reordering time, qT
∗
is also unique by Proposition 3.3.4.
Therefore, there is a unique optimal strategy; this strategy is stationary and
reordering is done after T∗ time has elapsed.
We have found that there is a unique optimal strategy, and that this
strategy is stationary. The dealer always reorders after T∗ time has elapsed
and its sales strategy in between any two arbitrary, consecutive reordering-
moments is always the same. Note that this implies that, even though the
dealer keeps its discounted instantaneous revenue constant in between or-
dering moments, its discounted instantaneous revenue decreases every time
it starts selling a new batch.
3.4 Comparative statics
In this section, it is analyzed how T∗ changes, when S, r or K changes. The
discounted profit of the dealer when it plays according to its optimal strategy
and K = 50 is shown in Figure 3.2. As T∗ changes, so do qT and cT , by Propo-
sition 3.3.5. Besides that, qT and cT are influenced directly by a change of
either S or r. That is, if S, r and K are no longer constants, but taken as
variables, T∗ becomes a function of S, r and K , or formally, T∗(S, r,K). And
qT
∗
(t) and cT
∗
become functions of S, r and K as well, given respectively by
qT
∗(S,r,K)(S, r, t) and cT
∗(S,r,K)(S, r). However, to avoid lengthy expression in
this section, we often omit the arguments, if no confusion can arise. There-
fore, qT
∗(S,r,K)(S, r, t) is denoted as q(t) and cT
∗(S,r,K)(S, r) is denoted as c.
The partial derivatives are given by ∂c
∂T
, ∂c
∂r
, ∂c
∂S
,
∂q
∂T
,
∂q
∂r
and
∂q
∂S
.
Proposition 3.4.1. If the dealer plays according to its optimal strategy, an
increase in the costs K of buying new stock will increase the time in between
ordering moments.
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Proof In the appendix it is shown that
T∗′K =
re−rT
∗
(1− e−rT
∗
)q(T∗)(rc+ ∂c
∂T
)
(3.30)
≥ 0.

The previous proposition shows that an increase in the costs of buying
inventory will increase the time in between reordering. This makes intu-
itive sense, since the earlier a dealer buys new stock, the less time it uses
for selling its current stock. And, as can be seen in the proof of Lemma 3.3.8,
the lesser time it takes for selling the current stock, the lower its total dis-
counted revenue it receives for will be. So, if costs increase, it will be more
fruitful to use some extra time to sell the current stock and, because of the
discount factor, pay relatively less for the ordering of new stock.
Proposition 3.4.2. If the dealer plays according to its optimal strategy, an
increase in r will change T∗ as follows:
T∗′r =
T∗R(q(T∗))e−2rT
∗
−T∗cq(T∗)− 1
r
(1− e−rT
∗
)(e−rT
∗
R(q(T∗))− cq(T∗))
(1− e−rT
∗
)(rc+ ∂c
∂T
)q(T∗)
(3.31)
+
−(1− e−rT
∗
)∂c
∂r
q(T∗)+ re−rT
∗ ∫T∗
0 te
−rtR(q(t))dt− re−rT
∫T
0 e
−rt dR
dq
∂q(t)
∂r
dt
(1− e−rT
∗
)(rc+ ∂c
∂T
)q(T∗)
.
Proof See appendix. 
The complexity of this expression makes it difficult to assess its sign in
general. However, with this expression we are able to determine the sign of
the derivative T∗′r for a specific demand function and variables K , r and S.
This is shown in Figure 3.3, for the linear demand function of D(p)= 1− p.
As can be seen in the picture, T∗ increases when r increases. Hereby is
the relative size of S of bigger influence than the relative size of r. When
r increases, less revenue can be made on each batch, but also, the costs
of buying a new batch decreases. Intuition might suggest that, since an
increase in r makes future profits less valuable, the dealer wants to increase
its current revenue by increasing its current sales. The disadvantage of this
strategy is that speeding its sales decreases its total discounted revenue on
the current stock, as is shown in Lemma 3.3.8. And, the earlier it has to buy
new stock, the relatively more it pays for ordering new. Apparently, in some
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Figure 3.2: The discounted profit of the firm for different interest rates and stock
levels, with K = 50.
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Figure 3.3: The derivative of T∗ to r, when K = 50.
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situations (and maybe even all), these two factors way heavier on the total
discounted sum of profits than the increase in instantaneous revenues does.
Proposition 3.4.3. If the dealer plays according to its optimal strategy, an
increase in the stock size will change T∗ as follows:
T∗′S =
−(1− e−rT
∗
) ∂c
∂S
q(T∗)− re−rT
∗
c
(1− e−rT
∗
)q(T∗)( ∂c
∂T
+ rc)
. (3.32)
Proof See appendix. 
Just as with the derivative of T∗ to r, we are unable to determine the
sign of the derivative of T∗ to S for all demand functions. Even though the
expression in Proposition 3.4.3 might not look that complex, even for a linear
demand function determining the sign is an open problem, if K , r and S are
not specified. This is shown in the following example.
Example 3.4.4. Equation (3.29) looks for linear demand of D(q) = 1− q as
follows:
1
4
(2S−T∗)(r(2S−T∗)+2)+
re−rT
∗
(2S−T∗)2
2(1− e−rT
∗
)
+K = 0.
From this expression, although it determines T∗ uniquely, it is hard to get
an explicit expression for T∗. To see now if T∗ increases when S increases,
we need to check whether the numerator of (3.32) is strictly bigger than zero,
that is, −(1− e−rT
∗
) ∂c
∂S
q(T∗)− re−rT
∗
c≥ 0. Substituting R(q) for q(1− q) and
rewriting, this equation is true iff
(1+ erT
∗
)
r(2S−T∗)
1− erT
∗ ≤ 1. (3.33)
Unfortunately, since we cannot substitute T∗, we need another way to check
whether this holds. Even though we do know that e
rT∗ r(2S−T∗)
1−erT
∗ ≤ 1, from (3.22)
and cT ≥ 0, this is not sufficient to prove (3.33) and we ran out of other useful
options to substitute.
An increase of S implies that the dealer has to sell more before it is out
of stock. An intuitive consequence of that would be that it takes the dealer
longer to sell its stock. We are able to determine, for a specific demand
function and variables K , r and S, the derivative T∗′
S
. The values for T∗′
S
are shown in Figure 3.4, for the linear demand function of D(p)= 1− p. As
can be seen in the picture in this specific setting, as suspected, T∗ increases
when S increases.
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Figure 3.4: The derivative of T∗ to S, when K = 50.
3.5 Discussion
In this chapter, we have shown that there exists a unique strategy that maxi-
mizes the total sum of discounted profits. In this strategy, the dealer always
reorders after the same amount of time has elapsed. It puts the largest
quantity on the market the moment it starts selling its new stock. This
quantity continuously decreases until it is at its lowest point right before it
runs out of its current stock. This whole cycle repeats itself when it buys
new stock again.
A possible way to extend this model would be to add inventory costs to it.
Since the size of the batch is fixed, this will not change the amount ordered
by the dealer. Making holding inventory costly, will most likely result into
the dealer trying to get rid of its stock more quickly. This effect will probably
be the strongest right after it has received the new batch, since inventory
costs are the highest at that point. Therefore, we conjecture that such an
addition will magnify the difference in the quantity setting we have found
in this chapter, but will not drastically influence the patterns we have found.
In this chapter it is assumed that the costs of buying new stock are fixed.
The production costs of the manufacturer, however, might change over time.
For instance, the price of the raw materials might change, or the production
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process itself could become more efficient. If the manufacturer bases its
batch price (partly) on these production costs, the dealer needs to take this
into account when deciding upon the best moment to reorder. A possible way
to extend this model in that direction would be using a trend to predict K .
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3.A Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3.3.6 b:
∂qT (t)
∂t
:
To find out how qT (t) changes when t changes, we derive (3.19) to t.
d
dt
R′(qT (t)) = R′′(qT (t))
dqT (t)
dt
(3.34)
= rcT ert.
Since R(q) is a concave function and c∗ is positive, this implies that
dqT (t)
dt
≤ 0.
Note that
dqT (t)
dt
=
∂qT (t)
∂t
.
∂qT (t)
∂T
:
To see how qT (t) changes when T changes, we derive (3.20) to T. Note
that S is a constant and therefore
0 =
d
dT
∫T
0
qT (t)dt (3.35)
= qT (T)+
∫T
0
dqT (t)
dT
dt.
Since qT (T) > 0, it must hold that
∫T
0
dqT (t)
dT
dt ≤ 0. However, we don’t know
yet whether this implies that
dqT (t)
dT
≤ 0 for all t ∈ [0,T]. Note that
∂qT (t)
∂T
=
∂qT (t)
∂T
. Further information about how q changes with T we get from analyz-
ing how cT changes with T.
∂c∗
∂T
:
To see how c∗ changes with T, we derive (3.19) to T.
d
dT
R′(qT (t)) =
dqT (t)
dT
R′′(qT (t)) (3.36)
= ert
dcT
dT
.
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Note that, since dc
T
dT
is independent of t and ert > 0 for all t ∈ [0,T], ert dc
T
dT
must have the same sign for all t ∈ [0,T]. This implies that
dqT
dT
R′′(qT (t))
must have the same sign for all t ∈ [0,T] as well. R′′(qT (t))< 0 and
dqT (t)
dT
≤ 0
for some t by (3.35). Since
dqT
dT
R′′(qT (t)) has the same sign for all t ∈ [0,T],
it must hold that
dqT (t)
dT
≤ 0 for all t ∈ [0,T]. This automatically implies that
dcT
dT
≥ 0. Note that dc
T
dT
= ∂c
T
∂T
.
Proof of Theorem 3.3.11:
This theorem is proven with the help of the following two lemmas.
Lemma 3.A.1. There exists at most one T∗ that maximizes total discounted
profit.
Proof Define
V (T)=
∫T
0
e−rtR(qT (t))dt for T ∈ [Tm, Tˆ]
The best ordering moment can be found by maximizing the following func-
tion:
Π(T∗) =
∞∑
i=0
e−rT
∗ i(V (T∗)−K)
=
V (T∗)−K
(1− e−rT
∗
)
.
We get
dΠ(T∗)
dT
=
V ′(T∗)(1− e−rT
∗
)− re−rT
∗
(V (T∗)−K)
(1− e−rT
∗
)2
(3.37)
=
(1− e−rT
∗
)(e−rT
∗
R(qT
∗
(T∗))− cT
∗
qT
∗
(T∗))+ re−rT
∗
(K −
∫T∗
0 e
−rtR(qT
∗
(t))dt)
(1− e−rT
∗
)2
(3.38)
= 0.
The second equality follows from the first by (3.26). The second derivative of
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Π(T∗) is:
d2Π(T∗)
dT2
=
( re−rT∗(e−rT∗R(qT∗ (T∗))− cT∗qT∗(T∗))
(1− e−rT
∗
)4
+
(1− e−rT
∗
)(−re−rT
∗
R(qT
∗
(T∗))+ e−rT
∗ dR
dq
dqT
∗
(T∗)
dT
)
(1− e−rT
∗
)4
(1− e−rT
∗
)(− dc
T∗
dT
qT
∗
(T∗)− cT
∗ dqT
∗
(T∗)
dT
)
(1− e−rT
∗
)4
+
−r2e−rT
∗
(K −
∫T∗
0 e
−rtR(qT
∗
(t))dt)
(1− e−rT
∗
)4
−re−rT
∗ ∫T∗
0 e
−rt dR
dq
dqT
∗
(t)
dT
dt− re−2rT
∗
R(qT
∗
(T∗))
(1− e−rT
∗
)4
)
(1− e−rT
∗
)2
−2(1− e−rT
∗
)re−rT
∗
( (1− e−rT∗)(e−rT∗R(qT∗(T∗))− cT∗qT∗(T∗))
(1− e−rT
∗
)4
+
re−rT
∗
(K −
∫T∗
0 e
−rtR(qT
∗
(t))dt)
(1− e−rT
∗
)4
)
.
To see whether we have a local maximum or minimum at dΠ(T
∗)
dT
= 0, we
substitute the expression for dΠ(T
∗)
dT
in the expression for d
2
Π(T∗)
dT2
. Since we
only want to know the sign of this expression, and the denominator is always
positive, we can leave the dominator out. So, the sign of d
2
Π(T∗)
dT2
at dΠ(T
∗)
dT
= 0
is
re−rT
∗
(e−rT
∗
R(qT
∗
(T∗))− cT
∗
qT
∗
(T∗))+ (1− e−rT
∗
)(−re−rT
∗
R(qT
∗
(T∗))
+e−rT
∗ dR
dq
dqT
∗
(T∗)
dT
−
dcT
∗
dT
qT
∗
(T∗)− cT
∗ dqT
∗
(T∗)
dT
)
−r2e−rT
∗
(K −
∫T∗
0
e−rtR(qT
∗
(t))dt)− re−2rT
∗
R(qT
∗
(T∗))
−re−rT
∗
∫T∗
0
e−rt
dR
dq
dqT
∗
(t)
dT
dt
(3.39)
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= re−rT
∗
(e−rT
∗
R(qT
∗
(T∗))− cT
∗
qT
∗
(T∗))+ (1− e−rT
∗
)(−re−rT
∗
R(qT
∗
(T∗))
+e−rT
∗ dR
dq
dqT
∗
(T∗)
dT
−
dcT
∗
dT
qT
∗
(T∗)− cT
∗ dqT
∗
(T∗)
dT
)
+r(1− e−rT
∗
)(e−rT
∗
R(qT
∗
(T∗))− cT
∗
qT
∗
(T∗))
−re−2rT
∗
R(qT
∗
(T∗))− re−rT
∗
∫T∗
0
e−rt
dR
dq
dqT
∗
(t)
dT
dt (3.40)
= re−rT
∗
(e−rT
∗
R(qT
∗
(T∗))− cT
∗
qT
∗
(T∗))
+(1− e−rT
∗
)(−re−rT
∗
R(qT
∗
(T∗))−
dcT
∗
dT
qT
∗
(T∗))
+r(1− e−rT
∗
)(e−rT
∗
R(qT
∗
(T∗))− cT
∗
qT
∗
(T∗))
−re−2rT
∗
R(qT
∗
(T∗))− re−rT
∗
∫T∗
0
e−rt
dR
dq
∂q
∂T
dt (3.41)
= −(1− e−rT
∗
)(re−rT
∗
R(qT
∗
(T∗))+
dcT
∗
dT
qT
∗
(T∗))
+r(e−rT
∗
R(qT
∗
(T∗))− cT
∗
qT
∗
(T∗))
−re−2rT
∗
R(qT
∗
(T∗))− re−rT
∗
∫T∗
0
e−rt
dR
dq
dqT
∗
(t)
dT
dt (3.42)
= −(1− e−rT
∗
)(re−rT
∗
R(qT
∗
(T∗))+
dcT
∗
dT
qT
∗
(T∗))
+r(e−rT
∗
R(qT
∗
(T∗))− cT
∗
qT
∗
(T∗))
−re−2rT
∗
R(qT
∗
(T∗))− re−rT
∗
∫T∗
0
cT
∗ dqT
∗
(t)
dT
dt (3.43)
= −(1− e−rT
∗
)(re−rT
∗
R(qT
∗
(T∗))+
dcT
∗
dT
qT
∗
(T∗))
+r(e−rT
∗
R(qT
∗
(T∗))− cT
∗
qT
∗
(T∗))
−re−2rT
∗
R(qT
∗
(T∗))+ re−rT
∗
cT
∗
qT
∗
(T∗) (3.44)
= −(1− e−rT
∗
)qT
∗
(T∗)
dcT
∗
dT
− rqT
∗
(T∗)cT
∗
+ re−rT
∗
cT
∗
qT
∗
(T∗) (3.45)
= −(1− e−rT
∗
)qT
∗
(T∗)(
dcT
∗
dT
+ rcT
∗
) (3.46)
≤ 0.
Here, the first equality follows from (3.38), the second from (3.19), the third
from rewriting, the fourth from (3.19) again, the fifth from (3.36), and the re-
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maining follow from rewriting again. Since dc
T∗
dT∗
and rcT
∗
are both positive,
the inequality follows.
Given that the second derivative is always negative for a stationary
point, we know that there can only be on such a point. 
Lemma 3.A.2. There exists at least one T∗ that maximizes total discounted
profit.
Proof If we can show that the first derivative is positive for small T∗ and
negative for large T∗, a local maximum exists and is also the global maxi-
mum.
The minimum number of time it will take for a dealer to sell its batch S
is Tm = S/qm, and in this situation, cT
∗
= 0 and qT
∗
(t)= qm for every t ∈R+.
At this point,
dΠ(Tm)
dT
=
(1− e−rT
m
)R(qm)e−rT
m
+ re−rT
m
(K −
∫Tm
0 e
−rtR(qm)dt)
(1− e−rT
m
)2
=
(1− e−rT
m
)R(qm)e−rT
m
+ re−rT
m
K − re−rT
m
[−1
r
e−rtR(qm)]T
m
0
(1− e−rT
m
)2
=
re−rT
m
K
(1− e−rT
m
)2
≥ 0.
So, for small T∗, profit is increasing with T∗. We know that the largest T∗
can be is where qT
∗
(T∗)= 0, this gives:
dΠ(T∗)
dT
=
(1− e−rT
∗
)e−rT
∗
R(0)+ re−rT
∗
(K −
∫T∗
0 e
−rtR(qT
∗
(t))dt)
(1− e−rT
∗
)2
=
re−rT
∗
(K −
∫T∗
0 e
−rtR(qT
∗
(t))dt)
(1− e−rT
∗
)2
≤ 0.
From our assumption that K <max
∫T∗
0 e
−rtR(qT
∗
(t))dt it follows that this
derivative is negative. 
In Lemma 3.A.1 and 3.A.2, it is shown that there is at most one T∗ and at
least one T∗ that maximizes total discounted profit. Ergo, there is a unique
T∗ that maximizes total discounted profit. This T∗ is found by solving the
first derivative of Π(T) (equation (3.38)) to zero. That is, T∗ solves
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(1− e−rT
∗
)(e−rT
∗
R(qT
∗
(T∗))− cT
∗
qT
∗
(T∗))+ re−rT
∗
(K −
∫T∗
0 e
−rtR(qT
∗
(t))dt)
(1− e−rT
∗
)2
= 0.
Proof of Proposition 3.4.1:
Proof To see how T∗ changes when K changes, we first need to make T∗ a
function of K and derive to K . We now that
dΠ(T∗)
dT
=
(1− e−rT
∗
)(e−rT
∗
R(q(T∗))− cq(T∗))+ re−rT
∗
(K −
∫T∗
0 e
−rtR(q(t))dt)
(1− e−rT
∗
)2
= 0.
Note that q is influenced by a change in K , directly via T and even more if
also t=T. Therefore, the optimum T∗ always has to solve
M(K) = (1− e−rT
∗
)(e−rT
∗
R(q(T∗))− cq(T∗))
+re−rT
∗
(K −
∫T∗
0
e−rtR(q(t))dt)
= 0.
The derivative to K of M(K) should still be equal to zero and is the following.
dM(K)
dK
= −T∗′K (1− e
−rT∗)q(T∗)(rc+
∂c
∂T
)+ re−rT
∗
= 0.
Here, the equality follows directly from (3.46) and deriving M(K) to the sep-
arate variable K . Therefore,
T∗′K =
re−rT
∗
(1− e−rT
∗
)q(T∗)(rc+ ∂c
∂T
)
≥ 0.

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Proof of Proposition 3.4.2:
Proof To see how T∗ changes when r changes, we first have to note that
T∗ is not only directly influenced by r, but also via c and q, as can be seen
in Proposition 3.3.4. So, if r is no longer a constant, but a variable, then c, q
and T∗ all become functions of r. Now, (3.29) becomes
M(r) = (1− e−rT
∗
)(e−rT
∗
R(q(T∗))− cq(T∗))
+re−rT
∗
(K −
∫T∗
0
e−rtR(q(t))dt)
= 0.
When deriving this function to r, we get the following.
dM(r)
dr
= −T∗′r (1− e
−rT∗)q(T∗)(rc+
∂c
∂T
)+T∗R(q(T∗))e−2rT
∗
−T∗cq(T∗)
−
1
r
(1− e−rT
∗
)(e−rT
∗
R(q(T∗))− cq(T∗))− (1− e−rT
∗
)
∂c
∂r
q(T∗)
+re−rT
∗
∫T∗
0
te−rtR(q(t))dt− re−rT
∫T
0
e−rt
dR
dq
∂q(t)
∂r
dt
= 0.
Therefore,
T∗′r =
T∗R(q(T∗))e−2rT
∗
−T∗cq(T∗)− 1
r
(1− e−rT
∗
)(e−rT
∗
R(q(T∗))− cq(T∗))
(1− e−rT
∗
)(rc+ ∂c
∂T
)q(T∗)
+
−(1− e−rT
∗
)∂c
∂r
q(T∗)+ re−rT
∗ ∫T∗
0 te
−rtR(q(t))dt− re−rT
∫T
0 e
−rt dR
dq
∂q(t)
∂r
dt
(1− e−rT
∗
)(rc+ ∂c
∂T
)q(T∗)
.

Proof of Proposition 3.4.3:
Proof To see how T∗ changes when S changes, observe that S is not di-
rectly part of equation (3.29). However, a change in S will change (3.20) and
therefore (3.19). Since T is constant here, the influence of a change in S will
be captured by a change of q(t) in (3.20). Because q(t) changes with S, it
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can be seen in (3.19) that therefore also c changes with S. These equations
change as follows when S changes:
d
dS
∫T
0
q(t)dt =
∫T
0
∂q(t)
∂S
dt (3.47)
= 1
and
d
dS
R′(q(t)) = R′′(q(t))
∂q(t)
∂S
(3.48)
=
∂c
∂S
ert. (3.49)
Since c doesn’t depend on t, the sign of (3.49) must be the same for all t ∈
[0,T]. Therefore, the sign of (3.48) must be the same for all t ∈ [0,T] as
well. Equation (3.47) tells us that there must be some t ∈ [0,T] for which
it holds that
∂q(t)
∂S
> 0. This implies that
∂q(t)
∂S
≥ 0 for all t ∈ [0,T] and since
R′′(q(t))< 0, ∂c
∂S
≤ 0.
To see now how T∗ actually changes with S, we need the expression for
the optimal T∗ again. Let
M(S) = (1− e−rT
∗
)(e−rT
∗
R(q(T∗))− cq(T∗))
+re−rT
∗
(K −
∫T∗
0
e−rtR(q(t))dt)
= 0.
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Then
∂M
∂S
= −T∗′S [(1− e
−rT∗)(rc+
∂c
∂T
)q(T∗)]+
(1− e−rT
∗
)(e−rT
∗
R′(q(T∗))
∂q(T∗)
∂S
−
∂c
∂S
q(T∗)− c
∂q(T∗)
∂S
)
−re−rT
∗
∫T∗
0
e−rt
∂q(t)
∂S
R′(q(t))dt
= −T∗′S (1− e
−rT∗)q(T∗)(
∂c
∂T
+ rc)+ (1− e−rT
∗
)(c
∂q(T∗)
∂S
−
∂c
∂S
q(T∗)− c
∂q(T∗)
∂S
)− re−rT
∗
∫T∗
0
∂q(t)
∂S
cdt
= −T∗′S (1− e
−rT∗)q(T∗)(
∂c
∂T
+ rc)− (1− e−rT
∗
)
∂c
∂S
q(T∗)
−re−rT
∗
c
∫T∗
0
∂q(t)
∂S
dt
= −T∗′S (1− e
−rT∗)q(T∗)(
∂c
∂T
+ rc)− (1− e−rT
∗
)
∂c
∂S
q(T∗)− re−rT
∗
c
= 0.
Here, the second equality sign follows from (3.19), the third from moving the
constant c out of the integral and the fourth from (3.47). Therefore,
T∗′S =
−(1− e−rT
∗
) ∂c
∂S
q(T∗)− re−rT
∗
c
(1− e−rT
∗
)q(T∗)( ∂c
∂T
+ rc)
.

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Chapter 4
Collusion in a Price-Quantity
Oligopoly
4.1 Introduction
“The Cournot story concerns producers who simultaneously
and independently make production quantity decisions, and who
then bring what they have produced to the market, with the
market price being the price that equates the total supply with
demand. The Bertrand story, on the other hand, concerns pro-
ducers who simultaneously and independently name prices. De-
mand is allocated to the low-price producer(s), who then produce
(up to) the demand they encounter . . . There are two differ-
ences in these stories: how price is determined (by an auctioneer
in Cournot and by price “competition” in Bertrand), and when
production is supposed to take place.” (Kreps and Scheinkman
(1983), p. 326)
Both the Cournot and the Bertrand story have significantly enhanced our
understanding of strategic firm behavior in oligopolies. Yet, both have also
been subject to severe criticism. For instance, Cournot’s model requires an
auctioneer to determine the market price, whereas in practice prices are typ-
ically set by suppliers themselves. In this respect, Bertrand’s story is more
satisfactory. However, this model assumes that production follows the re-
alization of demand, whereas in a great many industries production takes
place in advance of sale. More generally, and independent of the timing of
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production, it seems more reasonable to assume that firms choose both their
prices and production levels. This is true when producers compete, but no
different when they collude.
The objective of this chapter is to study (optimal) collusion among firms
that have both price and quantity as a strategic choice variable.1 Towards
that end, we analyze an infinitely repeated oligopoly game in which firms si-
multaneously make both price and production decisions in each period. This
mode of production we will call production in advance. With production in
advance, production costs are incurred before a firm learns how much it will
actually sell. At the end of this chapter, we also shortly analyze what hap-
pens when firms produce to order. When production is to order, producers
choose a price and produce after their private demand is known. Thus, the
key difference between both settings lies in whether or not firms commit to
a particular production level before the realization of demand. We therefore
incorporate the Cournot and Bertrand story regarding the timing of produc-
tion, but price decisions are made by the producers themselves (i.e., there is
no auctioneer).
In attempting to combine the more plausible elements of both stories,
existing literature has primarily focused on settings in which firms first
choose production capacities and then engage in price competition. The
reason for analyzing price competition given capacities is that prices can
presumably be adjusted more quickly than quantity-related variables. For
example, Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) find that Bertrand competition may
yield Cournot outcomes when suppliers first choose a scale of operation. As
to collusion, Fershtman and Muller (1986) explore the impact of long-run
competition in capital investments on collusion on prices and market shares
and show, among other things, that competition in capacities has no desta-
bilizing effect on collusion. Benoit and Krishna (1987) show that when firms
are allowed to collude on both price and capacity then all collusive equi-
libria have firms holding excess capacity. Davidson and Deneckere (1990)
establish that more collusion requires higher levels of excess capacity. Hold-
ing excess capacity is required to enforce a collusive scheme as it allows to
punish a deviator by increasing production. In the current chapter, we as-
sume that firms adopt grim-trigger strategies to sustain collusion and that
there is sufficient production capacity to implement this punishment strat-
egy. Consequently, our focus is on the actual quantity decisions and not on
the maximum amount of products a firm can offer each period. Our model
1This chapter is based on the paper van den Berg and Bos (2011).
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of production in advance falls in the class of games described by Maskin
(1986). He claims that an equilibrium exists in the static game, but refrains
from verifying the conditions as given by Dasgupta and Maskin (1986) for
the oligopolistic setting. Next to this, collusion is not a part of the paper.
To our knowledge, we are the first to study collusion in a price-quantity
oligopoly while taking account of different timing of production.2 As suppli-
ers have control over both price and quantity, one question of interest is what
choice variables they will optimally collude on. Will they choose to collude
on either price or quantity (semicollusion) or both (full collusion)?3 In this
chapter, we restrict attention to price collusion and price-quantity collusion.
Put differently, firms are given the possibility to either form a price-fixing
cartel or a price-quota cartel.4 Obviously, since firms can imitate semicol-
lusion by colluding in full, full collusion always gives the suppliers at least
as much profit as colluding on only one variable will. However, there are at
least three reasons why firmsmay prefer to collude on one variable only after
all. First, reaching consensus on coordination of an additional variable com-
plicates the bargaining process and there is plenty of evidence from practice
that bargaining issues should not be take too lightly. For example, Leven-
stein and Suslow (2004) state that "Bargaining problems were much more
likely to undermine collusion than was secret cheating. About one quarter
of the cartel episodes ended because of bargaining problems. Bargaining
issues affected virtually every industry studied." Second, coordinating on
more variables may complicate enforcement as more monitoring is required
to ensure compliance. Third, more complete cartel contracts leave additional
traces of evidence and therefore, ceteris paribus, increase the probability of
a conviction. In short, whenever a price cartel is more or less equally suc-
cessful as a price-quota cartel, firms will arguably prefer not to install an
additional quota agreement. For both modes of production, we first analyze
optimal price collusion and then evaluate the potential additional value of a
quota agreement.
The analysis in this study thus sheds some light on one particular type of
cartel heterogeneity: why do some cartels entail an agreement on both prices
and quantities, whereas others include only an arrangement on prices? For
2Contributions that consider competition in price-quantity oligopolies include, for exam-
ple, Kreps and Scheinkman (1983), Friedman (1988), Dixon (1992) and Tasnádi (2006).
3For a recent survey of literature on semicollusion, see Steen and Sørgard (2009).
4In this study, whenever we use the term (sales) quota(s), we mean an allocation of quan-
tities or market shares.
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example, in Carbonless Papermembers agreed on the timing and magnitude
of price increases for each EEA country.5 However, these price-fixing agree-
ments were only sometimes accompanied by quota agreements (e.g., in Spain
and France). In Elevators and Escalators members coordinated prices and
allocated projects on the basis of a pre-arranged market share scheme.6 In
particular, a compensation mechanism was adopted to ensure alignment of
overall project value with the allocated shares. Yet, in the Netherlands the
cartel operated on a project by project basis seemingly without a clear com-
pensation scheme. In Methionine parties fixed minimum and target prices
and agreed on concerted price increases.7 One of the members proposed a
volume control scheme including a compensation mechanism, but sales quo-
tas were never implemented. There are many more real-world examples of
price and price-quota cartels.8
We find that firms almost always prefer to install a price-quota cartel
when production is in advance of sales. However, the reasons for adopting a
market sharing scheme in addition to a price-fixing agreement differ. When
market demand is relatively elastic, firms will optimally set the monopoly
price. In this case, an arrangement on outputs allows firms to deal with both
coordination and incentive problems.9 The coordination problem concerns
the fact that in equilibrium every member should have a sufficiently high
level of sales, while ensuring that the market clears. The incentive prob-
lem prescribes the cartel to allocate a sufficiently large part of total sales
to the smallest members as they appear to have the strongest incentive to
defect from the agreement. Therefore, given that the size distribution of
members is sufficiently heterogeneous, a price-quota cartel is ceteris paribus
more likely than a price-fixing cartel. If market demand is relatively inelas-
tic, then the coordination problem is absent. The reason being that in this
case all members optimally produce identical amounts. Yet, sustainability of
collusion requires the cartel to set a price below the monopoly price in order
to mitigate incentives to defect. In this case, a price-quota cartel is found to
be always more profitable than a price-fixing cartel. Specifically, installing
5Case COMP/E-1/36.212 - Carbonless paper.
6Case COMP/E-1/38.823 - PO/Elevators and Escalators.
7Case C.37.519 - Methionine.
8See, for instance, Russo et al. (2010). This book provides a complete overview and de-
scription of all European cartel cases between 1962 and 2009.
9Osborne (1976) identifies four internal problems a cartel may be confronted with. The
cartel has to locate the contract surface and choose a point on that surface (the coordination
problem). Additionally, it has to detect and deter cheating (the incentive problem).
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an optimal market sharing scheme allows firms to avoid overproduction and
to sustain the monopoly price.
By contrast, overproduction does not occur in equilibrium when produc-
tion follows the realization of demand. Moreover, for both price collusion and
price-quantity collusion the profit-maximizing cartel price is the monopoly
price. In this case, an additional quota agreement is made solely when a
price cartel alone is not sustainable. As with production in advance, the
smallest members have the strongest incentive to deviate from the cartel
agreement. Hence, sustainability of collusion may require a redistribution
of sales from the larger to the smaller cartel participants. Overall, our study
suggests that a price-quota cartel is likely to be the rule rather than the
exception. An additional quota agreement may not have added value when
firms produce to order and are more or less of equal size.
We believe one should be reluctant to bring up evidence from antitrust
practice to support general theoretical predictions of cartel behavior like
ours. One reason for this is that known cartels differed in many respects.
Moreover, they have been operating in a wide variety of industries and had
to deal with specific problems. As a result, there are potentially many expla-
nations for observed collusive conduct. Apart from this, relevant information
that is required to confidently match a general theoretical framework with a
specific cartel case is often lacking. However, in this respect the lysine cartel
forms a notable exception. This cartel is one of the most well-documented
cases in antitrust history and of particular interest to our study as it had
two “lives”.10 During its first life, members fixed prices but no market shar-
ing scheme was adopted. During its second life, members also agreed on a
market share allocation. The market for lysine is characterized by homoge-
neous products, approximately constant unit production costs and relatively
inelastic market demand. In this case, our model would predict firms to
prefer a price-quota cartel as it allows them to sustain higher prices. This is
indeed what happened. That is, the cartel set prices at a significantly higher
level during its second life, which was generally more successful. Therefore,
there exists some support for our theoretical findings in antitrust practice.
This chapter proceeds as follows. The next section introduces the model.
Section 4.3 describes the stationary equilibria in markets with production
in advance. In the next section, Section 4.4, the conditions are analyzed
under which a firm prefers collusion over competition. Section 4.5 provides
an analysis of price- and price-quantity collusion. Section 4.6 describes the
10See, for instance, Connor (2001) and De Roos (2006).
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stationary equilibria and an analysis of price- and price-quantity collusion
when firms produce to order. Section 4.7 relates our main findings to exist-
ing literature that considers private information and demand uncertainty.
Section 4.8 concludes. All proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
4.2 Model
We consider a homogeneous good industry in which a fixed and finite set of
firms, denoted by N = {1, . . . ,n}, interact. In this section, we will describe our
assumptions for the static setting. In Section 4.4, to analyze the possibilities
to collude, we extend this model to be repeated an infinite amount of times.
Firms simultaneously make price and production decisions so as to max-
imize their expected profit. We define A ≡ [0,a]× [0,b] as the common action
set and price and quantity choices are respectively denoted by the vectors
p ≡ (p1, . . . , pn) and q ≡ (q1, . . . ,qn), where pi ∈ [0,a] and qi ∈ [0,b] for all i ∈
N. Define p−i ≡ (p1, ..., pi−1, pi+1, ..., pn) and q−i ≡ (q1, ...,qi−1,qi+1, ...,qn)
as the vector of respectively prices and quantities of all firms other than i.
Firms have identical unit production costs c ∈ (0,a) and sufficient production
capacity available (i.e., there are no capacity constraints, b is high enough
not to influence the quantity-decision of the firms).
Market demand is given by D(p), which is a continuous, strictly decreas-
ing and concave function of price in the range [0,a]. Additionally, we assume
that this function is identically zero on [a,∞), twice continuously differen-
tiable on (0,a) and D(0) < b.11 The monopoly price and output are respec-
tively indicated by pm and qm: D(pm)+ (pm− c)D′(pm)= 0 and qm =D(pm).
Firm i’s individual demand depends on p and q. Consumers buy first from
a supplier charging the lowest price. In case of a tie, demand is shared ac-
cording to ratio. In specifying firm i’s demand, define ∆(pi)≡ { j ∈N : p j < pi}
and Ω(pi)≡ { j ∈N : p j = pi} as the set of firms that respectively price below
and at pi.
12
With production in advance, production takes place before the realiza-
11We let b >D(0), since - as is described below - demand is shared proportionally when at
least one other firm sets the same price. This could give a firm the incentive to produce more
than D(0). It can easily be verified that there always exists an upperbound on how much a
firm is willing to produce.
12Officially, it is ∆(pi ,p−i) and Ω(pi ,p−i). From the context, it will be clear what p−i is.
Therefore, we use shorthand notation here to stress which value of pi these sets are based
on.
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tion of demand.13 We suppose that in this case demand is established ac-
cording to a proportional demand allocation rule. Thus, if two or more firms
charge the same price and total supply exceeds total demand at that price,
then sales are assumed proportional to individual levels of production. The
proportion that firm i receives of the (residual) demand at that price, is de-
noted by λi.
14
Assumption 4.2.1. Assume production in advance. Then λi =
qi∑
j∈Ω(pi )
q j
, for
all i ∈N.
Consequently, suppliers with more products available receive a larger
share of market demand, all else unchanged.15
Demand for the products of firm i is denoted D i(pi,qi,p−i,q−i). For any
price-quantity configuration, its profit is thus given by
πi(pi,qi,p−i,q−i)= piD i(pi,qi,p−i,q−i)− cqi. (4.1)
Firm i’s demand is then of the following general structure:
D i(pi,qi,p−i,q−i)=min{qi,λi(D(pi)−
∑
k∈∆(pi) qk)
+}.
4.3 Static Nash Equilibrium
In this section, we characterize the single-shot Nash equilibrium of the model
described above. When production is in advance of sales, there is no pure-
strategy Nash equilibrium. However, there does exist a symmetric mixed-
strategy Nash equilibrium for which it can be shown that expected profits
amount to zero.
Suppose that production is in advance of sales. The next result estab-
lishes that in this case there exists no pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. Yet,
we can apply Corollary 5.3 of Reny (1999) to establish the existence of a
symmetric mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium.
13That is, a firm only learns about the production levels and prices of its competitors áfter
it has produced and fixed the price for its products.
14We use λi instead of λi(p,q), since p and q follow directly from the context.
15Assumption 4.2.1 is primarily made for ease of analysis. The findings in this chapter
are robust against alternative allocation rules as long as the game is symmetric and a firm’s
share of demand depends positively on its own level of production.
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Theorem 4.3.1. Assume production in advance.
(i) There exists no pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.
(ii) There exists a symmetric mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium.
Unfortunately, in the current setting it is difficult if not impossible to
determine this mixed-strategy equilibrium explicitly. However, we are able
to prove that (expected) equilibrium profits are zero. Below, we provide a
generalized version of the analysis presented in Tasnádi (2004), who obtains
a similar result for a duopoly.
For all the analyses in this section it can be easily verified that firms will
never find it optimal to price below c or above pm and supply strictly positive
quantity. We therefore focus on the case where suppliers choose their actions
simultaneously from S = [c, pm]× [0,b]. In the following, let the space of all
(Borel) probability measures on S be given by P(S) and let µi ∈ P(S) denote a
mixed strategy of firm i ∈N. With µ−i we denote the mixed strategies of all
firms other then firm i, i.e., µ−i = (µ1, ...,µi−1,µi+1, ...,µn) and µ = (µi,µ−i).
The profit of firm i, when µ is the joint strategy, is represented by πi(µ). A
mixed-strategy equilibrium µ∗ is then defined by the following condition:
πi(µi,µ
∗
−i)≤πi(µ
∗
i ,µ
∗
−i) for all i ∈N and µi ∈ P(S).
As we consider a symmetric situation and search for a symmetric equi-
librium, we indicate a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium and corresponding
equilibrium profits of a single firm respectively by µ and π∗ for ease of no-
tation. The support of µ is denoted by supp(µ) and, for any price p ∈ [c, pm],
s(p)⊆ [0,b] is the set of quantities q ∈ [0,b] for which (p,q) ∈ supp(µ). More-
over, let µp be the projection of probability measure µ to the set of prices, i.e.,
µp(B)=µ(B× [0,b]) for any Borel set B⊆ [c, p
m]. Finally, let sup{p ∈ [c, pm] |
µp([p, p
m])= 1} and inf{p ∈ [c, pm] | µp([c, p])= 1} be respectively denoted by
pˇ and pˆ.
Clearly, if pˇ = c, then π∗ = 0. In the next two lemmas, we consider the
case where pˇ> c.
Lemma 4.3.2. If pˇ> c, then s(pˇ)= {D(pˇ)} and µp({pˇ})= 0.
That is, a firm that sets pˇ> c optimally produces to meet demand at this
price. The next lemma shows that producing to serve the entire market may
also be optimal for prices that are above pˇ.
Lemma 4.3.3. If pˇ> c, then there exists a price p′ ∈ (pˇ, pm] such that, for all
p ∈ [pˇ, p′], s(p)= {D(p)} and µp({p})= 0.
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Finally, we use this result to establish that the infimum of all prices
in the support cannot be strictly above c. As a result, all firms make zero
expected profits in equilibrium.
Theorem 4.3.4. Assume production in advance. Then,pˇ= c and π∗ = 0.
4.4 Cartel Problem
In this section, we analyze the incentives of firms to establish a particular
cartel contract. To do so, the game described in Section 2 is repeated an
infinite number of times. In every period t ∈N, firms simultaneously make
price and production decisions so as to maximize the expected discounted
sum of their profit stream, where δ ∈ (0,1) is the common discount factor.
In any period t, the price and quantity choices of all firms up to t− 1 are
common knowledge.
We assume that holding inventories is sufficiently costly so that firms do
not find it in their interest to store unsold products.
Assumption 4.4.1. Firms do not build inventories.
Supply may exceed demand in equilibrium when production is in ad-
vance of sale. Therefore, this assumption clearly comes with a price in terms
of generality. However, it is required to keep the analysis tractable. Conse-
quently, our findings related to collusion with production in advance primar-
ily apply to industries selling perishable or fashionable goods.
In the previous section, we found an equilibrium in the stationary set-
ting. If we talk about competition in the infinitely repeated stage game, we
refer to a situation in which all firms use strategies in which they do not
use past-play or timing of current play to decide upon their current actions.
Therefore, the only subgame perfect equilibrium in competition is the equi-
librium in which the (symmetric) stationary outcome prevails every period.
To prevent that from happening, firms can form a collusive agreement. In
forming a collusive agreement, firms can choose between two types of car-
tels: a price cartel and a price-quota cartel. In a price cartel, the strategies
of all firms take into account past choices of price only, i.e. previous quantity
choices of competitors are ignored. Therefore, deviations in the past in price
can be punished, but quantity can be freely chosen every moment in time
without further consequences. If the firms form a price-quota cartel, in the
strategies of all firms, both history of price and quantity choices matters, and
any deviations of the collusive agreement will be responded to accordingly.
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For both cases, we consider an all-inclusive cartel in which all suppliers
agree on a common cartel price pc ∈ (c, pm]. The key difference between the
two types of contracts is that with a price cartel firms are free to choose
their level of production, whereas a price-quota cartel additionally specifies
the level and allocation of outputs. The agreed upon quota in a price-quota
cartel for firm i is expressed by qc
i
. We require collusive arrangements to be
a subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of the game and it is assumed that
firms adopt grim-trigger strategies to sustain collusion.16
This results in the following formal definitions of a price cartel strategy and
a price-quota cartel strategy. Define qi(t) as the quantity that firm i ∈ N
chooses in period t. Let
Q= {arg max
q∈[0,b]
πi(p
c, (q,q−i)) for some q−i ∈ [0,b]
n−1}.
A strategy profile is a price cartel if there is a price pc ∈ [0,a] and for each
firm i a sequence qi(1),qi(2), ... with qi(t) ∈Q for all t, such that each firm i
plays as follows:
- At period 1: set price pc and quantity qi(1);
- At each period T > 1: set price pc and quantity qi(T) if all firms have
set prices equal to pc at all t < T, and play according to the static
equilibrium strategy µ∗
i
otherwise.
A strategy profile is a price-quota cartel if there is a price pc ∈ [0,a] and for
each firm i an individual quantity qc
i
∈ [0,b], such that each firm i plays as
follows:
- At period 1: set price pc and quantity qc
i
;
- At each period T > 1: set price pc and quantity qc
i
if all firms j ∈ N have
set prices equal to pc and quantities equal to their individual quantity
qc
j
at all t<T, and play according to the static equilibrium strategy µ∗
i
otherwise.
To begin, let us focus on a price cartel. If, given a certain collusive price,
the firms always choose the same quantity level, we call this a price-cartel
16Notice that this is the most severe punishment strategy in our setting, i.e. profits in
competition are zero. Therefore, if collusion is not sustainable by adopting this strategy,
then collusion will not occur in any subgame perfect equilibrium.
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with a constant output configuration. If this is the case, the collusive value
for firm i is recursively defined by
Vi(p
c,q)= pcD i(p
c,q)− cqi+δVi(p
c,q). (4.2)
Rearranging gives,
Vi(p
c,q)=
pcD i(p
c,q)− cqi
1−δ
. (4.3)
As customers buy first from the cheapest supplier, maximum profit that can
be earned by defecting from the cartel agreement is obtained by undercut-
ting the cartel price slightly and producing to meet market demand at that
price. Notice that this holds for all members of a price- or a price-quota car-
tel. Consequently, given a particular cartel price pc, the optimal defection
profit always amounts to (pc− c)D(pc). Whether all price-cartel really have
constant output configurations will be analyzed in the next sections.
As shown in the previous section, competitive behavior yields zero (ex-
pected) profits. The incentive compatibility constraint of firm i is therefore
given by
pcD i(p
c,q)− cqi
1−δ
≥ (pc− c)D(pc), (4.4)
or
δ≥ δ∗i = 1−
pcD i(p
c,q)− cqi
(pc− c)D(pc)
, for all i ∈N. (4.5)
As is well-known, there may exist a plethora of sustainable cartel contracts.
Yet, as we require collusion to be subgame perfect and pc > c, all these col-
lusive arrangements have in common that total cartel supply will not fall
short of market demand. If it did, then there would be at least one firm that
would benefit from increasing its production. As a result, firm demand is
given by D i(p
c,q)=
qi∑
j∈Ω(pc ) q j
D(pc). In turn, this implies that all firms agree
to set a cartel price that maximizes total cartel value.
A price cartel thus faces the following constraint optimization problem:
max
p
V (p,q)=max
p
pD(p)− c
∑
j∈N q j
1−δ
,
subject to
pD i(p,q)− cqi− (1−δ)(p− c)D(p) ≥ 0, for all i ∈N,∑
j∈N
q j ≥ D(p).
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The key question is then if and how firms can benefit from an additional
quota agreement. In the following, we analyze this issue in more detail for
markets that are characterized by production in advance.
4.5 Collusion with Production in Advance
4.5.1 Price Cartel
Suppose that the cartel prices at pc ∈ (c, pm] and that production is in ad-
vance of sale. In the following, we start by considering a price cartel and
then analyze if and under which conditions firms would prefer to establish a
price-quota cartel instead. As a price cartel does not include an agreement
on sales, all members are unrestricted in their choice of output. That is to
say, every firm can individually decide on its production level without having
to fear retaliation from its rivals. Consequently, a cartel member produces
to maximize current profit given the output choices of its fellow members.
The production level that maximizes firm i’s current profit, given the output
choices of its fellow members, we will call the best reply production choice
q∗
i
(pc,q−i).
The next result specifies the optimal production decision at a given cartel
price.
Lemma 4.5.1. Assume production in advance and a price cartel with com-
mon cartel price pc ∈ (c, pm]. For all i ∈ N, the best reply production choice
q∗
i
(pc,q−i) is given by:
q∗
i
(pc,q−i)=


D(pc)−
∑
j∈N\{i} q j if
∑
j∈N\{i} q j ≤D(p
c)c/pc√
pcD(pc)(
∑
j∈N\{i} q j)
c
−
∑
j∈N\{i} q j if D(p
c)c/pc <
∑
j∈N\{i} q j ≤D(p
c)pc/c
0 if
∑
j∈N\{i} q j >D(p
c)pc/c.
Observe that the first in combination with the second or the third opti-
mal response cannot occur in equilibrium. Likewise, we can exclude the pos-
sibility that in equilibrium some firms adopt the middle best response and
some firms produce nothing. To see this, notice that in this case it must hold
that
∑
i∈N qi =
√
pcD(pc)(
∑
j∈N\{i} q j)
c
and
∑
j∈N\{i} q j ≤ D(p
c)pc/c. This implies∑
i∈N qi ≤
√
pcD(pc)(D(pc)pc/c)
c
= D(pc)pc/c. If a firm would produce nothing,
then
∑
j∈N\{i} q j ≤ D(p
c)pc/c. Yet, zero production is only a best response
when
∑
j∈N\{i} q j > D(p
c)pc/c; a contradiction. This leaves two possibilities
that can occur in equilibrium. Either, all firms produce according to the first
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best response (i.e.,
∑
i∈N qi =D(p
c)), or all firms set their outputs such that∑
i∈N qi =
√
pcD(pc)(
∑
j∈N\{i} q j)
c
. In the latter case, total supply exceeds market
demand.
The next result shows that, in the event of overproduction, all firms pro-
duce the same quantity.
Lemma 4.5.2. If q∗v (p
c,q−v)=
√
pcD(pc)(
∑
j∈N\{v} q j)
c
−
∑
j∈N\{v} q j and q
∗
w(p
c,q−w)=√
pcD(pc)(
∑
j∈N\{w} q j)
c
−
∑
j∈N\{w} q j, then q
∗
v (p
c,q−v)= q
∗
w(p
c,q−w) for all v,w ∈
N.
The previous two findings are useful in characterizing the set of subgame
perfect equilibria. It appears that equilibrium production decisions in part
depend on the level of the cartel price.
Theorem 4.5.3. Assume production in advance. If a price cartel (pc,q∗) is a
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, then for all i ∈N,
(i) pc ≤ cn
n−1
, q∗
i
(pc,q−i)=D(p
c)−
∑
j∈N\{i} q
∗
j
(pc,q−j) and q
∗
i
(pc,q−i)≥ (
pc−c
pc
)D(pc),
(ii) pc > cn
n−1
and q∗
i
(pc,q−i)=
(n−1)pcD(pc)
cn2
.
Thus, in equilibrium, the collusive value for firm i is given by
Vi(p
c,q∗)=


(pc−c)(D(pc)−
∑
j∈N\{i} q
∗
j
(pc,q−j))
1−δ
for pc ≤ cn
n−1
and q∗
i
(pc,q−i)≥
(
pc−c
pc
)D(pc) for all i ∈N,or
pcD(pc)
(1−δ)n2
for pc > cn
n−1
and q∗
i
(pc,q−i)=
(n−1)pcD(pc)
cn2
for all i ∈N.
The next issue is to find the price that maximizes the total cartel value.
Following Theorem 4.5.3, we can distinguish two cases. First, if the cartel
sets a price p ≤ cn
n−1
, then q∗
i
(p,q−i)=D(p)−
∑
j∈N\{i} q
∗
j
(p,q−j) for all i ∈ N.
Therefore, the incentive compatibility constraint as given by (4.5) reduces to
δ≥ δˆ∗
i
= 1−
q∗
i
(p,q−i)∑
j∈N q
∗
j
(p,q−j)
, for all i ∈N, (4.6)
which does not directly depend on the cartel price. As a result, if pm ≤
cn
n−1
, then the cartel optimally sets the monopoly price. Note that, since
maxi∈N δˆ
∗
i
≥ 1− 1
n
, this can only occur if δ≥ 1− 1
n
.
Second, all cartel participants optimally produce q∗(p) =
(n−1)pD(p)
cn2
at
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any price p > cn
n−1
. In this case, the incentive compatibility constraint as
given by (4.5) is therefore given by
δ≥ δ˜∗(p)= 1−
p
n2(p− c)
, (4.7)
which is the same for all firms and directly depends on price. In fact, δ˜∗(p)
is an increasing and concave function of p and, since δ˜∗( cn
n−1
) = 1− 1
n
, also
this incentive compatibility constraint can only hold as long as δ≥ 1− 1
n
.
Given that the cartel price exceeds cn
n−1
, define p∗ as the unconstrained so-
lution of the cartel problem:
dV (p,q∗(p))
dp
=
pD′(p)+D(p)
(1−δ)n2
= 0. (4.8)
Thus, p∗ solves p∗D′(p∗)+D(p∗) = 0 and therefore pm > p∗. Additionally,
define p˜ as the constrained solution, i.e., δ= 1−
p˜
n2( p˜−c)
.
Using the foregoing analysis, the next Proposition summarizes the opti-
mal pricing decision of a price-fixing cartel.
Proposition 4.5.4. Assume production in advance and δ≥ 1− 1
n
. The opti-
mal cartel price pc is specified as follows:
1. Suppose pm ≤ cn
n−1
.
(a) If δ≥ δˆ∗
i
for all i ∈N, then pc = pm.
2. Suppose pm > cn
n−1
.
(a) If p∗ < cn
n−1
, then pc = cn
n−1
.
(b) If δ< δ˜∗(p∗) and p∗ ≥ cn
n−1
, then pc = p˜.
(c) If δ≥ δ˜∗(p∗) and p∗ ≥ cn
n−1
, then pc = p∗.
4.5.2 Price-Quota Cartel
Above, we have characterized the optimal collusive strategy of a price-fixing
cartel. The remaining issue is to analyze if and how suppliers could benefit
from an additional quota agreement. In the following, we show that there
are at least three arguments in favor of a price-quota cartel when production
is in advance of sales.
First, if pc ≤ cn
n−1
, then by Theorem 4.5.3 production levels must be such
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that q∗
i
(pc,q−i) = D(p
c)−
∑
j∈N\{i} q
∗
j
and q∗
i
(pc,q−i) ≥ (
pc−c
pc
)D(pc). Thus,
the market should clear while ensuring that every cartel participant has a
sufficiently high level of sales. Combining both these requirements yields
the following rather striking result.
Corollary 4.5.5. Assume production in advance and pc ≤ cn
n−1
. The market
share of every cartel member must (weakly) exceed the Lerner index for a price
cartel to be stable.17
A price cartel therefore faces a coordination problem when it prices at
pc < cn
n−1
.18 This is the case when pm < cn
n−1
. As in this case there seems to
be no natural division of outputs, an explicit arrangement on market shares
may be required to solve this coordination problem.
In addition, a quota agreement may also be needed to solve the incentive
problem when pm ≤ cn
n−1
. Observe that the minimum critical discount factor
is always weakly larger than 1− 1
n
, which is obtained with an equal division
of sales. We therefore conclude that there exists no viable cartel when δ <
1− 1
n
. Yet, given that δ≥ 1− 1
n
, viability of a cartel may still require a market
sharing scheme to prevent the smallest member(s) from leaving the ring.
Theorem 4.5.6. Assume production in advance, δ≥ 1− 1
n
and pm ≤ cn
n−1
.
(i) If 1− 1
n
≤ δ< 1−
q∗
i
(pc,q−i)∑
j∈N q
∗
j
(pc,q−j)
for some firm i ∈ N, then there exists only a
viable price-quota cartel, not a viable price cartel, and
(ii) If 1−
q∗
i
(pc,q−i)∑
j∈N q
∗
j
(pc,q−j)
≤ δ for all i ∈ N, then there exists both a viable price
cartel and a price-quota cartel.
Finally, if pm > cn
n−1
, then Proposition 4.5.4 reveals that a price-fixing
cartel is feasible. Moreover, in this case firms have no coordination problem
as they optimally produce the same amount of products at any cartel price
pc ≥ cn
n−1
. Here, the only reason for suppliers to establish a price-quota cartel
is that it generates more profits than a price cartel. In particular, we know
by Proposition 4.5.4 that the profit-maximizing price of a price cartel is below
the monopoly price. Implementing an optimal quota scheme allows firms
to avoid excessive production and to sustain the monopoly price, thereby
increasing the collusive value.
17The Lerner index describes the relative profit margin, i.e.
p−c
p , of a firm.
18This coordination problem is absent for pc = cnn−1 as then all members find it optimal to
produce the same amount of products.
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Theorem 4.5.7. Assume production in advance, δ ≥ 1− 1
n
and pm > cn
n−1
.
There exists a price-quota cartel for which Vi(p
c,qc) > Vi(p
c,q∗(pc)) for all
i ∈N. An optimal price-quota cartel contract has all firms pricing at pm and
a total production of D(pm).
In conclusion, if market demand is sufficiently elastic (pm ≤ cn
n−1
), then a
quota agreement may be required to solve a coordination and an incentive
problem. If a price-quota cartel is necessary to overcome incentive problems,
all else unchanged, the cartel leads to a convergence of market shares. By
contrast, when market demand is sufficiently inelastic (pm > cn
n−1
), the sole
reason for establishing an additional quota agreement is that it allows the
cartel to sustain a higher price while reducing costs due to overproduction.
As cn
n−1
is decreasing in n, the latter situation is more likely the larger the
number of firms in the industry. Contrary to conventional wisdom, this im-
plies that the coordination problem may be more pronounced the fewer the
number of cartel participants, all else equal.
4.6 Production to Order
In this chapter, next to production in advance, we consider another mode of
production: production to order. Many of the assumptions made for produc-
tion in advance are the same as those for production to order. Therefore, in
this section, we will only explicitly define the assumptions that differ from
those in the previous sections.
The fundamental difference between both settings lies in the way in which
a firms’ demand is determined. When firms produce to order, each firm only
sets its price, not its production level. The consumers first buy from a sup-
plier charging the lowest price. In case the cheapest supplier(s) choose(s)
not to produce up to demand, consumers go to have their residual demand
fulfilled at the second cheapest supplier(s), etcetera. We will assume that,
as long as there are no agreements made between firms about allocation of
demand, each firm always supplies the demand it faces.
Since realization of demand is known before production takes place, the al-
location of customers when two or more firms charge the same price does not
depend on firms’ actual production levels. In this case, we use α to describe
a firm’s share of market demand. Particularly, if all suppliers charge the
same price and total supply does not fall short of market demand at that
price, then αi is the (exogenously given) market share of firm i.
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Firm i’s demand, when there are no agreements made between firms about
allocation of demand, is therefore of the following structure:
D i(pi,p−i)=
{ αi∑
j∈Ω(pi )
α j
if pi ≤ p j for all j ∈N\{i}
0 otherwise
Consequently, the profit of firm i is given by
πi(pi,p−i)= (pi− c)D i.
4.6.1 Static Nash Equilibrium
Firms in this setting basically compete in price. Therefore, the static Nash
Equilibrium here is the same as in the Bertrand Paradox. That is, there ex-
ists a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium with all firms (or at least two) pricing
at c and producing to meet demand. There is no other Nash equilibrium in
which one or more suppliers make a positive profit. Consequently, it can be
concluded that stationary profits are zero. This provides a strong incentive
for firms to engage in a cartel. But what (type of) cartel contract is most
likely to be formed? It is this issue that we address in the next section.
4.6.2 Collusion
If the firms form a price cartel, then firm i faces a demand of αiD(p
c). The
collusive value of this price cartel for firm i is recursively defined by
Vi(p
c)= (pc− c)αiD(p
c)+δVi(p
c),
which can be rewritten as
Vi(p
c)=
(pc− c)αiD(p
c)
1−δ
.
The incentive compatibility constraint of firm i is therefore given by
δ≥ δ∗i = 1−αi, for all i ∈N.
As before, sustainability of collusion requires δ ≥ 1− 1
n
, which is obtained
with an equal division of sales. Yet, unlike with production in advance, a
price cartel will not face a coordination problem. Also, the incentive con-
straint is independent of the elasticity of market demand. In fact, given
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that δ≥ 1− 1
n
, whether or not price collusion is viable solely depends on the
size distribution of cartel participants. Specifically, feasibility of collusion
requires the market share of the smallest cartel member(s) to be sufficiently
large. As the critical discount factor is independent of the cartel price, the
cartel will optimally set the monopoly price, i.e., pc = pm. The next result
therefore closely resembles Theorem 4.5.6 above.
Theorem 4.6.1. Assume production to order and δ≥ 1− 1
n
.
(i) If 1− 1
n
≤ δ< 1−
αi∑
j∈N α j
for some firm i ∈N, then there exists only a viable
price-quota cartel, not a viable price cartel, and
(ii) If δ ≥ 1−
αi∑
j∈N α j
for all i ∈ N, then there exists both a viable price cartel
and a price-quota cartel.
When firms produce to order, a price cartel and a price-quota cartel are
equally profitable as in both cases the cartel mimics a multi-plant monop-
olist. Consequently, the only reason for firms to adopt a market sharing
scheme is that without such an arrangement collusion may not be sustain-
able. In particular, the cartel may have to agree on a redistribution of sales
from the larger to the smaller members.19 There are several ways in which
firms can arrange a more equal division of sales. For example, larger firms
may simply refuse to serve part of their demand so as to increase the resid-
ual demand for the products of smaller members. Alternatively, the car-
tel may adopt a more sophisticated system of end-of-the-year buy backs to
ensure that every member meets its pre-arranged output level. It is note-
worthy that such agreements have been observed several times in antitrust
practice.20
4.7 Discussion
The above analysis has been conducted under several assumptions, some of
which we believe warrant some discussion. In the following, we relate our
work to literature that considers settings with cost heterogeneity, demand
uncertainty and private information.
By studying collusion in a price-quantity oligopoly, our analysis sheds some
19In this chapter, we derive results for a given cartel size. Alternatively, when cartel for-
mation is assumed endogenous, it may be more optimal for the larger firms to form a less
than all-inclusive cartel leaving out the smaller firms. This possibility is analyzed in Bos
and Harrington (2010).
20See, for example, Harrington (2006).
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light on what type of cartel we may expect in particular type of industries.
Our findings suggest that we often may expect firms to agree on both prices
and quantities, albeit for various reasons. We have derived results in a set-
ting where both prices and quantities are public information and firms have
accurate knowledge about cost and demand functions. Clearly, relaxing one
or more of these assumptions may provide alternative explanations for when
to expect firms to establish a price-quota cartel. Existing literature has of-
fered various rationales for full collusion in the presence of cost and demand
shocks and in case strategic choice variables are private information. Here,
we briefly discuss this related literature.
Let us first discuss the possibility of cost heterogeneity. In our setting,
differences in firm size are unrelated to differences in unit costs. Conse-
quently, a market-sharing scheme when implemented is also not driven by
efficiency considerations. This is unlikely to hold in general as differences in
unit costs may give rise to asymmetric incentive schemes. For instance, one
may conjecture a cartel to allocate a relatively large market share to more
efficient members as these have more to gain from defection and less to fear
from retaliation.21 In this respect, Harrington (1991) shows that whether
or not an optimal market sharing rule is sensitive to cost differences in part
depends on the level of the discount factor. Specifically, the market sharing
rule is independent of firms’ unit costs when the discount factor is relatively
low, but not when firms are sufficiently patient.
The potential impact of cost heterogeneity on collusion has also been
analyzed in a setting of fluctuating demand conditions. Choi et al. (1985),
for example, consider a static framework in which firms negotiate price and
market shares to establish an efficient cartel agreement. Assuming cost
heterogeneity and demand uncertainty, the prediction is that the cartel ar-
rangement includes averaging of unit production costs. Moreover, this study
predicts a convergence of market shares when market demand declines. The
reason being that the small firms (i.e., high cost firms) must earn sufficient
profits for the cartel to remain effective. Alternatively, firms may engage in
involuntary periodic price wars to sustain collusion. Indeed, as Green and
Porter (1984) predicts, a temporary breakdown in prices may be required to
maintain a collusive scheme when demand conditions are fluctuating and
firms’ quantities are private information.
Market share schemes potentially also play an important role when pro-
21Note that sustainability of collusion with differences in unit costs may also require a
more equal division of sales, because efficient firms have more to gain from a cartel.
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duction costs are not publicly known. As Athey and Bagwell (2001) points
out, market share agreements may allow producers to collude perfectly when
they experience privately observed cost shocks in each period. By exchang-
ing future market share favors efficiently, first-best profits can be attained
when firms are sufficiently patient. Such a rather sophisticated price-quota
cartel is preferred as it induces a high cost firm to reveal its identity, thereby
allowing the cartel to produce efficiently. In a comparable setting, Athey
et al. (2004) shows that optimal collusion may induce firms to fix both prices
and market shares. In particular, this implies that the cartel forgoes produc-
tive efficiency as low cost firms produce relatively too little and high costs
firms produce relatively too much. Yet, it is also found that when firms are
sufficiently impatient, effectiveness of collusion may require low cost firms
to set a lower price in order to gain more market share.
A couple of recent studies has considered collusion in a setting where
prices or quantities are private information. Harrington and Skrzypacz
(2007) shows that when prices are not publicly observable (but firms’ quanti-
ties are), then the mere threat of (symmetric) price wars may be insufficient
to sustain collusion. Yet, collusion may be sustainable through an asym-
metric punishment scheme that prescribes firms that sold in excess of their
quota to compensate those members that sold under quota. In a similar
fashion, Harrington and Skrzypacz (2010) shows that firms with high sales
may have an incentive to compensate members with low sales to sustain
collusion in an environment where both prices and quantities are private
information. That firms do not need much information to collude effectively
has been recently confirmed by Hörner and Jamison (2007). This study finds
that firms require hardly any information to collude almost perfectly. How-
ever, to obtain this result, firms need to agree on both prices and market
shares.
The studies mentioned above reveal that there are distinct possibilities
for price-fixing firms to benefit from a market sharing scheme. In this re-
spect, our findings are complementary and suggest that price-quota cartels
are likely to be the rule. Put differently, even in a world where cost and de-
mand are known and stable and actions are publicly observable, firms often
benefit from a market sharing agreement.
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4.8 Concluding Remarks
Why do we observe various types of cartel contracts in antitrust practice?
In this study, we have sought to shed some light on one specific sort of car-
tel heterogeneity: price versus price-quota cartels. Existing literature has
shown that an additional agreement on production levels may be needed to
overcome incentive problems that arise due to imperfect information and de-
mand uncertainty. This chapter provides an alternative explanation. In the
context of an infinitely repeated game with complete information, sustain-
ability of collusion may still require an agreement on sales levels. Specifi-
cally, the market share of the smallest cartel member must be sufficiently
large, which may induce firms to arrange a more equal division of outputs.
This holds when firms produce to order and when production is in advance of
sale and market demand is sufficiently elastic. As to the latter, an arrange-
ment on outputs may additionally help firms to solve a coordination problem.
Moreover, with production in advance, establishing an output ceiling is al-
ways profitable when market demand is sufficiently inelastic. Consequently,
there are several rationales for the existence of both price and price-quota
cartels, even in a world of certainty and perfect information.
These results have potentially important implications in light of an-
titrust enforcement. For instance, industries with price increases in conjunc-
tion with a decline in sales volume and converging market shares should,
ceteris paribus, be considered suspect of anti-competitive practices. Also,
refusals to deal at relatively high prices in combination with relatively low
capacity utilization may indicate the presence of a cartel. However, such
observations should always be judged while taking account of the idiosyn-
crasies of a particular industry. Indeed, our analysis suggests that market
characteristics may play a vital role in the design of a cartel contract. In par-
ticular, knowing when and where to expect a price-quota cartel is likely to
increase the effectiveness of antitrust enforcement as the chance of discover-
ing physical evidence is higher, all else equal. The reason being that, unlike
with price collusion, it is difficult to see how firms can coordinate their sales
levels without communicating explicitly. Yet, to what extent our theoretical
findings are helpful in detecting cartels is ultimately an empirical question.
We leave this issue for future research.
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4.A Appendix
Proof of Theorem 4.3.1.
(i) If all firms price above c, then there is at least one firm that finds it
optimal to undercut the lowest price slightly and serve market demand at
that price. Therefore, let M = {i ∈ N | pi = c} the set of firms that price at c,
where |M |≥ 1. In this case, for all i ∈M, qi >D i(c,qi,p−i,q−i) gives πi < 0,
whereas qi =D i(c,qi,p−i,q−i) gives πi = 0. Thus, a firm pricing at c will not
produce in excess of its demand. This implies that there exists a firm j ∈M
for which it holds that D(c)−
∑
i∈M\{ j} qi > 0. As a result, this firm j can do
better by charging a higher price and produce to meet its residual demand
at that price. Hence, there exists no pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.
(ii) In our setting, the strategy space A is compact and the game is sym-
metric. Therefore we can apply Corollary 5.3 of Reny (1999). According to
this corollary, there exists a symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium in our
game if its mixed extension is diagonally payoff secure and each πi(µ, ...,µ)
is upper semicontinuous as a function of µ on P(A). Here, P(A) is the space
of all (Borel) probability measures on A endowed with the weak topology.
• Upper semicontinuity: To proof that each πi(µ, ...,µ) is upper semicon-
tinuous as a function of µ on P(A), we have to show that limsupπi(µ
t, ...,µt)≤
πi(µ, ...,µ) whenever limt→∞µ
t = µ. This is equivalent to showing that
every converging subsequence has a limit that is smaller or equal to
πi(µ, ...,µ). Therefore, assume w.l.o.g. that limt→∞πi(µ
t, ...,µt)= y and
let x = πi(µ, ...,µ). Since
∑
i∈N πi is continuous and all firms play the
same strategy in a symmetric game, it holds that ny= limt→∞
∑
i∈N πi(µ
t, ...,µt)=∑
i∈N πi(µ, ...,µ)= nx. Therefore, x= y and limt→∞πi(µ
t, ...,µt)=πi(µ, ...,µ).
This implies that each πi(µ, ...,µ) is not only upper semicontinuous as
a function of µ on P(A), but continuous as well.
• Diagonally payoff secure: To proof that our setting is diagonally payoff
secure, we have to show that for every µ ∈ P(A) and every ε > 0, each
firm i can secure a payoff πi(µ, ...,µ)−ε along the diagonal at (µ, ...,µ).
Firm i can secure a payoff of πi(µ, ...,µ)−ε along the diagonal at (µ, ...,µ)
if there exists a µ¯ ∈ P(A) such that πi(µ
′, ..., µ¯, ...,µ′)≥ πi(µ, ...,µ)−ε for
all µ′ in some open neighborhood of µ ∈ P(A).
Now, for every δ> 0 and every Borel subset B of A define
Bδ := {(p′,q) ∈ A | there is (p,q) ∈B such that p′ = p+δ}.
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For a mixed strategy µ on A define the mixed strategy µδ by
µδ(B) :=µ(Bδ)+µ({(p,q) ∈B | p< δ})
for every Borel set B. Finally, let ε > 0 and let µ be a mixed strat-
egy on A. Then there is a δ > 0 such that ui(µ
′, . . . ,µ′,µδ,µ′, . . . ,µ′) ≥
ui(µ, . . . ,µ)− ε for all µ
′ close enough to µ. This last line follows be-
cause, given that the other firms do not change their mixed strategies
too much, if firm i slightly lowers its price, this at most slightly reduces
its profit. ä
Proof of Lemma 4.3.2. We prove that s(pˇ)= {D(pˇ)} by deriving a contra-
diction. In our game, the support is compact and therefore s(pˇ) 6= ;.
First, we will show that for all p ∈ [pˇ, pm], for all q ∈ s(p) it holds that q≤
D(p). Define Bε(p,q) as the open ε-ball centered at (p,q). Assume q > D(p)
and let ε> 0 be small enough, such that for all (pi,qi) ∈Bε(p,q) it holds that
qi > D(pi). Let (p˜, q˜) be an arbitrary element in Bε(p,q). Then, given any
(p−i,q−i), the actions chosen by the other n−1 firms, firm i’s profit is
πi(p˜, q˜,p−i,q−i)= p˜
q˜∑
j∈Ω( p˜) q j
(D(p˜)−
∑
k∈∆( p˜)
qk)
+
− cq˜.
Instead, if firm i would choose the action (p˜− δ,D(p˜− δ)), where δ > 0 is
chosen such that D(p˜−δ)< q˜ and δD(p˜)< c(q˜−D(p˜−δ)), its profit is
πi(p˜−δ,D(p˜−δ),p−i,q−i)= (p˜−δ)
q˜∑
j∈Ω( p˜−δ) q j
(D(p˜−δ)−
∑
k∈∆( p˜−δ)
qk)
+
−cD(p˜−δ).
Note that since D(p˜− δ) < q˜, it holds that if (D(p˜)−
∑
k∈∆( p˜) qk)
+ = 0,
then (p˜− δ,D(p˜− δ)) is a strict improvement over (p˜, q˜). Now, if (D(p˜)−∑
k∈∆( p˜) qk)
+ > 0, then
πi(p˜−δ,D(p˜−δ),p−i,q−i) > (p˜−δ)(D(p˜)−
∑
k∈∆( p˜)
qk)− cD(p˜−δ)
> (p˜−δ)(D(p˜)−
∑
k∈∆( p˜)
qk)+δD(p˜)− cq˜
= p˜(D(p˜)−
∑
k∈∆( p˜)
qk)− cq˜+δ
∑
k∈∆( p˜)
qk
≥ p˜(D(p˜)−
∑
k∈∆( p˜)
qk)− cq˜
≥ p˜
q˜∑
j∈Ω( p˜) q j
(D(p˜)−
∑
k∈∆( p˜)
qk)− cq˜
= πi(p˜, q˜,p−i,q−i).
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Here, the first inequality holds because of the following. First, note that
Ω(p˜−δ)\{i}∪∆(p˜−δ)⊆∆(p˜), Ω(p˜−δ)\{i}∩∆(p˜−δ)=; and D(p˜−δ)>D(p˜).
This gives
D(p˜)−
∑
k∈∆( p˜)
qk < D(p˜−δ)−
∑
k∈∆( p˜−δ)
qk−
∑
j∈Ω( p˜−δ)\{i}
q j
≤
q˜∑
j∈Ω( p˜−δ) q j
(D(p˜−δ)−
∑
k∈∆( p˜−δ)
qk).
The second inequality follows from δD(p˜)< c(q˜−D(p˜−δ)). So, also when
the residual demand is strictly positive, the action (p˜−δ,D(p˜−δ)) gives a
strictly higher profit than (p˜, q˜). This implies that, for any (p˜, q˜) ∈ Bε(p,q),
there exists a δ such that it holds that (p˜−δ,D(p˜−δ)) gives a strictly higher
payoff and therefore q ∉ s(p).
Next, assume that q ∈ s(pˇ) and q < D(pˇ). The maximum profit that a
firm can make in any point in an open ε-ball centered at (pˇ,q) is strictly
smaller than (pˇ+ ε− c)(q+ ε). Since (pˇ− c)D(pˇ) > (pˇ− c)q, as ε→ 0, there
always exists a η> 0 such that
(pˇ−η− c)D(pˇ−η)> (pˇ+ε− c)(q+ε).
That is, there always exists a price-quantity combination (pˇ− η,D(pˇ− η))
that gives a strictly higher profit than any point in Bε(pˇ,q). This contradicts
q ∈ s(pˇ). Thus, we conclude s(pˇ)= {D(pˇ)}.
Suppose there is an atom at price pˇ. In that case, πi((pˇ,D(pˇ)),µ−i) < (pˇ−
c)D(pˇ). This implies that there exists a small enough δ> 0 such that
πi((pˇ−δ,D(pˇ−δ)),µ−i) = (pˇ−δ− c)D(pˇ−δ)
> πi((pˇ,D(pˇ)),µ−i).
This implies that µp does not have an atom at pˇ. ä
Proof of Lemma 4.3.3. First observe that Lemma 4.3.2 implies pˇ < pm,
because otherwise pˇ = pm = pˆ and µ({pˇ})> 0. Next, we will show that there
exists a price p′ ∈ (pˇ, pm] for which s(p′) = {D(p′)}. In the proof of Lemma
4.3.2, it is shown that for any p ∈ [pˇ, pm], it holds for all q > D(p) that q ∉
s(p). Therefore, given that all n−1 rivals stick to their equilibrium strategy,
firm i’s profit of choosing (p,q) ∈ supp(µ), is as follows. The expected residual
demand of firm i, when m ≥ 1 firms price below, l firms price at the same
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price and n−m− l−1 price above the price of firm i, is given by
A((p,q),µ−i) =
( n−1∑
m=1
n−1−m∑
l=0
∫
([ pˇ,p)×[0,D(c)])m×({p}×[0,D(c)])l
min{q,
q∑
j∈Ω(p) q j
(D(p)−
∑
k∈∆(p)
qk)
+}d(
m+l∏
j=1
µ(p j,q j))
×
(n−1)!
(n−1−m)!m!
×
(n−1−m)!
(n−1−m− l)!l!
)
× (µp((p, pˆ]))
n−m−l−1.
The expected residual demand of firm i, when l ≥ 1 firms price at the same
price and n− l−1 firms price above the price of firm i, is given by
B((p,q),µ−i) =
(n−1∑
l=1
∫
({p}×[0,D(c)]l
min{q,
q∑
j∈Ω(p) q j
D(p)}d(
l∏
j=1
µ(p j,q j))
×
(n−1)!
(n−1− l)!l!
)
× (µp((p, pˆ]))
n−l−1.
Therefore, firm i’s expected profit of choosing (p,q) ∈ supp(µ) is
πi((p,q),µ−i) = p×A((p,q),µ−i)+ p×B((p,q),µ−i) (4.9)
+pq(µp((p, pˆ]))
n−1
− cq.
Both A((p,q),µ−i) and B((p,q),µ−i) are increasing in q for q≤D(p). Hence,
πi((p,q),µ−i) is strictly increasing in q when p(µp((p, pˆ]))
n−1− c> 0.
Since there are at most countably many atoms in µp, pˇ > c and µp({pˇ}) = 0
(Lemma 4.3.2), there exists a p′ ∈ (pˇ, pm] such that p(µp((p, pˆ]))
n−1− c > 0
for all p ∈ (pˇ, p′] and s(p′) 6= ;. We now show that s(p)= {D(p)} or s(p)=; for
all p ∈ (pˇ, p′]. Assume p ∈ (pˇ, p′], q ∈ s(p) and q<D(p). Define Bε(p,q) as the
open ε-ball centered at (p,q) and let ε> 0 be small enough, such that for all
(pi,qi) ∈Bε(p,q) it holds that qi <D(pi), pi(µp((pi, pˆ]))
n−1−c> 0 and pi > pˇ.
Let (p˜, q˜) be an arbitrary element in Bε(p,q). Then, since the profit of firm i
is increasing in q for q≤D(p), firm i strictly improves its profits by choosing
(p˜,D(p˜)). Therefore, for any (p˜, q˜) ∈ Bε(p,q) there is another combination
of price and quantity that will give a strictly higher payoff and therefore
q ∉ s(p). In the proof of Lemma 4.3.2, it is shown that for all q ∈ s(p) it holds
that q ≤ D(p). This gives s(p) = {D(p)} or s(p) = ; for all p ∈ (pˇ, p′]. Since
s(p′) 6= ;, it holds that s(p′)= {D(p′)}.
Now suppose that µp has an atom at some price p ∈ (pˇ, p
′]. The measure
µp has at most countably many atoms, which implies that there exists a
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small enough δ> 0 such that p−δ> pˇ, µp({p−δ})= 0 and
πi((p−δ,D(p−δ)),µ−i) = (p−δ)D(p−δ)µp((p−δ, pˆ]))
n−1
− cD(p−δ)
≥ (p−δ)D(p−δ)µp([p, pˆ]))
n−1
− cD(p−δ)
> pD(p)
(n−1∑
l=0
1
n− l
µp({p})
n−1−lµ((p, pˆ])l ×
(n−1)!
(n−1− l)!l!
)
− cD(p)
= πi((p,D(p)),µ−i).
In the third line, l represents the number of firms that price at the same
level as firm i. Since there is an atom at p, the probability of l being strictly
positive is strictly bigger than 0, hence the inequality before the third line.
Consequently, µp cannot have an atom at any price p ∈ (pˇ, p
′].
Finally, we show that s(p)= {D(p)} for all p ∈ (pˇ, p′]. Assume that s(p)=
; for all p in some interval (α,β)⊆ (pˇ, p′). This implies that, for p ∈ (α,β),
πi((p,D(p)),µ−i) = pD(p)(µp([β, pˆ]))
n−1
− cD(p).
It follows from β ≤ pm and D′(p)(p− c)+D(p) > 0 for all p ∈ (α,β), that
πi((p,D(p)),µ−i) is strictly increasing for all p ∈ (α,β).
Now, the maximum profit that a firm can make in any point in an open ε-
ball centered at (α,D(α)) is strictly smaller than (α+ε)D(α+ε)µp((α−ε, pˇ])−
cD(α+ε). Since πi((p,D(p)),µ−i) is strictly increasing for all p ∈ (α,β) and
µp does not have an atom at any price p ∈ (pˇ, p
′], as ε→ 0, there always
exists γ ∈ (α,β) such that
πi((γ,D(γ)),µ−i)> (α+ε)D(α+ε)µp((α−ε, pˇ])− cD(α+ε).
That is, there always exists a price-quantity combination (γ,D(γ)) that gives
a strictly higher profit than any point in Bε(α,D(α)). This contradicts (α,D(α)) ∈
supp(µ). Thus, we conclude that s(p)= {D(p)} for all p ∈ (pˇ, p′]. ä
Proof of Theorem 4.3.4. Suppose pˇ > c and let pu = sup{p′ ∈ [pˇ, pm] |
∀p ∈ [pˇ, p′) : s(p)= {D(p)} and µp({p})= 0}. From Lemma 4.3.3 it follows that
pu > pˇ. Moreover, since the support of a measure is closed, D(pu) ∈ s(pu).
Since µp({p}) = 0 for all p ∈ [pˇ, p
u), it follows directly from the proof of
Lemma 4.3.3 that π∗ =D(p)[p(µp((p, pˆ]))
n−1− c] for all p ∈ [pˇ, pu). As π∗ ≥ 0,
it follows that
pu(µp([p
u, pˆ]))n−1− c = lim
p↑pu
p(µp((p, pˆ]))
n−1
− c
≥ 0.
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Hence, there are two possibilities. Either pu(µp([p
u, pˆ]))n−1−c= 0 or pu(µp([p
u, pˆ]))n−1−
c> 0.
Suppose that pu(µp([p
u, pˆ]))n−1− c= 0. Then it follows from µ({p})= 0 for all
p ∈ [pˇ, pu) that
π∗ = lim
p↑pu
D(p)[p(µp((p, pˆ]))
n−1
− c]
= D(pu)[pu(µp([p
u, pˆ]))n−1− c]
= 0.
This implies that p(µp((p, pˆ]))
n−1− c = 0 for all p ∈ [pˇ, pu). Since µ({pˇ}) = 0,
it follows that (µp((pˇ, pˆ]))
n−1 = 1 and therefore pˇ= c.
Now suppose that pu(µp([p
u, pˆ]))n−1 − c > 0. If this is the case, it must
hold that µp({p
u}) > 0. Suppose the contrary, i.e. µp({p
u}) = 0. Then there
exists a p˜ > pu for which it holds that p˜(µp((p˜, pˆ]))
n−1 − c > 0. From the
proof of Lemma 4.3.3 it follows that s(p) = {D(p)} and µp({p}) = 0 for all
p ∈ [pˇ, p˜). This contradicts the definition of pu. Hence, µp({p
u}) > 0. Given
that µp({p
u})> 0, for every q<D(pu), there exists a δ> 0 such that
πi((p
u,q),µ−i) ≤ q[p
u(µp([p
u, pˆ]))n−1− c]
< D(pu−δ)[(pu−δ)(µp((p
u
−δ, pˆ]))n−1− c]
= πi((p
u
−δ,D(pu−δ)),µ−i)
= π∗.
The first inequality follows since firm i sells at most q. Since q<D(pu) and
limp↑pu D(p)[p(µp((p, pˆ]))
n−1− c] = D(pu)[pu(µp([p
u, pˆ]))n−1− c], the second
inequality is strict for a small enough δ.
Now, for q=D(pu) it holds for all 0< δ≤ pu− pˇ that
πi((p
u,D(pu)),µ−i) < D(p
u)[pu(µp([p
u, pˆ]))n−1− c]
= lim
p↑pu
D(p)[p(µp((p, pˆ]))
n−1
− c]
= D(pu−δ)[(pu−δ)(µp((p
u
−δ, pˆ]))n−1− c]
= π∗.
Since there is an atom at pu, firm i expects to sell strictly less than D(pu)
when it sets a price of pu. Hence, the first inequality is strict and the equal-
ities follow immediately.
So, given that µp({p
u}) > 0, for any combination (pu,q) there exists a δ > 0
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such that it holds that (pu−δ,D(pu−δ)) gives a strictly higher payoff. There-
fore, this second situation cannot occur. Thus, we conclude that pˇ = c and
π∗ = 0. ä
Proof of Lemma 4.5.1. As we consider a price cartel, firms are free in
choosing their production levels. Therefore, it is sufficient to analyze the
impact of output decisions on per-period profits. Given a fixed cartel price
pc ∈ (c, pm], per-period profit for every firm i ∈N is
πci (p
c,q)= pcD i(p
c,q)− cqi,
where firm demand is given by
D i(p
c,q)=
{
qi if
∑
j∈N q j ≤D(p
c)
qi∑
j∈N q j
D(pc) if
∑
j∈N q j >D(p
c).
The following first-order condition specifies the impact of a change in the
level of individual production on per-period profit.
dπc
i
(pc,q)
dqi
=


pc− c if qi ≤D(p
c)−
∑
j∈N\{i} q j
pc
∑
j∈N\{i} q j
(
∑
j∈N q j)
2 D(p
c)− c if qi >D(p
c)−
∑
j∈N\{i} q j.
Hence, as pc > c, the profit of firm i is increasing in its production level
as long as qi ≤ D(p
c)−
∑
j∈N\{i} q j. Yet, profits may increase even more for
output levels that make aggregate supply exceed market demand. This re-
quires
pc
∑
j∈N\{i} q j
(
∑
j∈N q j)
2
D(pc)− c≥ 0,
or
qi ≤
√
pcD(pc)(
∑
j∈N\{i} q j)
c
−
∑
j∈N\{i}
q j.
Therefore, this case applies when there exists a production level qi for which
the following condition is satisfied
D(pc)−
∑
j∈N\{i}
q j < qi ≤
√
pcD(pc)(
∑
j∈N\{i} q j)
c
−
∑
j∈N\{i}
q j.
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This is possible if and only if
∑
j∈N\{i}
q j >
D(pc)c
pc
.
Thus, we can conclude that q∗
i
(pc,q−i) = D(p
c)−
∑
j∈N\{i} q j if
∑
j∈N\{i} q j ≤
D(pc)c
pc
. Moreover, if
∑
j∈N\{i} q j >
D(pc)c
pc
, then q∗
i
(pc,q−i)=
√
pcD(pc)(
∑
j∈N\{i} q j)
c
−∑
j∈N\{i} q j provided that this yields more profit than with zero production.
Producing nothing is strictly preferred when the following two equations
hold simultaneously:
D(pc)−
∑
j∈N\{i}
q j < 0, (4.10)
and
pc
∑
j∈N\{i} q j
(
∑
j∈N q j)
2
D(pc)− c< 0. (4.11)
If qi = 0, then
∑
j∈N q j =
∑
j∈N\{i} q j. Substituting in (4.11) and rearranging
gives ∑
j∈N\{i}
q j >
D(pc)pc
c
. (4.12)
Notice that (4.12) implies (4.10). Hence, (4.12) is a sufficient condition under
which firm i finds it optimal to produce nothing. We therefore conclude that
q∗
i
(pc,q−i) =
√
pcD(pc)(
∑
j∈N\{i} q j)
c
−
∑
j∈N\{i} q j if
D(pc)c
pc
<
∑
j∈N\{i} q j ≤
D(pc)pc
c
and q∗
i
(pc,q−i)= 0 if
∑
j∈N\{i} q j >
D(pc)pc
c
. ä
Proof of Lemma 4.5.2. Let m=
∑
k∈N\{v,w} qk. Hence,
q∗v =
√
pcD(pc)(m+ q∗w)
c
− (m+ q∗w),
and
q∗w =
√
pcD(pc)(m+ q∗v )
c
− (m+ q∗v ).
Substituting q∗w in q
∗
v yields
4q∗2v + (4m−
pcD(pc)
c
)q∗v −m(
pcD(pc)
c
−m)= 0.
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Solving for q∗v gives
q∗v =
−(4m−
pcD(pc )
c
)±
√
pcD(pc )
c
(8m+
pcD(pc )
c
)
8
.
There is a unique solution for which q∗v > 0. As we have a similar expression
for q∗w, we conclude q
∗
v = q
∗
w. ä
Proof of Theorem 4.5.3. For a given cartel price pc, a cartel contract
(pc,q) is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium when none of the firms has
an incentive to change its production level given the output of rivals. There
are two possibilities. For all i ∈ N, either (i)
∑
j∈N\{i} q j ≤ D(p
c)c/pc, or (ii)
D(pc)c/pc <
∑
j∈N\{i} q j ≤D(p
c)pc/c.
(i) By Lemma 4.5.1, it holds that q∗
i
(pc,q−i) = D(p
c)−
∑
j∈N\{i} q j for all
i ∈ N. As D(pc)−
∑
j∈N\{i} q j ≥ D(p
c)−
D(pc)c
pc
, it follows that q∗
i
(pc,q−i) ≥
pc−c
pc
D(pc).
In turn, this implies
n
pc− c
pc
D(pc)≤D(pc).
Rearranging gives
pc ≤
cn
n−1
.
(ii) By Lemma 4.5.1, it holds that q∗
i
(pc,q−i)=
√
pcD(pc)(
∑
j∈N\{i} q j)
c
−
∑
j∈N\{i} q j
for all i ∈ N. In this case, we know by Lemma 4.5.2 that all firms produce
the same quantity. Therefore,
q∗i (p
c,q−i)=
√
pcD(pc)(
∑
j∈N\{i} q j)
c
−
∑
j∈N\{i}
q j =
√
pcD(pc)(n−1)q∗
i
(pc,q−i)
c
−(n−1)q∗i (p
c,q−i).
Rearranging gives
q∗i (p
c,q−i)=
pcD(pc)(n−1)
cn2
.
AsD(pc)c/pc <
∑
j∈N\{i} q j, it follows that (n−1)q
∗
i
=
pc(n−1)2D(pc)
cn2
>D(pc)c/pc.
Rearranging gives
pc >
cn
n−1
.
Finally, it should also hold that (n−1)q∗
i
≤D(pc)pc/c, which is true as (n−1)
2
n2
<
1. ä
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Proof of Theorem 4.5.6. If pm ≤ cn
n−1
, then pc ≤ cn
n−1
. By Theorem 4.5.3,
q∗
i
=D(pc)−
∑
j∈N/i q
∗
j
. In this case, the incentive compatibility constraint is
given by
δ≥ δ∗i = 1−
q∗
i∑
j∈N q
∗
j
, for all i ∈N.
Hence, the critical discount factor is highest for the firm(s) with the lowest
level of sales. Clearly, if δ ≥ δ∗
i
for all i ∈ N, then there exists both a viable
price cartel and a price-quota cartel. If 1− 1
n
≤ δ < 1−
q∗
i∑
j∈N q
∗
j
for some firm
i ∈ N, then a price cartel is not viable. In this case, the cartel is only viable
when a sufficiently large share of market demand is allocated to the smallest
cartel member(s). There exists an allocation of sales for which the price-
quota cartel is viable, because δ≥ 1− 1
n
. ä
Proof of Theorem 4.5.7. If pm > cn
n−1
, then pc < pm and q∗
i
=
(n−1)pcD(pc)
cn2
for all i ∈ N. Moreover,
∑
i∈N q
∗
i
≥D(pc). The collusive value of every mem-
ber of a price cartel is then given by Vi(p
c,q∗)=
q∗
i∑
i∈N q
∗
i
(pcD(pc)−c
∑
i∈N q
∗
i
)
1−δ
. Clearly,
keeping the cartel price and market shares fixed, eliminating all excess sup-
ply increases the collusive value of every member. This would yield a situ-
ation in which all firms produce
D(pc)
n
and the market clears. In this case,
firms optimally set the monopoly price, which is sustainable as δ≥ 1− 1
n
by
assumption. ä
Proof of Theorem 4.6.1. See proof of Theorem 4.5.6. ä
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Dat de schaarste van een product of dienst van invloed is op de marktprijs
van dat specifieke goed, kan als algemeen bekend verondersteld worden.
De beschikbaarheid van een goed is van verschillende factoren afhankelijk.
Ten eerste zijn de grondstoffen die gebruikt worden om het goed te produ-
ceren en de beschikbaarheid van deze grondstoffen van belang. Daarnaast
is er de tijd die het kost om van deze grondstoffen het uiteindelijke product
te maken. Dit wordt onder andere beïnvloed door de benodigde arbeid, de
stappen in het productieproces en de benodigde machines en kapitaal voor
bewerking. De laatste factor van invloed is het aantal schakels in het lever-
ingsproces voordat het product binnen handbereik van de consument is.
In dit proefschrift worden de strategische keuzes van de bedrijven in
de laatste schakel geanalyseerd, de bedrijven die het product rechtstreeks
aan de consument leveren. Deze bedrijven zijn in verschillende typen mark-
ten en sectoren actief. De overeenkomst tussen de bedrijven is dat ze alle-
maal beperkt zijn in de hoeveelheid goederen die ter plekke kunnen wor-
den geleverd in een bepaalde periode. Daarnaast moeten productie/inkoop
beslissingen van te voren worden genomen. Alle bedrijven hebben als doel
hun winst te maximaliseren. Wanneer bedrijven met elkaar in concurrentie
zijn, is de winst van een bedrijf mede afhankelijk van de strategieën van
concurrenten. In dit geval tracht elk bedrijf zijn winst te maximimaliseren,
gegéven de strategieën van zijn concurrenten. Als tegelijkertijd voor alle be-
drijven geldt dat ze een strategie hanteren die - gegeven de strategieën van
concurrenten - de winst maximaliseert, spreken we van een evenwicht. De
technieken die worden gebruikt om het gedrag van de bedrijven te analy-
seren, zijn onder andere afkomstig uit de speltheorie en de systeemtheorie.
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In Hoofdstuk 2 analyseren we het strategisch gedrag van twee bedrij-
ven, die hetzelfde (homogene) goed verkopen. De inkoop/productie beslis-
sing is al voor aanvang van het spel genomen en kan dus niet meer wor-
den aangepast. De bedrijven concurreren een beperkt aantal perioden met
elkaar via de verkoop van dit product - in onze analyse is dit twee perio-
den - waarna de vraag naar het product acuut stopt. Elke periode maken
de bedrijven de keuze hoeveel van hun voorraad ze gaan verkopen, wetende
dat alles wat ze nu verkopen niet meer tot hun beschikking staat in de vol-
gende periode. Een voorbeeld van dit type concurrentie kan worden gevon-
den bij handelaren in toegangskaarten voor een (uitverkochte) wedstrijd of
concert. Nadat de wedstrijd of het concert heeft plaatsgevonden, zijn de toe-
gangskaarten waardeloos. Tot die tijd kan de handelaar elke dag beslissen
hoeveel van de toegangskaarten hij verkoopt en tegen welke prijs. Hierbij
kan de handelaar zijn concurrentie niet uit het oog verliezen. Het aanbod
van de concurrent bepaalt mede de vraag voor zijn toegangskaarten, nu en
in de toekomst. Andere voorbeelden zijn de verkoop van zitplaatsen op een
vlucht, hotelkamers, limited edition goederen en modieuze goederen.
Zoals reeds genoemd in het voorbeeld, dient het bedrijf bij het nemen
van zijn verkoopbeslissing niet alleen rekening te houden met hoe dit zijn
toekomstige voorraad en verkoopmogelijkheden beïnvloedt, maar ook met
de verkoopbeslissing van zijn concurrent en de invloed van beide beslissin-
gen op toekomstige verkoop. Het bedrijf kan zich committeren aan zijn
verkoopbeslissing, dat wil zeggen, het bepaalt voor aanvang van het spel
welk deel van de voorraad het in elke specifieke periode gaat verkopen en
wijkt daar niet vanaf. Of het legt zich niet vast en laat elke periode de
verkoopbeslissing afhangen van zijn resterende voorraad en van wat het
inmiddels heeft geleerd over de strategie van de concurrent. Beide situ-
aties analyseren we, de situatie waarin beide bedrijven committeren en de
situatie waarin geen van beiden dat doet. Wanneer beide bedrijven zich
committeren aan hun verkoopstrategie blijkt dat er altijd een uniek zuiver
evenwicht bestaat waarvoor geldt dat de prijs voor het product stijgt in de
tijd. Daarnaast blijkt dat, wanneer het verschil in beginvoorraad tussen
de twee bedrijven toeneemt, het consumenten surplus en het totale surplus
afnemen. In de tweede situatie, wanneer beide bedrijven zich niet commit-
teren aan hun verkoopbeslissing, bestaat er niet altijd een zuiver evenwicht.
Als er in deze situatie wel een zuiver evenwicht bestaat, dan hangt het van
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de beginvoorraden van beide bedrijven af of de prijs voor het product stijgt
of daalt in de tijd.
In Hoofdstuk 3 analyseren we de situatie van een monopolist die zijn
winst, verkregen uit de verkoop van een product, over de tijd wil maxi-
maliseren. De monopolist koopt zijn voorraden (of een belangrijk onderdeel
noodzakelijk voor de productie van het goed) in bij een groothandel, die
het product of onderdeel alleen in grote partijen verkoopt. De monopolist
bepaalt zelf wanneer hij bijbestelt en welke prijs hij vraagt voor het product.
De prijs van het goed kan elk moment worden aangepast. Voorbeelden van
dit type monopolie zijn te vinden bij bedrijven die specialistische goederen
verkopen. Daarbij kan onder andere worden gedacht aan een webwinkel die
cd’s verkoopt met daarop niet-commerciële muziek.
We nemen aan dat het bedrijf zo vaak kan bij bestellen als het wil en
een vaste prijs betaalt voor het bij te bestellen product. De vraag van de
consument naar het product blijft constant over de tijd. Onderzocht is wat
het beste bestelmoment is en hoe de monopolist zijn winst tussen bestel-
momenten maximaliseert. We vinden dat de monopolist altijd na een vaste
tijd bij bestelt. De nieuwe voorraad arriveert zodra de oude voorraad op
is. Meteen na het arriveren van de nieuwe voorraad is de prijs van het
product het laagst, ergo, het bedrijf verkoopt het meest. De prijs van het
product neemt continu toe over de tijd. Dit verkooppatroon herhaalt zich
telkens tussen twee opeenvolgende bestelmomenten. Wanneer toekomstige
winsten minder waardevol worden zal in sommige gevallen, in tegenstelling
tot wat men misschien verwacht, de tijd tussen twee opeenvolgende bestel-
momenten toenemen.
In het laatste hoofdstuk, Hoofdstuk 4, analyseren we het strategische
gedrag van een aantal bedrijven dat concurreert over de verkoop van het-
zelfde product. Iedere periode beslist elk bedrijf hoeveel het inkoopt/ produ-
ceert van het goed en welke prijs het vraagt voor de verkoop van het betref-
fende goed. Het goed is beperkt houdbaar, dat wil zeggen, een overgebleven
voorraad kan niet mee worden genomen naar de volgende periode. We be-
kijken twee mogelijke situaties, één waar de bedrijven hun inkoop/productie
beslissing nemen vóórdat en één waarin bedrijven pas produceren/inkopen
nádat hun indivuele vraag bekend is. Voorbeelden van dit specifieke type
concurrentie kunnen worden gevonden in de voedselindustrie, maar zijn ook
van toepassing op andere industrieën.
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We vinden dat in concurrentie, ongeacht de productie situatie, alle be-
drijven een verwachte winst van nul hebben. Om de winst te verhogen,
kunnen de bedrijven besluiten afspraken te maken over prijs en/of produc-
tie/verkoop hoeveelheden. Doorgaans zijn deze afspraken echter illegaal.
Een prijs-hoeveelheidsafspraak biedt meer mogelijkheden voor collusie dan
een prijsafspraak alleen, maar vereist ook meer coördinatie tussen bedrijven
en daarbij de kans om betrapt te worden. Daarom zullen bedrijven alleen
bereid zijn om naast een afspraak op prijs ook een hoeveelheidsafspraak te
maken, als dit een strict hogere verwachte winst oplevert. In het geval dat
de bedrijven van te voren hun productie/verkoop beslissing moeten nemen,
vinden we de volgende resultaten. Wanneer de vraag relatief elastisch is,
is een prijsafspraak alleen niet altijd mogelijk. Om coördinatie en intentie
problemen op te lossen, kan een extra afspraak op hoeveelheid noodzakelijk
zijn. Wanneer de consumentenvraag relatief inelastisch is, is een hoeveel-
heidsafspraak niet nodig om coördinatie en intentie problemen te verhelpen.
De enige redenen om, naast prijs, een afspraak op hoeveelheid te maken is
de mogelijkheid om een hogere prijs te kunnen vragen en tegelijkertijd over-
productie te voorkomen. Wanneer bedrijven pas hun inkoop/productie be-
slissing hoeven te nemen nadat hun individuele vraag bekend is, blijkt dat
soms een afspraak op hoeveelheid, naast een prijsafspraak, noodzakelijk is
om samenwerking mogelijk te maken.
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